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Abstract 
 
Ethical Foreign Policy? 
A Study of U.S. Humanitarian Interventions in the 1990s 
 
Chih-Hann Chang 
 
 
This research is situated within the introduction of a strong ethical dimension into 
foreign policy-making in the study of international relations in the post-Cold War era. 
While the 1990s gave rise to a wealth of literature on the notion of ethical foreign 
policy, it has tended to simply focus on a version of realism, which overlooks the role 
of ethics in international affairs, lacking an empirical analysis of foreign policy 
decision-making, with relation to ethical values in the post-Cold War period. The 
purpose of this thesis is to address this gap in the literature by exploring ethical 
realism as a theoretical framework and, in particular, by looking at US humanitarian 
interventions in the 1990s at an empirical level to analyse an ethical foreign policy in 
practice.  
 
This study analyses the concepts of ethical realism and responsible power. The 
application of ethical realism to the conduct of international affairs involves the 
assertion that powerful states should have responsibilities and exercise leadership 
with ethical obligations. This research looks at the foreign policy of the United States 
and its experiences of dealing with humanitarian interventions during the Clinton 
administration, focusing on Bosnia and Kosovo, to see whether the United States 
could thus effectively promote liberal values and make a commitment to moral goals, 
rather than simply follow considerations of national security against the background 
of the end of the Cold War.    
 
This thesis argues that the United States, as the only world’s superpower, should not 
only pursue national interests but also shoulder the responsibility of power. However, 
as the world still divides itself into separate sovereign states, statespeople are 
primarily responsible and accountable for their own citizens and national survival. 
Therefore, a foreign policy with an ethical dimension needs to be conducted in a 
pragmatic way.  
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Chapter 1. 
Introduction 
 
The possibility of introducing ethics and values into international relations emerged 
strongly in the post-Cold War era. The 1990s gave rise to a wealth of literature on the 
notion of ethical foreign policy in the field of international relations.1 Much recent 
discussion has focused on the shift from the pursuit of national interests to the 
emphasis on moral responsibility to protect the rights and interests of others in 
foreign policy.2 In particular, the end of the Cold War led to religious and ethnic 
conflicts in several parts of the world. This soon raised the questions: “Where a 
government engages in genocide against a minority in its territory, what ought we to 
do about it?” and, “May we use force of arms to stop human rights abuses in other 
states?”3 It then raised the debate over whether a state should send its troops to save 
strangers in distant lands. 4  Humanitarian intervention thus became a heatedly 
debated issue amongst international relations scholars in the post-Cold War period.  
 
The idea of a foreign policy with an ethical dimension challenged the traditional 
understanding of foreign policy from the classical realist point of view - that 
governmental action should be determined by national interest. While the literature 
on this has provided critical analyses, it has tended to simply focus on a version of 
realism, which overlooks the role of ethics in international affairs,5 lacking empirical 
analysis of foreign policy decision-making, with relation to ethical values in the 
post-Cold War period. This research aims to address this gap in the literature, by 
exploring ethical realism as a theoretical framework and, in particular, by looking at 
                                                 
1 See e.g. Karen E. Smith and Margot Light (eds.), Ethics and Foreign Policy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001); David B. MacDonald, Robert G. Patman, and Betty Mason-Parker, 
The Ethics of Foreign Policy (London: Ashgate, 2007); David Chandler and Volker Heins (eds.), 
Rethinking Ethical Foreign Policy: pitfalls, possibilities and paradoxes (London: Routledge, 2007); 
Robert W. McElroy, Morality and American Foreign Policy: The Role of Ethics in International 
Affairs (Princeton; New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1992); Michael Cromartie (ed.), Might 
and Right after the Cold War: Can Foreign Policy Be Moral? (Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1993). 
2 See e.g. Robert Cooper, Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First Century 
(London: Atlantic Books, 2003); Ken Booth, ‘Human Wrongs and International Relations’, 
International Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 1 (1995), pp. 103-126; Robert Jackson, The Global Covenant: 
Human Conduct in a World of States (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Hedley Bull, The 
Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, 3rd edition (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002); 
Joseph S. Nye, The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go It Alone 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 
2001). 
3 Mervyn Frost, Ethics in International Relations: A Constitutive Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), p. 2. 
4 See e.g. Nicholas J. Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Interventions in International Society 
(Oxford: Oxford University press, 2000). 
5 See e.g. Joel H. Rosenthal, Righteous Realists: Political Realism, Responsible Power, and American 
Culture in the Nuclear Age (Baton Rouge and London: Louisiana State University Press, 1991). 
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US humanitarian interventions in the 1990s at an empirical level to analyze an ethical 
foreign policy in practice. The following section will further demonstrate the 
objectives of the study; the research methodology; the contribution of the research, 
and the structure of the study. 
 
1.1 The Objectives of the Study 
There are three objectives of this study. Firstly, it will explore ethical realism and the 
concept of responsible power. It is important to note that ethical realists criticize 
idealists’ conceptions of utopianism, but not of morality.6 They propose the idea of 
responsible power as an opportunity for balancing the tension between ethics and 
politics. The concept of responsible power comes from the work of Max Weber. In 
his classic essay ‘Politics as a Vocation’, Weber outlined the central problem of 
political ethics and proposed the idea of the ethics of responsibility, attempting to 
balance the tension between ethics and politics.7 The application of ethical realism 
to the conducting of international affairs involves the assertion that powerful states 
should have responsibilities and exercise leadership with ethical obligations. This 
seems particularly useful as a guiding philosophy for the United States and its role as 
the only superpower in the aftermath of the Cold War.  
 
Thus, the second objective of this research will be to look at the foreign policies of 
the United States and its experiences of dealing with humanitarian interventions 
during the Clinton administration. There are two reasons that US humanitarian 
interventions in the 1990s provide an ideal arena to study the notion of ethical 
foreign policy in practice. The first is that following the collapse of the bipolar world 
in the 1990s, the role of America’s power has been essential. In Stephen Walt’s 
description, the United States was in a position of “unprecedented preponderance”.8 
The United States witnessed the mobilization of a wide diversity of opinion among 
well-informed students of foreign relations regarding America’s proper international 
role in the post-Cold War era.9 In addition, the world’s only superpower had to set 
out new strategies to replace the obsolete containment policy that had guided 
                                                 
6 Alastair J.H. Murray, Reconstructing Realism: Between power politics and cosmopolitan ethics 
(Edinburgh: Keele University Press, 1997); Anatol Lieven, and John Hulsman, Ethical Realism: A 
Vision for America’s Role in the World (New York: Pantheon Books, 2006); Anatol Lieven, and John 
Hulsman, ‘Ethical Realism and Contemporary Challenges’, American Foreign Policy Interests, Vol. 
28, No. 6 (December 2006), pp. 413-420. 
7 Max Weber, ‘Politics as a Vocation’, in H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds.), From Max Weber: 
Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958). 
8 Stephen M. Walt, ‘Two Cheers for Clinton’s Foreign Policy’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 2 
(March/April 2000), p. 64. 
9 Cecil V. Crabb, Leila S. Sarieddine, and Glenn J. Antizzjo, Charting A New Diplomatic Course: 
Alternative Approaches to America’s Post-Cold War Foreign Policy (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 2001). 
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America’s diplomatic behaviour for almost half a century. Therefore, the 
development of how the United States sought an alternative strategy and redefined its 
role in the new era is highly worthy of examination.  
 
The second reason is that the period of the 1990s witnessed several humanitarian 
crises, such as starvation in Somalia, genocide in Rwanda, a refugee crisis in Haiti, 
and ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and Kosovo. With the United States as the leader of 
the free world and Bill Clinton as its first genuinely post-Cold War president, it is 
important to explore the development of Clinton’s foreign policy on humanitarian 
interventions in order to examine the relationship between ethics and foreign policy. 
This is also important in order to see whether the United States could effectively 
promote liberal values, and make a commitment to moral goals in its foreign policy, 
rather than simply follow considerations of national security against the background 
of the end of the Cold War.    
 
The criteria to underpin American engagement and the questions such as under what 
kind of circumstances the United States should intervene in the case of humanitarian 
crises beyond its borders, and how to intervene, militarily or diplomatically, 
dominated Clinton’s foreign policy agenda. This leads to the final objective of this 
study, which will be to provide an in-depth examination of the experiences of dealing 
with humanitarian interventions in Bosnia (in Clinton’s first administration) and 
Kosovo (in his second term). The collapse of communism and the end of the Cold 
War made the Balkans lose its strategic importance in the eyes of most Western 
policy-makers.10 Therefore, it is important to study how and under what conditions 
the United States decided to intervene.  
 
1.2 Methodology 
The means of achieving these objectives outlined above will be through qualitative 
research, including content analysis, case studies, and elite interviews. The two case 
studies on the Balkans will provide a “levels of analysis” framework for 
understanding Clinton’s foreign policy decision-making process, covering the 
spectrum from the individual psychology of decision-makers (the individual level) to 
the role played by American domestic factors such as the power of Congress, public 
opinion, and the media (the national level) and to the changing international system 
in post-Cold War conditions (the global system level).11 
 
                                                 
10 Richard Holbrooke, To End a War (New York: Random House, 1998), pp. 24-33. 
11 Robert Jackson and Georg Sørensen, ‘Foreign Policy’, Introduction to International Relations: 
Theories and Approaches, 4th edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 226-239. 
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Primary research draws on government publications, including public speeches, 
statements, press briefings, and Congressional testimony, available online at the GPO 
(Government Printing Office) Access (http://www.gpo.gov/) and the William J. 
Clinton Presidential Library (http://www.clintonlibrary.gov/). Foreign policy 
dispatches are also available online US Department of State’s Electronic Research 
Collection (http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/index.html). Other sources of data were 
collected during three months of archival and official documentary research and 
semi-structured interviews in Washington, D.C. As official documents with regard to 
humanitarian interventions policy during the 1990s has not been declassified, this 
research was conducted by interviewing relevant scholars and former Clinton foreign 
policy staff now resident in Washington universities or think tanks to understand the 
motivations for interventions. Interviewees included: Victor Jackovich who was US 
Ambassador to Bosnia in 1992-95; Daniel P. Serwer who was the US special envoy 
and coordinator for the Bosnian Federation from 1994 to 1996 (he also negotiated the 
first agreement reached at the Dayton peace talks); Charles A. Kupchan who was 
Director for European Affairs at National Security Council in 1993-94; James 
Goldgeier who was a Council on Foreign Relations international affairs fellow 
serving at the State Department and on the National Security Council staff in 
1995-96; Gary Schmitt who was a consultant to the US Department of Defense in 
1992-93 and Executive Director of the neo-conservative Project for the New 
American Century in 1997-2005; Tomicah Tillemann who is professional staff 
member (specializes on the Balkans) of US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations; 
Donald McHenry who was US Ambassador to the United Nations from 1979 to 1981; 
Janusz Bugajski who is Director of the New European Democracies Project and 
senior fellow in the Europe Program at the Center for Strategic & International 
Studies; John Sitilides who is the Chairman, Board of Advisors, Southeast Europe 
Project at Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Other important 
sources for the research included foreign policy-makers’ memoirs and publications, 
academic journal articles, newspapers, magazines, and books. 
 
1.3 The Contribution of the Study 
This research aims to make a contribution to developing a deeper understanding of 
ethical foreign policy in theory and practice by means of providing an in-depth study 
of ethical realism and examining US humanitarian interventions in the 1990s. Ethical 
realism proposes the idea of responsible power as an opportunity for balancing the 
tension between ethics and foreign policy and concentrating on achievable results 
rather than good intentions. This work addresses concepts of moral leadership and 
pragmatic foreign policy in the field of international relations in general and foreign 
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policy analysis in particular.  
 
It suggests that the United States, as the only world’s superpower, should not only 
pursue national interests, but should also shoulder the responsibility of power and 
demonstrate moral leadership; especially if the United States intends to keep its 
position of power in international politics. Actions that pursue narrow self-interest 
tend to lead to ethical failures of leadership. Besides, the maintenance of 
international order demands that powerful states have responsibilities and exercise 
leadership with ethical obligations; and a peaceful international society will help to 
consolidate the leading status of powerful states and enhance their security and 
prosperity.  
 
On the other hand, despite its role as a superpower, America’s superiority and 
strength are limited by its amount of resources. Moreover, as the world still divides 
itself into different sovereign states, statespeople12 are primarily responsible and 
accountable for their own citizens and for national survival. Therefore, it could be 
concluded that an ethical foreign policy is not an abstract moral conception; instead, 
it has to be based on a prudent calculation, “given the facts of international 
competition and human nature”.13 As a result, a foreign policy with an ethical 
dimension should be conducted in a selective and pragmatic way. This study thus 
bridges a link between the academic study of foreign policy and real-world foreign 
policy-making.  
 
1.4 The Organization of the Study 
This thesis consists of seven chapters. This first chapter provides the introduction, 
including a demonstration of the aims and objectives, methodology, contribution, and 
organization of this research. The second chapter provides an evaluation of the 
relevant literature in order to explore the debate over ethical foreign policy in the 
aftermath of the Cold War and highlight research questions. The third chapter 
explores ethical realism and the idea of responsible power, and links these concepts 
to understand the essence of US foreign policy. This provides the theoretical 
framework where this study will be lodged. The fourth chapter discusses options for 
post-Cold War US foreign policy, reviews Clinton’s diplomacy, and briefly examines 
the experiences of the Clinton administration in dealing with humanitarian 
                                                 
12 “Statespeople”, according to Robert Jackson, “are the organizers and managers who attend the 
ordering and operating of the states system”. See Robert Jackson, The Global Covenant: Human 
Conduct in a World of States (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 34. 
13 Michael J. Smith, Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger (Bato Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1986), p. 9. 
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interventions in Somalia and Haiti. That chapter aims to demonstrate the nature of 
Clinton’s foreign policy in the post-Cold War international environment.  
 
The fifth chapter will examine the Clinton’s administration’s intervention in Bosnia. 
It first divides the policy decision-making process into three stages and then explains 
the administration’s decisions for intervention. The sixth chapter provides an 
in-depth analysis of the Clinton White House’s intervention in another case, Kosovo. 
It also divides the decision-making process into three stages and then explores the 
reasons why the administration decided to intervene. These two chapters provide a 
“levels of analysis” framework for understanding Clinton’s policy decision-making 
in resolving both the Bosnian crisis and the Kosovo conflict. The final chapter will 
provide the theoretical framework to evaluate the Clinton administration’s foreign 
policy on humanitarian interventions and examine its implications for future US 
foreign policy. This chapter demonstrates the concepts of moral leadership and 
pragmatic foreign policy in the field of international relations and foreign policy 
analysis.  
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Chapter 2. 
Debates on Ethical Foreign Policy in the aftermath of the Cold War 
 
Introduction 
Interwar debates between idealism (identified by values, morality, and ethics) and 
realism (identified by facts, power, and politics) resulted in Idealism/Liberalism and 
Realism becoming the mainstream theoretical traditions in International Relations 
(IR). 14  During the Cold War, power politics between a much freer Western 
democratic system, led by the United States, and a communist system, led by the 
Soviet Union, helped to consolidate Realism’s status as the dominant intellectual 
framework in foreign policy and international relations theory. Realists recognize 
that the rules of international politics are that states exist in an anarchic, self-help 
system, and therefore states must engage in power politics in order to secure their 
survival.  
 
However, with the end of bipolarity in the post-Cold War world, political leaders and 
policy-makers in major states have claimed a central role for ethics, morality, and 
values in the shaping of international goals such as human rights, humanitarian 
intervention and international justice. As a consequence, the role of ethics in 
international relations became a hotly debated issue. As Leslie H. Gelb and Justine A. 
Rosenthal described the phenomena, “With the passing of the Cold War and 
America’s emergence as the sole superpower … the tradeoffs between security and 
ethics became less stark, and a moral foreign policy seemed more affordable.”15  
 
Perhaps one of the more dramatic examples of the new power of morality on foreign 
policy agendas and international affairs has been humanitarian interventions in the 
1990s. The issue has remained of whether states could intervene in the sovereign 
territory of other states to stop massive violations of human rights, such as genocide 
or ethnic cleansing.16 However, this research will not try to solve issues of legality 
or legitimacy on humanitarian intervention. Instead, it will focus on whether a state 
would intervene for humanitarian purposes. The traditional understanding of foreign 
policy has been that it is based on national interests and national security issues; 
however, increasingly, it has become widely debated whether ethical and moral 
concerns should dominate foreign policy.  
                                                 
14 E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International 
Relations, 2nd edition (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001). 
15 Leslie H. Gelb and Justine A. Rosenthal, ‘The Rise of Ethics in Foreign Policy: Reaching a Values 
Consensus’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 3, (May/June 2003), p. 5. 
16 Ibid., p. 6; Karen E. Smith and Margot Light (eds.), Ethics and Foreign Policy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 6. 
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This chapter will examine the role of ethics returning to international relations and its 
place in foreign policy discourses on the demise of the Cold War. First, it will look at 
the rise of the role of ethical or moral values in foreign policy discourses and the role 
of the United States in President George H. W. Bush’s New World Order. Second, it 
will look at humanitarian intervention issues in the 1990s and its challenges to 
international order built on principles of sovereignty, non-intervention, and non-use 
of force. Finally, it will analyze the debate between Realism and other perspectives 
over the tension between “national interests” and “ethics” in the conducting of 
foreign policy.  
 
2.1 The Rise of Ethical Foreign Policy  
The fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of Soviet communism brought about the 
end of the Cold War. With the disappearance of the threat and the ideological basis of 
the contest with the Soviet Union, the mission of American “containment” foreign 
policy throughout the Cold War was vindicated. American policy-makers were 
searching for an alternative focus for American energies to fill the vacuum left by 
containment’s evisceration. Normative pleas for moving beyond containment and 
recasting America’s role in the post-Cold War era made the 1990s a decade of 
reassessment of America’s foreign policy goals.17 Certainly, the George H. W. Bush 
administration had to “carry American foreign policy into the century’s last decade 
amidst a climate of internal debate about America’s world role and in an international 
environment characterized by profound change”.18 
 
The first opportunity for President Bush to chart the new vision came during the 
early stages of the Gulf crisis. Bush and his National Security Advisor Brent 
Scowcroft envisaged an American-initiated “new world order” to justify US 
involvement in the wide coalition against Iraq and the continuing role of the United 
States in post-Cold War international relations.19 Shortly after the invasion of 
Kuwait by Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi troops, Bush delivered a speech to a joint session 
of Congress: 
 
We stand today at a unique and extraordinary moment. The crisis in the Persian Gulf, as grave as it is, 
also offers a rare opportunity to move toward a historic period of cooperation. Out of these troubled 
                                                 
17 Linda B. Miller, ‘American Foreign Policy: Beyond Containment’, International Affairs, Vol. 66, 
No. 2 (April 1990), p. 313; Hal Brands, From Berlin to Baghdad: America’s Search for Purpose in the 
Post-Cold War World (Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky, 2008), p. 75. 
18 Karl Kaiser, ‘A View from Europe: The US Role in the Next Decade’, International Affairs, Vol. 65, 
No. 2 (Spring 1989), p. 209. 
19 Brands, From Berlin to Baghdad, pp. 79-80. 
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times, our fifth objective – a new world order – can emerge: a new era – freer from the threat of terror, 
stronger in the pursuit of justice, and more secure in the quest for peace. An era in which the nations 
of the world, East and West, North and South, can prosper and live in harmony. A hundred generations 
have searched for this elusive path to peace, while a thousand wars raged across the span of human 
endeavor. Today, that new world is struggling to be born, a world quite different from the one we’ve 
known. A world where the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle. A world in which nations 
recognize the shared responsibility for freedom and justice. A world where the strong respect the 
rights of the weak. This is the vision that I shared with President Gorbachev in Helsinki. He and other 
leaders from Europe, the Gulf, and around the world understand that how we manage this crisis today 
could shape the future for generations to come.20  
 
In Bush’s New World Order, the international community had a shared responsibility 
for freedom and justice and protected the weak against an aggressor. Also, since the 
end of the Cold War and bipolarity brought about more harmonious and cooperative 
international affairs, this historic period provided the opportunity for the United 
States to cooperate with its former adversary, Russia.21 In particular, they could 
work on the enhanced peacekeeping function of the United Nations (UN), since it 
was hard to achieve during the Cold War period.22  
 
Furthermore, a New World Order showed that sovereign states could reach a 
consensus about what rules of international behavior might be enforced by using 
international institutions to prohibit state aggression.23 As Bush stated: 
 
We can now point to five United Nations Security Council resolutions that condemn Iraq’s aggression. 
They call for Iraq’s immediate and unconditional withdrawal, the restoration of Kuwait’s legitimate 
government, and categorically reject Iraq’s cynical and self-serving attempt to annex Kuwait. Finally, 
the United Nations has demanded the release of all foreign nationals held hostage against their will 
and in contravention of international law.24 
 
Therefore, within this new world order, international institutions, especially the UN, 
would play a more important role in global management and, more importantly, 
                                                 
20 ‘Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Persian Gulf Crisis and the Federal Budget 
Deficit’, 11 September 1990, George Bush Presidential Library (BPL). 
21 Lawrence Freedman, ‘Order and Disorder in the New World’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 1 
(1991/1992), p. 21. 
22 ‘Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session at a Meeting of the Economic Club in New York, 
New York’, 6 February 1991, Public Papers, pp. 123-124. 
23 Steve Brinkoetter, ‘The Role for Ethics in Bush’s New World Order’, Ethics & International Affairs, 
Vol. 6, No. 1 (March 1992), p. 70. 
24 ‘Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Persian Gulf Crisis and the Federal Budget 
Deficit’. 
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could provide a recognizable version of collective security operations as had been 
envisaged in the UN Charter with the active support of the world’s major powers to 
guarantee international peace and security.25 Thus, the UN played a central role in 
Bush’s New World Order, especially in relation to peacekeeping.26 In short, Bush’s 
New World Order provided “a version of American internationalism which stressed 
American global responsibilities and opportunities, but recognized limits and the 
need for burden-sharing”.27  
 
Meanwhile, the role of the United States in Bush’s New World Order was as the 
world leader.28 Bush stressed that American leadership was required to stand up to 
aggression: 
 
Recent events have surely proven that there is no substitute for American leadership. In the face of 
tyranny, let no one doubt American credibility and reliability. Let no one doubt our staying power. We 
will stand by our friends. One way or another, the leader of Iraq must learn this fundamental truth. 
From the outset, acting hand in hand with others, we’ve sought to fashion the broadest possible 
international response to Iraq’s aggression. The level of world cooperation and condemnation of Iraq 
is unprecedented.29 
 
Most importantly, many thought that Bush attempted to place a moral and ethical 
slant on his phrase “New World Order”, for instance, the respect for the rule of law, 
justice, and freedom, and the consequent prospects for multilateral action. It seemed 
that Bush tended to address the grander moral import of the New World Order.30 As 
Steve Brinkoetter argued, there existed visible moral links in Bush’s statements of his 
principles of conduct for his new world order. For example, Bush stated that the 
                                                 
25 Freedman, ‘Order and Disorder in the New World’, p.22; Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘The Real New 
World Order’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 5 (September/October 1997), p. 183; Stephen F. Burgess, 
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United States had a “moral responsibility” to intervene in the Persian Gulf War 
because “we were compelled by the moral compass that guides our nation”. He 
described Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait as “immoral” and the principle that “one country 
won’t take over another” as “a fundamental moral principle”. Referring to 
state-destroying aggression, he spoke of “a strong moral underpinning” in “a world 
free from unlawful aggression” and the demand for Iraq’s unconditional withdrawal 
from Kuwait. Also, with regard to the promotion of democratic values, he linked 
human rights to morality by stating that it was a “moral imperative to put a stop to 
the atrocities in Kuwait once and for all”.31 
 
In his subsequent speeches, Bush frequently referred to his vision of a New World 
Order and its link to moral values. In his address before a joint session of Congress 
on the State of the Union on 29 January 1991, he said: “A new world order, where 
diverse nations are drawn together in common cause to achieve the universal 
aspirations of mankind – peace and security, freedom, and the rule of law.”32 By the 
same token, at the 50th anniversary observance of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s four 
freedoms speech, he stated: “As we look around the world at the events of the past 
year, we see how these very same beliefs are bringing about the emergence of a new 
world order, one based on respect for the individual and for the rule of law – a new 
world order that can lead to the lasting peace we all seek.” Furthermore, he addressed 
the role of ethics in US foreign policy, which was emphasised in President 
Roosevelt’s four freedoms speech: “Our national policy in foreign affairs has been 
based on a decent respect for the rights and dignity of all nations, large and small, 
and the justice of morality must and will win in the end.” Bush claimed, “That charge 
is as true today in the Gulf as it was 50 years ago in Europe. And the triumph of the 
moral order must still be the vision that compels us.”33  
 
Then the Gulf War was over. Bush described the war as a “first step toward a just 
international order”:34 
 
Now, we can see a new world coming into view. A world in which there is the very real prospect of a 
new world order. In the words of Winston Churchill, a world order in which “the principles of justice 
and fair play protect the weak against the strong…..” A world where the United Nations, freed from 
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cold war stalemate, is poised to fulfill the historic vision of its founders. A world in which freedom 
and respect for human rights find a home among all nations. The Gulf war put this new world to its 
first test. And my fellow Americans, we passed that test.35 
 
Bush’s emphasis on morality and justice in his vision of the New World Order 
“appealed to those looking for a new US role in the world”.36 
 
Essentially, Bush’s New World Order was grounded in the end of the Cold War,37 a 
period of historic shift that demonstrated the triumph of Western liberal democracy.  
The 1990s was seen as the high moment of liberalism and Francis Fukuyama’s 
concept of the ‘end of history’ represented the most influential liberal theory of the 
post-Cold War era.38 Fukuyama argued that what the end of the Cold War presented 
not only the passing of a particular period of postwar history but also ‘the end of 
history’: “the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization 
of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government”. Moreover,  a 
“universal homogeneous state” emerged that “is liberal insofar as it recognizes and 
protects through a system of law man’s universal right to freedom, and democratic 
insofar as it exists only with the consent of the governed”.39 He stated,  
 
The liberal state must be universal, that is, grant recognition to all citizens because they are human 
beings, and not because they are members of some particular national, ethnic, or racial group. And it 
must be homogeneous insofar as it creates a classless society based on the abolition of the distinction 
between masters and slaves. The rationality of this universal and homogenous state is further evident 
in the fact that it is consciously founded on the basis of open and publicized principles, such as 
occurred in the course of the constitutional convention that led to the birth of the American republic.40  
 
For Fukuyama, “‘the Western idea’ had become universal: Western-style liberal 
democratic institutions provided the norm for states everywhere”.41 Overall, the 
theory of ‘the end of history’ was mainly derived from three key liberal arguments: 
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“that democracies do not go to war with one another; that institutions can overcome 
the logic of anarchy; and that modern globalized capitalism binds states more closely 
together.”42 
 
Obviously, the success of Operation Desert Storm in 1991 brought out optimism in 
Bush’s New World Order and raised the prospect of greater international cooperation 
among major countries and a revitalized UN.43 The UN was envisaged by the Bush 
administration to become a major vehicle for defending international law and order 
and democratic regimes, for resolving disputes, and for supporting human rights.44 
Earl C. Ravenal argued that the Bush New World Order attempted to create – or 
re-create – a regime of collective security in world politics, which became the 
progenitor of “assertive multilateralism” in the early Clinton administration by the 
eventual Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and in the guise of the “engagement” 
proposition by National Security Advisor Anthony Lake.45  
 
As a consequence, the George H. W. Bush administration started to use US forces for 
humanitarian missions, which was regarded as beyond their traditional role of 
defending the national interest. The first was the US-led intervention in northern Iraq, 
known as Operation Provide Comfort, to rescue and relieve Kurdish refugees in 
April-June 1991 following the end of the Gulf War.46 The notion of humanitarian 
intervention was articulated by many leaders, such as with the phrases “humanitarian 
concern” and “humanitarian need”, frequently used by President Bush to explain the 
US military presence in northern Iraq.47 It also sparked the debate on armed 
interventions on behalf of humanitarian concerns in the post-Cold War era.48  
 
2.2 Humanitarian Interventions in the 1990s  
“Humanitarian intervention”, according to Bhikhu Parekh, “is an act of intervention 
in the internal affairs of another country with a view to ending the physical suffering 
caused by the disintegration or the gross misuse of the authority of the state, and 
helping create conditions in which a viable structure of civil authority can emerge.”49 
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That is to say, it is an intervention inspired by humanitarian considerations.50 
Furthermore, Parekh defines the term “humanitarian” as being “wholly or primarily 
guided by the sentiment of humanity, compassion or fellow-feeling.” 51  Such 
interventions usually involve military force,52 which is different from humanitarian 
aid that is only concerned with “[relieving] suffering and not to create peace and 
order”.53 However, it is important to note that “if a state sought to relieve suffering 
in another country with a view to establishing a government of its choice, or to 
acquiring control over its natural resources, its action would be motivated by selfish, 
not humanitarian, considerations”.54  
 
Intervention has been a controversial concept for state sovereignty. It appears to 
violate the principles of sovereignty, non-intervention and non-use of force enshrined 
in the UN Charter. In Article 2 (7), it states that nothing “shall authorize the United 
Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction 
of any state”. In particular, it has been argued that Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter, 
which states that “all members shall refrain from the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any state”, makes interventions for 
humanitarian purposes illegal. Only “the right of individual or collective 
self-defense”, and thus the necessity for the UN Security Council to “maintain 
international peace and security” under these circumstances found in Article 51, 
could be a legitimate exception to this general ban.55  
 
However, since internal or intrastate conflicts (which are wars fought within a state’s 
territory) became a new pattern of armed conflict in the 1990s, including examples in 
Angola, Cambodia, Colombia, Haiti, Liberia, Somalia, Rwanda, the former-Soviet 
Union and the former-Yugoslavia, 56  the development of “state failure”, 
“humanitarian intervention” and “international peace and security maintenance” has 
challenged the absoluteness of sovereignty. State failure refers to states being “unable 
to provide basic social, economic, legal, and political services and safeguards to the 
populations”; in other words, when a state “no longer performs the functions 
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normally attributed to it”. 57  Although for a long time the principle of 
non-intervention in state sovereignty has been emphasised as the basis for order in 
the society of states, when state failure occurs and leads to collapse into internal war 
devastating the basic human rights of a population, it forms the boundary of authority 
between domestic jurisdiction of states over individuals within its territory and 
international jurisdiction over inalienable human rights. It thus raises the question: 
which authority is superior?58 
 
As UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan expressed in his millennium report: “If 
humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how 
should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica – to gross and systematic violations 
of human rights that offend very precept of our common humanity?…. We confront a 
real dilemma. Few would disagree that both the defence of humanity and the defence 
of sovereignty are principles that must be supported. Alas, that does not tell us which 
principle should prevail when they are in conflict.”59 However, the question could be 
asked that since in a failed state sovereign authority has collapsed, does it still have 
the right to exclusive domestic jurisdiction?  
 
Furthermore, its international legal sovereignty is questionable since it has been 
recognized as a ‘failed’ state. Perhaps this enhances the legitimacy of humanitarian 
intervention. Fernando R. Tesόn defends humanitarian intervention on the grounds 
that it is “morally justified”, deriving from the argument that “a major purpose of 
states and governments is to protect and secure human rights, that is, rights that all 
persons have by virtue of personhood alone”. 60  Kurt Mills demonstrates that 
“individuals have human rights, which must be upheld by any entity claiming 
sovereignty” and “the authority of a state is derived from the popular sovereignty of 
the people”; hence human rights and popular sovereignty are viewed as constitutive 
principles of state legitimacy.61 He further states that: 
 
Theoretically, states exist for the well-being of their inhabitants. The primary function of states is that 
of protection. In other words, the state exists to ensure that its citizens are able to live their lives free 
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from the fear that an outside force will interrupt their lives. A reasonable extension of this would be 
that the inhabitants of a state should also be as free from internal persecution as from external 
persecution. Thus, the social function of states is to ensure the ability of people to live.62 
 
Therefore, it has been suggested that the social identity of the state as sovereign 
possesses moral purposes to do rightful state action within the society of states.63 If 
states’ governments massively abuse the human rights of their citizens, then, as 
Tesόn claims, “We have a general duty to assist persons in grave danger if we can do 
it at reasonable cost to ourselves. If this is true, we have, by definition, a right to do 
so. The right to intervene thus stems from a general duty to assist victims of grievous 
injustice”. 64  Ultimately, as Thomas M. Franck and Nigel S. Rodley asserted, 
interventions for humanitarian purposes “belongs in the realm not of law but of 
moral choice, which nations, like individuals, must sometimes make”.65 Despite 
their view that humanitarian intervention is morally permitted, they maintained that 
this moral imperative could not be legally recognized as such a legal right might be 
wrongly abused.66 
 
However, counter-restrictionists argue that “human rights” actually plays an equal 
role to “international peace and security” in the UN Charter. Human rights have been 
emphasised in the Charter’s preamble and Articles 1 (3), 55, and 56.67 Indeed, 
according to Article 2 (4), Members shall refrain from any manner inconsistent with 
the Purposes of the United Nations, and Article 1 (3), as part of the Purposes of the 
United Nations, clearly indicates that: 
 
To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, 
cultural, or humanitarian character, and promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for 
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.68   
 
This assertion is reinforced in Annan’s comment on international interventions for 
humanitarian crises:  
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States are now widely understood to be instruments at the service of their peoples, and not vice versa. 
At the same time individual sovereignty – by which I mean the fundamental freedom of each 
individual, enshrined in the charter of the UN and subsequent international treaties – has been 
enhanced by a renewed and spreading consciousness of individual rights. When we read the charter 
today, we are more than ever conscious that its aim is to protect individual human beings, not to 
protect those who abuse them.69  
 
On the other hand, humanitarian intervention also brought a new understanding of 
the concept of security. As Annan remarked in his millennium report, “Once 
synonymous with the defence of territory from external attack, the requirements of 
security today have come to embrace the protection of communities and individuals 
from internal violence.”70 When the UN Security Council authorized Resolution 688 
to conduct Operation Provide Comfort, it asserted that refugee flows and 
cross-border incursions, resulting from the repression of the Iraqi civilian population 
in many parts of Iraq, could pose a threat to “international peace and security”.71 In 
the case of Somalia, the then UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali wrote: 
 
At present no government exists in Somalia that could request and allow such use of force. It could 
therefore be necessary for the Security Council to make a determination under Article 39 of the 
Charter that a threat to the peace exists, as a result of the repercussions of the Somali conflict on the 
entire region, and to decide what measures should be taken to maintain international peace and 
security.72 
 
This understanding led to Operation Restore Hope, authorized by Resolution 794 in 
December 1992. 
 
The debate between pluralism and solidarism in the English School has affected the 
theory and practice of humanitarian intervention. Pluralism emphasises reciprocal 
recognition of state sovereignty and the norm of non-intervention. It argues that state 
sovereignty and the rule of non-intervention are sacrosanct; and hence, individual 
acts of intervention are illegitimate.73 Moreover, pluralism identifies the absence of a 
consensus on what principles should underpin a doctrine of humanitarian 
intervention. If there is a right to govern individual or collective humanitarian 
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intervention, then it would undermine international order. As Hedley Bull 
commented:  
 
As regards the right of so-called humanitarian intervention…. there is no present tendency for states to 
claim, or for the international community to recognize, any such right. The reluctance evident in the 
international community even to experiment with the conception of a right of humanitarian 
intervention reflects not only an unwillingness to jeopardize the rules of sovereignty and 
non-intervention by conceding such a right to individual states, but also the lack of any agreed 
doctrine as to what human rights are.74 
 
The international community’s inaction in response to the genocide in Rwanda and 
its controversial intervention in Kosovo’s conflict are illustrations of the absence of 
international consensus and clear legal authority.75  
 
For example, the Independent International Commission on Kosovo claimed that the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)’s military intervention in Kosovo was 
“illegal but legitimate”. It is likely that this long-standing controversy stems not only 
from a legal and legitimate issue but also, most importantly, from whose right it is to 
authorize it.76 Article 53 of the UN Charter shows that “no enforcement action shall 
be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the 
authorization of the Security Council”.77 Therefore, the controversy over NATO’s 
bombing of Kosovo was linked to the fact that NATO is a trans-Atlantic military 
organization, while the UN Security Council was unable to act due to Russia and 
China vetoing the use of force. Moreover, the argument involves not only the tension 
between non-intervention and human rights but also the differences of interpretation 
amongst the international communities over when, how, and under what conditions 
that intervention must be taken.  
 
From a constructivist point of view, “practices of humanitarian intervention are 
conditioned by their international normative context, which frames the interests and 
values of actors, and how that normative context changes over time”.78 For example, 
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Cynthia Weber stated that “when state practices do not fit supposed intersubjective 
norms of what a sovereign state must be, then intervention by a sovereign state into 
the affairs of an ‘aberrant’ state is deemed to be legitimate by a supposed 
international community”.79 Hence the interpretation of intervention can change 
over time as long as the rules of non-intervention also change and rely on a supposed 
international community to interpret these norms.80  
 
However, in contrast to pluralism, solidarism claims that “state sovereignty is not 
ontologically prior to humankind and that a universal solidarity exists between 
humans”.81 It assumes that states have both a legal right and a moral obligation to 
intervene in extreme cases of human rights violations, 82  and argues that 
humanitarian claims could constitute a legitimate exception to the principle of 
non-intervention. For example, Operation Provide Comfort in northern Iraq, 
authorized by UN Security Council Resolution 688, demonstrated that “human 
suffering could constitute a threat to international peace and security and hence 
warrant a collective armed intervention by the society of states”. 83 In other words, 
pluralists emphasise the rights and duties of states while solidartists emphasise the 
rights and duties of individuals at the centre of its ethical code. Bush’s New World 
Order may be interpreted as a solidartist moment in the society of states in the 
post-Cold War era.84  
 
The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) 
produced The Responsibility to Protect in 2001 and affected a shift from the “right to 
intervene” to the “responsibility to protect”. It highlights the basic principles that: 
 
A. State sovereignty implies responsibility, and the primary responsibility for the protection of its 
people lies with the state itself. 
B. Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or 
state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of 
non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect.85 
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In addition to the attempt to build a conceptual bridge between human rights and 
state sovereignty, it also intends to provide an alternative framework for forging 
some sort of consensus on when and how to intervene. It outlines that military 
intervention for humanitarian reasons could be undertaken under circumstances 
which comprise of: 
 
A. Large scale loss of life, actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or not, which is the product 
either of deliberate state action, or state neglect or inability to act, or a failed state situation; or  
B. Large scale ‘ethnic cleansing’, actual or apprehended, whether carried out by killing, forced 
expulsion, acts of terror or rape.86 
 
It sets up the precautionary principles, which are basically derived from the Just War 
tradition,87 and are: 
 
A. Right intention: The primary purpose of the intervention, whatever other motives intervening 
states may have, must be to halt or avert human suffering. Right intention is better assured with 
multilateral operations, clearly supported by regional opinion and the victims concerned. 
B. Last resort: Military intervention can only be justified when every non-military option for the 
prevention or peaceful resolution of the crisis has been explored, with reasonable grounds for 
believing lesser measures would not have succeeded. 
C. Proportional means: The scale, duration and intensity of the planned military intervention should 
be the minimum necessary to secure the defined human protection objective. 
D. Reasonable prospects: There must be a reasonable chance of success in halting or averting the 
suffering which has justified the intervention, with the consequences of action not likely to be 
worse than the consequences of inaction.88   
 
Furthermore, it suggests that the UN Security Council is the right authority to 
authorize military intervention for human protection purposes. It indicates that “the 
task is not to find alternatives to the Security Council as a source of authority, but to 
make the Security Council work better than it has”.89 It also reflects the concept of 
human security: “What matters is not just state security but the protection of 
individuals against threats to life, livelihood, or dignity that can come from within or 
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without.”90 The principle of responsibility to protect was adopted at the UN 2005 
World Summit. It reinforces the idea that a state has the responsibility to protect its 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against 
humanity; however, when the state fails to do so, the international community should 
take the responsibility to react to situations in which there is need for human 
protection.91 
 
The 1990s has been described as the golden era of humanitarian activism. Not only 
was human rights the dominant moral vocabulary in foreign affairs, but also in state 
practice it was more likely for states to contemplate intervention to protect strangers 
in distant lands. This was because “Western militaries had spare capacity and time” 
to make it possible.92 However, after the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 and 
President George W. Bush’s declaration of ‘the war on terror’, it raised the question: 
“Now with America launched on an indefinite military campaign against terrorists, 
will there be the political energy necessary to mount humanitarian interventions?” 
Michael Ignatieff argues that “the intellectual and political climate of a war on terror 
now resembles the atmosphere of the Cold War.”93  
 
Despite skepticism that ‘the war on terror’ may make it less likely for powerful states 
to place their own strategic interests ahead of concerns for human rights to save 
strangers, there has been criticism pertaining to humanitarian intervention that states 
will never genuinely engage in interventions motivated by primarily humanitarian 
concerns.94 For instance, the interventions in East Pakistan (Bangladesh), Cambodia, 
Uganda, northern Iraq, Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia and Kosovo were widely seen as 
acts for political and military ends rather than for humanitarian concerns. As a result, 
they were all partial and selective.95  
 
Nicholas J. Wheeler has tried to identify the threshold conditions for an intervention 
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to qualify as humanitarian.96 In his definition,  
 
The primacy of humanitarian motives is not a threshold condition. But if it can be shown that the 
motives behind the intervention, or the reasons behind the selection of the means, are inconsistent 
with a positive humanitarian outcome, then it is disqualified as humanitarian. It follows that, even if 
an intervention is motivated by non-humanitarian reasons, it can still count as humanitarian provided 
that the motives, and the means employed, do not undermine a positive humanitarian outcome…. The 
society of states should reserve its praise and material support only for those governments that accord 
humanitarian reasons a significant factor in their decision to intervene…97  
 
By the same token, Tesόn argues, 
 
The humanitarian outcome should be a central factor in evaluating the intention of the intervention… 
politicians, even in democratic states, will never have pure humanitarian motives, because they have a 
fiduciary duty to their citizens, and because they have other selfish personal motives, such as 
incumbency. It follows that in order to judge the legitimacy of intervention we must look at the 
situation as a whole.98  
 
This is because “governments owe a fiduciary duty to their citizens. They are bound 
to advance their interests internationally, so it would be morally wrong for them to 
care only about saving others”.99 Indeed, regardless of the debate over the legality, 
legitimacy, and moral reasoning of humanitarian intervention, the debate will 
ultimately return to the argument of whether a state should or would risk its soldiers’ 
lives to save strangers. In the next section, this thesis will explore the debate over 
whether ethical concerns such as the interests of humanity should be placed in the 
centre of foreign policy-making.    
 
2.3 The Debate on Ethical Foreign Policy 
The doctrine of humanitarian intervention challenges not only the norm of state 
sovereignty but also the statist view of international relations derived from Realism. 
The classical tradition of realist thought is derived from the work of Thucydides, 
Niccolo Machiavelli, and Thomas Hobbes. These realists developed the notion of 
reason of state, or raison d’état, which demonstrated that the fundamental principle 
of national conduct was to preserve the health and strength of the state, and thus “the 
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interests of the state predominate over all other interests and values”.100 For this 
reason, such a belief became the guiding principle for statesmen in the conduct of 
their foreign affairs. This thus leads to Machiavelli’s notion of a dual morality for 
states and individuals.101 “A dual moral standard” means “one moral standard for 
individual citizens living inside the state and a different standard for the state in its 
external relations with other states”.102  
 
Perhaps we can understand this in more detail by examining Parekh’s interpretation 
of Hobbes’ view: 
 
For Hobbes (1588-1679) there was neither a universal human community nor a society of states. 
States were sovereign and self-sufficient moral communities, and in a state of nature in their relations 
with each other… The sovereign’s sole concern was to promote the interests of his state, and neither 
he or his subjects had duties extending beyond its boundaries….his view involved a complete 
rejection of the ideas of the universal human community… the view represented by Hobbes prevailed 
in practice, giving rise to the statist view of international relations...103 
 
Given this, it could be concluded that states are legally self-contained and morally 
self-sufficient units having no wider obligations than the pursuit of their self-interests. 
Thus, states have a moral duty for and a responsibility to its citizens alone; in other 
words, an ethical political community only exists domestically. For realists, the state 
is the dominant actor in international relations.104 States have remained the chief 
holders of external sovereignty since the system of sovereign states.105  
 
Realism holds the view that state behaviour in international politics is mainly shaped 
by power and material interests.106 “International politics”, as Hans J. Morgenthau 
wrote, “like all politics, is a struggle for power”. Power, in Morgenthau’s definition, 
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is “man’s control over the minds and actions of other men”. Furthermore, 
Morgenthau held that the concept of interest in international politics is defined in 
terms of power. “The idea of interest is indeed of the essence of politics and is 
unaffected by the circumstances of time and place”, and “the struggle for power is 
universal in time and space and is an undeniable fact of experience”.107 He stated 
that “a foreign policy guided by moral abstractions without consideration of the 
national interest is bound to fail”.108  
 
For classical realists, the desire for power and the drive to dominate others is derived 
from human nature. As Hobbes pointed out, in the nature of man, there are three 
principal causes of quarrel: competition, diffidence, glory. “The first, maketh men 
invade for gain; the second, for safety; and the third, for reputation”.109 Similarly, 
Morgenthau indicated that the root of conflict stemmed from the desire for power, a 
general quality of the human mind:  
 
The desire for power is closely related to the selfishness... but is not identical with it. For the typical 
goals of selfishness, such as food, shelter, security…have an objective relation to the vital needs of the 
individual; … The desire for power, on the other hand, concerns itself not with the individual’s 
survival but with its position among his fellows once his survival has been secured. Consequently, the 
selfishness of man has limits; his will to power has none. For while man’s vital needs are capable of 
satisfaction, his lust for power would be satisfied only if the last man became an object of his 
domination, there being nobody above or beside him, that is, if he became like God.110 
 
Morgenthau further wrote, “Politics, like society in general, is governed by objective 
laws that have their roots in human nature.” “The drives to live, to propagate, and to 
dominate are common to all men”.111 Consequently, “the essential continuity of 
state’s behaviour is their power-seeking, which is rooted in the biological drives of 
human beings”; and “the behaviour of the state as a self-seeking egoist is understood 
to be a reflection of the characteristics of the people that comprise the state”.112 
 
In contrast to this, structural realists view the struggle for power in international 
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politics as resulting from the lack of an overarching authority above states and the 
relative distribution of power in the international system.113 It is because “the 
essential structural quality of the system is anarchy – the absence of a central 
monopoly of legitimate force”114 and hence, “in crucial situations the ultimate 
concern of states is not for power but for security”.115 Kenneth Waltz notes, 
“Competition and conflict among states stem directly from the twin facts of life 
under conditions of anarchy: States in an anarchic order must provide for their own 
security, and threats or seeming threats to their security abound.” 116  As a 
consequence, “the uneasy state of affairs is exacerbated by the familiar ‘security 
dilemma,’ wherein measures that enhance one state’s security typically diminish that 
of others”.117 By the same token, Frederick Dunn indicates that “international 
politics is concerned with the special kind of power relationship that exists in a 
community lacking an overriding authority”.118  
 
In such an anarchic structure, “self-help is necessarily the principle of action”.119 As 
Waltz observes, “A self-help system is one in which those who do not help 
themselves, or who do so less effectively than others, will fail to prosper, will lay 
themselves open to dangers, will suffer. Fear of such unwanted consequences 
stimulates states to behave in ways that tend towards the creation of balances of 
power.”120 “The mechanism of the balance of power seeks to ensure equilibrium of 
power in which case no one state or coalition of states is in a position to dominate the 
others”.121 Also, because of the inequality and imbalance of capabilities among 
states, such as size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic 
capability, military strength, political stability, and competence, states have to 
estimate one another’s capabilities, especially their abilities to do harm, in order to 
secure themselves in a self-help system.122  
 
However, offensive realists like John Mearsheimer assert that “the international 
system forces great powers to maximize their relative power because that is the 
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optimal way to maximize their security”.123 That is to say, in opposition to classical 
realism’s human nature assumptions, offensive realists hold that “great powers 
behave aggressively not because they want to or because they possess some inner 
drive to dominate, but because they have to seek more power if they want to 
maximize their odds of survival”, with hegemony as their ultimate goal.124 As 
rational actors, great powers are aware of their external environment and work on 
strategies in order to survive.125 Overall, as Richard G. Gilpin summarizes the realist 
view, “Anarchy is the rule; order, justice, and morality are the exceptions. The realist 
need not believe that one must always forgo the pursuit of these higher virtues, but 
realists do stress that in the world as it is, the final arbiter of things political is power. 
All moral schemes will come to naught if this basic reality is forgotten.”126 
 
Therefore, as John Mearsheimer states: 
 
There is not much place for human rights and values in the Realist story. Realists basically believe that 
states are interested in gaining power, either because they’re hardwired that way or because it’s the 
best way to survive, and they don’t pay attention to values.127 
 
Moreover, realists are skeptical about whether there exist universal moral principles. 
For instance, Morgenthau argued that “universal moral principles, such as justice or 
equality, are capable of guiding political action only to the extent that they have been 
given concrete content and have been related to political situations by society”. 
However, “no such consensus exists in the relations between nations. For above the 
national societies there exists no international society so integrated as to be able to 
define for them the concrete meaning of justice or equality, as national societies do 
for their individual members”. As a result, it is difficult to find a concrete meaning 
that could provide rational guidance for political action in the international sphere.128  
 
Mark F. N. Franke sums up: 
 
International Relations and the considerations of ethics made possible within that vision respond 
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primarily to the notion that there is no natural structure or code upon which actions and judgements in 
human relations may be legitimately justified in any final sense. No person or groups of persons has 
view to any thinking like what one might call the universal conditions of humanity. Each is limited to 
particular perspectives and cultural mappings of how a human universe may appear if local 
understandings could be extended globally. It is for this reason that persons are said to naturally in a 
state of war with each other.129  
 
This is because “there is never actually a single world to which all ideas of human 
life may agree”; and hence, “there are no natural grounds upon which a singular 
world may be justifiably created from this variety of views”.130    
 
Nevertheless, European Union (EU) diplomat Robert Cooper argues that in the 
postmodern world the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs has broken 
down; non-state actors can pose a danger to the postmodern system and hence the 
threats to security within the postmodern world are no longer threats in the traditional 
sense. Besides, “a large number of the most powerful states no longer want to fight 
or conquer”, and the European Union is the example of a postmodern system. 
Consequently, the notion of raison d’état has been replaced by a moral consciousness 
that applies to international relations as well as to domestic affairs in the postmodern 
world.131  
 
Critical theorist Ken Booth has assumed that: 
 
The nineteenth century has been called the century of history, and the twentieth century that of 
philosophy. To my mind the twenty-first will be the century of ethics, and global ethics at that. What I 
would like to see is a shift in the focus of the study of international relations from accumulating 
knowledge about ‘relations between states’ to thinking about ethics and applied ethics on a global 
scale.132  
 
He argues that in postmodern times “what is needed must have moral at its center 
because the fundamental questions of how we might and can live together concern 
values, not instrumental rationality”.133  
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It was Immanuel Kant who raised the idea of the community of humankind, with 
individual human beings having natural rights prior to the legal rights of sovereign 
states: “the right of man as a citizen of the world”.134 Hedley Bull also stated the 
need for justice in world politics, demanding “equality in the distribution or in the 
application of rights as between the strong and the weak, the large and the small, the 
rich and the poor, the black and the white”.135 Joseph Nye argues that in the global 
information age the concept of “national interest” should be redefined, which should 
take the interests of others into account.136 He states: 
 
In a democracy, the national interest is simply the set of shared priorities regarding relations with the 
rest of the world. It is broader than strategic interests, though they are part of it. It can include values 
such as human rights and democracy, if the public feels that those values are so important to its 
identity that it is willing to pay a price to promote them. The American people clearly think that their 
interest include certain values and their promotion abroad – such as opposition to ethnic cleansing in 
the Balkans. A democratic definition of the national interest does not accept the distinction between a 
morality-based and an interest-based foreign policy. Moral values are simply intangible interests.137 
 
Similarly, the ICISS’s The Responsibility to Protect suggests that another dimension 
of national interest which is highly relevant to intervention for human protection 
purposes is the “national interest in being, and being seen to be, a good international 
citizen”. “The interest in being seen to be a good international citizen is simply the 
reputational benefit and regularly willing to pitch into international tasks for motives 
that appear to be relatively selfless”.138 
 
In general, IR scholars traditionally emphasise that the duties of states should extend 
no further than their territorial boundaries. Their arguments are based on the concept 
of a social contract among citizens and between citizens and the states, and that the 
responsibilities and duties which states and their citizens have to each other stop at 
the boundaries of the territorial states. However, as a result of deepening 
interdependence and growing transnational connections in the globalized age, the 
concept of “duties beyond borders” emerges. It suggests that all individuals share a 
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common humanity that “each person is of equal moral worth and a subject of moral 
concern”. Thus, “if the concept of sovereignty appears to put a brake on the concern 
for others, the concept of humanity pushes us forward”.139 Especially the emergence 
of the notion of failed states in the early 1990s led to the question whether the 
international community, or liberal-democratic societies in particular, have a moral 
responsibility to the peoples of failed states and to intervene when massive violations 
of human rights occur.140   
 
It seems that Realism stands against or at least could not follow this trend. However, 
it is worth noting that Morgenthau claimed that “international politics cannot be 
understood by considerations of power alone. Man is an animal longing for power, 
but he is also a creature with a moral purpose”.141 Therefore, if self-interest is human 
nature, morality and moral sense are also human nature. This thesis will defend that 
realism does recognize the importance of morality, takes interests of others into 
account, and also tries to create a better world for all human beings. However, 
because they see the world as it is, they achieve it in a prudent and pragmatic way. 
The next chapter will move on to explore ethical realism. This thesis will apply 
ethical realism as a theoretical framework to assess Clinton’s foreign policy on 
humanitarian intervention in the 1990s.  
 
Conclusion 
As Volker Heins and David Chandler state, “Ethical foreign policy cannot be 
explained without understanding the moral void left by the end of the cold war which 
allowed Western nations to generate a strong sense of mission and a dramatic 
representation of their meaning in history.”142 The end of the Cold War left the only 
superpower, the United States, searching for an alternative focus of American 
energies to fill the vacuum left by containment’s evisceration. The 1991 Persian Gulf 
War provided an opportunity for President George H. W. Bush to situate the role of 
leadership for the United States and to place a moral and ethical slant on the new 
world order. This subsequently had an influence on the US-led intervention in 
northern Iraq, Operation Provide Comfort. The United States started to send its 
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troops for humanitarian missions, which was viewed as beyond their traditional role 
of defending the national interest.  
 
In the post-Cold War period, humanitarian intervention emerged from state failure to 
assure the meeting of humanitarian concerns and international peace and security. 
Humanitarian intervention has invited wide debate on its legality and legitimacy. 
Solidarists and liberalists argue that states have both a legal right and a moral 
obligation to intervene in extreme cases of human rights violations. Pluralists claim 
that there is a lack of consensus on what principles should underpin a doctrine of 
humanitarian intervention. They also argue that the right to govern individual or 
collective humanitarian intervention would undermine international order. However, 
there is a new version of the concept of security: that refugee flows caused by 
internal or intrastate conflicts will destabilize the region and pose a threat to 
international peace and security. Ultimately, the practices of humanitarian 
intervention in the 1990s help to construct the concept of the responsibility to protect, 
looking at interventions from the perspective of the victims rather than the 
interveners and hence granting the opportunity to redefine the legitimacy and legality 
of interventions made in the name of human rights and humanitarianism.143  
 
Humanitarian intervention also raises the question whether states have moral duties 
to save strangers in distant lands. Realists argue that the state’s ethical or moral 
duties are only restricted to its citizens. Postmodernists argue that political 
communities in the postmodern world are no longer restricted by the territorial 
boundaries of sovereign states. Critical theorists emphasise the importance of moral 
values on a global scale in postmodern times. ‘Kantian’ internationalists uphold the 
notion of the community of humankind, meaning that individual human beings have 
natural rights prior to the legal rights of sovereign states. The English School and 
cosmopolitan liberalists take the demand for justice and equality in world politics 
into consideration and reject the distinction between a values-based foreign policy 
and an interest-based foreign policy. However, it is important to accept the force of 
Morgenthau’s assertion of the nature of man as both a political and a moral animal. 
In the next chapter, we will look at ethical realism and its idea of “responsible 
power” as an opportunity to balance the tension between “ethics” and “politics”. 
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Chapter 3. 
Ethical Realism and Responsible Power 
 
Introduction 
Deep in minds of students of international relations, realism is not concerned with 
ethics or morality. National interests and security are the predominant concerns of the 
states and the states must engage in power politics and maximizing its capabilities in 
order to secure its survival. State leaders have a clear notion on their mind that they 
need to distance themselves from traditional morality, which attaches a positive value, 
and the greater good of humankind as a whole;144 and therefore, it seems that the 
only viable ethics for realists are those of self-interest. Statespeople only have a duty 
to their own people and a responsibility to ensure the survival of their state in the 
uncertain conditions of international anarchy.  
 
Self-help is moral duty and such self-interested ethics are considered as virtuous. 
State leaders are advised to work on material and strategic outcomes rather than to 
act in the name of universal morality. Ultimately, realist ethics is characterized as 
“amorality”. It especially appears opposite to universal ethics such as human 
rights.145 When it comes to the case of humanitarian intervention, realists would 
certainly suggest that the national interest over the interests of outsiders, and avoid 
risking the lives and interests of their own people. It seems to realists that there exists 
the conflicting tension between “ethics” and “politics”. 
 
However, many mid-twentieth-century realists have assumed that “anarchy could be 
mitigated by wise leadership and the pursuit of the national interest in ways that are 
compatible with international order”. Moreover, they observed that if states only 
behaved in a manner on the basis of power and self-interest without considering any 
moral and ethical principles, they would possibly produce self-defeating results.146 
In the meantime, there are more and more IR scholars attempting to bring ethical 
agenda into realist approach to international relations and trying to make 
international politics more humane and within the limits of what international 
anarchy allows. They make the efforts to advocate policies driven by ethical agenda 
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such as trying to mitigate human suffering.147  
 
This research is situated within this apparent introduction of a strong ethical 
dimension into the study of international relations. This chapter will explore ethical 
realism and the idea of responsible power. First, it will outline key discourses of the 
intellectual fathers of ethical realism, including Reinhold Niebuhr, Hans Morgenthau, 
and George Kennan. Meanwhile, it will also explore Weber’s conception of “ethic of 
responsibility”, attempting to balance the tension between “ethics” and “politics”. 
Next, it will apply ethical realism to the conduct of international affairs and propose 
the concept of “responsible power”. Finally, it will suggest ethical realism as a 
guiding principle for the only superpower, the United States, in the aftermath of the 
Cold War. 
 
3.1 Ethical Realism  
In Reconstructing Realism, Alastair J.H. Murray proposed to return to the realism 
contained in the works of Reinhold Niebuhr, Hans Morgenthau, and George Kennan 
as an alternative perspective to approaching contemporary debates about 
international relations in general and international ethics in particular. Murray 
suggested that realism needed to move beyond the historical tradition of political 
thought articulated by Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Hobbes in order to fit in with 
modern normative theory. The revival of interest in Niebuhr, Morgenthau, and 
Kennan provide an opportunity to reconstruct realist moral theory.148 In the article 
‘Ethical Realism and Contemporary Challenges’, Anatol Lieven and John Hulsman 
go further to identify Niebuhr, Morgenthau, and Kennan as the intellectual fathers of 
ethical realism.149  
 
Reinhold Niebuhr (1892-1971) was a Christian theologian but his writings have 
contributed to the evolution of realism as an approach to international politics. 
Kennan called Niebuhr as “the father of us all”. Niebuhr was famous for his 
Christian conception of human nature and human society. As he described, “Man is 
insecure and involved in natural contingency; he seeks to overcome his insecurity by 
a will-to-power which overreaches the limits of human creatureliness… All of his 
intellectual and cultural pursuits, therefore, become infected with the sin of pride. 
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Man’s pride and will-to-power disturb the harmony of creation.”150  
 
“The survival impulse, which man shares with the animals, is regarded as the 
normative form of his egoistic drive”; however, Niebuhr further described: 
 
The most significant distinction between the human and the animal world is that animal impulses are 
“spiritualized” in man. Human capacities for evil as well as for good are derived from this 
spiritualization. There is, of course, always a natural survival impulse at the core of all human 
ambition. But this survival impulse cannot be neatly disentangled from two forms of its 
spiritualization. The one form is the desire to fulfill the potentialities of life and not merely to maintain 
its existence. Man is the kind of animal who cannot merely live. If he lives at all, he is bound to seek 
the realization of his true nature; and to his true nature belongs his fulfillment in the lives of others. 
The will to live is thus transmuted into the will to self-realization; and self-realization involves 
self-giving in relation to others….. the will-to-live is [also] spiritually transmuted into the 
will-to-power or into the desire for “power and glory”. Man, being more than a natural creature, is not 
interested merely in physical survival but in prestige and social approval.”151 
  
Niebuhr’s primary concern was to reassert the relevance of a Christian approach to 
man and society,152 and he aimed to combine political realism with the tradition of 
Christian social ethics.153 He demonstrated that national interests had to be qualified 
by universal ethics.154 But his approach to ethical and political action is quite 
pragmatic. In other words, he was concerned about compromise and pragmatic 
choices instead of theological or ideological purity.155   
 
Hans Morgenthau (1904-1980), whom Niebuhr called “the brilliant and authoritative 
political realist”, was a professor of political science. He was identified as the father 
of modern realist thought in the United States.156 Despite placing power and national 
interest at the centre of his analysis, Morgenthau also emphasised: “Political realism 
is aware of the moral significance of political action. It is also aware of the 
ineluctable tension between the moral command and the requirements of successful 
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political action.”157 He maintained, “Man is a political animal by nature; he is a 
scientist by chance or choice; he is a moralist because he is a man.”158 “In brief,” 
Morgenthau described, “man is also a moral being. It is this side of man which the 
age of science has obscured and distorted, if not obliterated, by trying to reduce 
moral problems to scientific propositions.”159  
 
Therefore, Morgenthau insisted that “a mature political science must combine 
utopian and realistic thought, purpose and analysis, ethics and politics”. For 
Morgenthau, “It is a dangerous thing to be a Machiavelli. It is a disastrous thing to be 
a Machiavelli without virtue.”160 In sum, as Morgenthau stated:   
 
Political realism considers a rational foreign policy to be good foreign policy; for only a rational 
foreign policy minimizes risks and maximizes benefits and, hence, complies both with the moral 
precept of prudence and the political requirement of success….  Aware of the inevitable gap between 
good - that is, rational - foreign policy and foreign policy as it actually is, political realism maintains 
not only that theory must focus upon the rational elements of political reality, but also that foreign 
policy ought to be rational in view of its own moral and practical purposes.161 
 
George Kennan (1904-2005) was a US diplomat, serving as United States 
ambassador to the Soviet Union during the Second World War, head of the State 
Department’s Policy Planning Staff, and key player in the formulation of the 
Marshall Plan. After he left the Foreign Service, he pursued an academic interest in 
the diplomatic history of early Soviet-American relations at Princeton University. His 
Foreign Affairs article “The Sources of Soviet Conduct by X”, which was largely 
composed out of the text of his “Long Telegram” of 1946, set out the policy of 
“containment” that was to be followed in different forms by every US administration 
until the end of the cold war.162 Instead of the pursuit of direct competition against 
the Soviet power, Kennan called for a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant 
containment of Russian expansive tendencies.163  
 
Kennan viewed man as a deeply flawed creature: “I have no high opinion of human 
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beings: they are always going to fight and do nasty things to each other. They are 
always going to be part animal, governed by their emotions and subconscious drives 
rather than by reason.”164 But at the same time he also considered man as a creature 
capable of striving for some justice in an imperfect world. Although he was 
suspicious of the utopian moralistic-legalistic approach to international affairs, he 
was not only concerned about “power politics” alone but also attempted to bridge 
morality and power. As Joel H Rosenthal described Kennan’s position: “For him 
(Kennan), there could be no separation of the moral from the practical: an amoral 
conception of realpolitik was unacceptable.”165 Kennan’s conception of foreign 
policy was suffused with moral purpose; nevertheless, for highest possible 
achievement of diplomacy, he suggested a “moderate” approach.166 
 
To sum up, the modern ethical realists recognize that the controlling nature of 
selfishness and egoism is inescapable and therefore the darkness of human nature 
ultimately leads to an imperfect human world. As Michael J. Smith concluded, at the 
heart of Niebuhr’s Christian doctrine of human nature: “Man is an ‘organic unity’ of 
a spirit capable of self-transcendence and a creature that sins inevitably.” 167 
Nevertheless, instead of Machiavelli’s harsh realism and the Hobbesian logic of 
competition, ethical realists draw on a Christian intellectual tradition stretching back 
through Edmund Burke to St. Augustine. An Augustinian perspective centered on an 
ethics of imperfectionism; that to work for a better world in an inevitably imperfect 
one requires a realistic view of human nature and human society.168  
 
Morgenthau claimed that political realism “aims at the realization of the lesser evil 
rather than of the absolute good”.169 He wrote: 
 
It is only the awareness of the tragic presence of evil in all political action which at least enables man 
to choose the lesser evil and to be as good as he can be in an evil world. Neither science nor ethics nor 
politics can resolve the conflict between politics and ethics into harmony. We have no choice between 
power and the common good. To act successfully, that is, according to the rules of the political art, is 
political wisdom. To know with despair that the political act is inevitably evil, and to act nevertheless, 
is moral courage. To choose among several expedient actions the least evil one is moral judgement. In 
the combination of political wisdom, moral courage, and moral judgment, man reconciles his political 
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nature with his moral destiny.170  
 
Consequently, if one wants to act ethically in the political sphere, one has to clearly 
recognize the role of power and make a choice of the lesser evil in every concrete 
human situation.171 
 
As a result, an Augustinian framework, in which a transcendental morality could be 
combined with a realistic appraisal of the conditions of life, provides a compromise 
between abstract moralism and pure realpolitik, and thus a solution of the tension 
between power politics and cosmopolitan ethics.172  Also, in his classic essay 
‘Politics as a Vocation’, Max Weber outlined the central problem of political ethics 
and proposed the conception of “ethic of responsibility”, attempting to balance the 
tension between “ethics” and “politics”.173 Weber stated that “the career of politics 
grants a feeling of power. The knowledge of influencing men, of participating in 
power over them”. Therefore, striving for power is one of the driving forces of all 
politics and an unavoidable means for the politician. “Power instinct” belongs to his 
normal qualities, but in addition to power as the unavoidable means, leaders may use 
power as serving national, humanitarian, social, ethical, cultural, worldly, or religious 
ends. Then the question for the professional politician is how to do justice to this 
power and to the responsibility that power imposes upon him.  
 
What are the relations between “ethics” and “politics”? Weber assumed that “all 
ethically oriented conduct may be guided by one of two fundamentally differing and 
irreconcilably opposed maxims: conduct can be oriented to an ‘ethic of ultimate 
ends’ or to an ‘ethic of responsibility’”.174 As Weber wrote,  
 
… This is not to say that an ethic of ultimate ends is identical with irresponsibility, or that an ethic of 
responsibility is identical with unprincipled opportunism. Naturally nobody says that. However, there 
is an abysmal contrast between conduct that follows the maxim of an ethic of ultimate ends – that is, 
in religious terms, ‘The Christian does rightly and leaves the results with the Lord’ – and conduct that 
follows the maxim of an ethic of responsibility, in which case one has to give an account of the 
foreseeable results of one’s action.  
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You may demonstrate to a convinced syndicalist, believing in an ethic of ultimate ends, that his action 
will result in increasing the opportunities of reaction, in increasing the oppression of his class, and 
obstructing its ascent – and you will not make the slightest impression upon him. If an action of good 
intent leads to bad results, then, in the actor’s eyes, not he but the world, or the stupidity of other men, 
or God’s will who made them thus, is responsible for the evil. However, a man who believes in an 
ethic of responsibility takes account of precisely the average deficiencies of people; as Fichte has 
correctly said, he does not even have the right to presuppose their goodness and perfection. He does 
not feel in a position to burden others with the results of his own actions so far as he was able to 
foresee them; he will say: these results are ascribed to my action.175 
 
In Joel H. Rosenthal’s interpretation: 
 
The first phrase is “ethic of ultimate ends”. It refers to intention, and it holds that intent is the most 
important factor in considering the moral dimension of an action. Therefore, a person subscribing to 
the ethic of ultimate ends would have less regard for the actual consequences of his action than for its 
intended effect. Opposed to this ethic is the “ethic of responsibility”. This phrase refers to 
consequences and implies that the morality of an act is related directly to the results that stem from it. 
Intent is secondary. A person subscribing to the ethic of responsibility would judge the morality of an 
act by the outcome it produces.176  
 
That is to say, in the oxymoronic phrase, “political ethics”, there are two standards of 
morality: “one for the ideal world and one for the real world – the world of politics. 
Neither standard is superior to the other, but each is appropriate to its own realm: 
ideal standards must hold for the ideal realm, and pragmatic standards must hold for 
the political realm”. In other words, “‘ethics’ deals with the way the world ought to 
be, ‘politics’ with the way it is”. Weber’s model of ethical dualism illustrates the 
paradox of “political ethics”.  
 
Therefore, Weber argued that “whoever wants to engage in politics at all, and 
especially in politics as a vocation, has to realize these ethical paradoxes. He must 
know what he is responsible for what may come about under the impact of these 
paradoxes”.177  
 
“Politics is made with the head, but it is certainly not made with the head alone; in 
particular when a mature man – no matter whether old or young in years – is aware 
of a responsibility for the consequences of his conduct and really feels such 
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responsibility with heart and soul”. For Weber, “An ethic of ultimate ends and an 
ethic of responsibility are not absolute contrasts but rather supplements, which only 
in unison constitute a genuine man – a man who can have the ‘calling for 
politics’.”178  
 
This ultimately comes to a pragmatic conception of morality articulated in ethical 
realism. Morgenthau clearly claimed that: 
 
The contest between utopianism and realism is not tantamount to a contest between principle and 
expediency, morality and immorality, although some spokesmen for the former would like to have it 
that way. The contest is rather between one type of political morality and another type of political 
morality, one taking as its standard universal moral principles abstractly formulated, the other 
weighing these principles against the moral requirements of concrete political action, the irrelative 
merits to be decided by a prudent evaluation of the political consequences to which they are likely to 
lead.179 
 
He distinguished between judging action by its conformity with moral law in ethics 
and judging action in relation to its consequences in the real world in political ethics. 
“Realism,” he wrote, “then, considers prudence - the weighing of the consequences 
of alternative political actions - to be the supreme virtue in politics. Ethics in the 
abstract judges action by its conformity with the moral law; political ethics judges 
action by its political consequences.” 180  Consequently, the virtue of prudence 
enables a moral man in an immoral society to seek the possibilities for humanity.  
 
Furthermore, Morgenthau claimed: “What is done in the political sphere by its very 
nature concerns others who must suffer from unwise action. What is here done with 
good intentions but unwisely and hence with disastrous results is morally defective; 
for it violates the ethics of responsibility to which all action affecting others, and 
hence political action par excellence, is subject.” As he quoted from President 
Abraham Lincoln’s speech: “I do the very best I know how, the very best I can, and I 
mean to keep doing so until the end. If the end brings me out all right, what is said 
against me won’t amount to anything. If the end brings me out wrong, ten angels 
swearing I was right would make no difference.”181  
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Prudence, therefore, becomes a guideline for shaping goals and deciding on actions, 
in particular with regard to the launching of military operations.182 For example, 
referring to US external undertakings and involvement, Kennan stated: 
 
No divine hand has ever reached down to make us, as a national community, anything more than what 
we are, or to elevate is in that capacity over the remainder of mankind. We have great military power – 
yes; but there is, as Reinhold Niebuhr so brilliantly and persuasively argued, no power, individual or 
collective, without some associated guilt. And if there were any qualities that lie within our ability to 
cultivate that might set us off from the rest of world, these would be the virtues of modesty and 
humility.183 
 
Hence, ethical realists shared a belief in the values of prudence, moderation, and 
humility.184 
 
Overall, ethical realism rejects the juxtaposition of “power” politics and “moral” 
politics. As Morgenthau wrote: 
 
Morality is not just another branch of human activity, co-ordinate to the substantive branches, such as 
politics or economics. Quite to the contrary, it is superimposed upon them, limiting the choice of ends 
and means and delineating the legitimate sphere of a particular branch of action altogether. This latter 
function is particularly vital for the political sphere. For the political actor is peculiarly tempted to 
blind himself to the limits of his power and thereby to overstep the boundaries of both prudence and 
morality.185  
 
Moreover, the conducting of international affairs in an ethical realist spirit leads to 
the respecting of the views and interests of other nations.186 Niebuhr noted that: “It 
is a concern for both the self and the other in which the self, whether individual or 
collective, preserves a “decent respect for the opinions of mankind,” derived from a 
modest awareness of the limits of its own knowledge and power.” 187  Also, 
Morgenthau maintained that: “The national interest of a nation which is conscious 
not only of its own interests but also of that of other nations must be defined in terms 
compatible with the latter. In a multinational world this is a requirement of political 
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morality; in an age of total war it is also one of the conditions for survival.”188 
Lieven and Hulsman argued that states have to serve their national interests as well 
as act in ways that will serve the good as far as possible. Otherwise, the world will 
quickly go to hell if states always act according to their own self-interests.189 
Therefore, the international strategy on achievable results rather than good intentions, 
a close study of interests of other states and a willingness to accommodate them 
when possible constitutes the philosophical root of ethical realism.  
 
3.2 Responsible Power  
The application of ethical realism to the conduct of international affairs involves the 
assertion that powerful states should have responsibilities and exercise leadership 
with ethical obligations. As Niebuhr noted, “Government is never completely under 
the control of a total community. There is always some class, whether economic 
overlords or political bureaucrats, who may use the organs of government for their 
special advantages. This is true of both nations and the community of nations. 
Powerful classes dominate the administration of justice in the one, and powerful 
nations in the other.”190 In other words, “as powerful classes organise a nation, so 
powerful nations organise a crude society of nations”.191  
 
It could be said that hierarchy and inequality also exist in the society of states. 
Although “sovereign equality is a foundational principle of the Westphalian 
order”,192 it could not be denied that a hierarchic relationship exists in the global 
system. For instance, when the principle of sovereignty became a global norm as a 
result of colonial independence after 1945, the emergence of ‘quasi-states’ has shown 
that their sovereignty is more juridical than empirical in the post-colonial game.193 
Georg Sørensen has argued, “It is clear that the legal equality between modern and 
post-colonial states is not matched by substantial equality; post-colonial states are 
much weaker players.”194  
 
This therefore leads David A. Lake to state that “the norm of juridical or international 
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legal sovereignty has taken such deep roots that it is unseemly or impolite to point 
out and talk about hierarchies in contemporary international relations; nevertheless, 
as we have seen, “hierarchy is still there, lying in the middle of the table”.195 Since 
“states are simply groupings of men”,196 “among states as among individuals”,197 
hierarchy is an essential part of international relations just as it is in a society within 
a state. The absence of a world government among states and no higher authority to 
regulate their relations with each other leads to anarchy in the system of sovereign 
states, and hierarchy is present in this anarchic order. Or more precisely, as Jack 
Donnelly described, it is “hierarchy in anarchy”.198  
 
Since every state is different in terms of territory, population, size, military strength, 
economic development, culture, and social structure, Robert Jackson reinforced that 
“the practical ethics of world politics cannot ignore the fact that states differ 
enormously in their particular characteristics and capacities and allowance must be 
made for those differences”. Consequently, “a great power has fundamental global 
capabilities and responsibilities that minor or medium powers do not have”.199 
“Because states are grossly unequal in power”,200  “great powers have greater 
responsibilities than lesser powers”201 to promote international order. In other words, 
it is expected that those with power act responsibly. This leads to the assertion that 
along with power comes responsibility and constructs the concept of “responsible 
power”.  
 
The realism of responsible power came from Weber’s conception of the ethic of 
responsibility. In ‘Politics as a Vocation’, Weber described a ‘state’ as “a human 
community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical 
force within a given territory”; and ‘politics’ as “striving to share power or striving to 
influence the distribution of power, either among states or among groups within a 
state”. “He who is active in politics strives for power either as a means in serving 
other aims, ideal or egoistic, or as ‘power for power’s sake,’ that is, in order to enjoy 
the prestige-feeling that power gives.”202 However, “the honor of political leader, of 
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the leading statesman lies precisely in an exclusive personal responsibility for what 
he does, a responsibility he cannot and must not reject or transfer”.203 Furthermore, 
Weber pointed out that irresponsibility is one of two kinds of deadly sins in the field 
of politics. A politician’s irresponsibility reflected that “he enjoy power merely for 
power’s sake without a substantive purpose”. As a direct consequence, “the mere 
‘power politician’ may get strong effects, but actually his work leads nowhere and is 
senseless”.204  
 
Obviously, for Weber, a true politician has more than a simple lust for power but 
possesses the proper ethics of statecraft.205 In Weber’s Parliament and Government, 
he wrote: “The struggle for personal power and the resulting personal responsibility 
is the lifeblood of a politician,” however, that struggle must never “become purely 
personal self-intoxication”.206 In sum, Weber’s ideal political actor is “aware of the 
ethical paradoxes facing him and remains willing to act”, while at the same time, is 
“aware of the practical consequences of his actions” and takes the responsibility for 
the outcome of his actions. “Because he is responsible to his constituents and must 
take action that will produce consequences favorable to them, he cannot afford the 
luxury of idealism”.207  
 
On the other hand, it is also worthy to note that in Moral Man and Immoral Society, 
Niebuhr maintained that “human beings are endowed by nature with both selfish and 
unselfish impulses”; however, “his natural impulses prompt him not only to the 
perpetuation of life beyond himself but to some achievement of harmony with other 
life”.208 Therefore, for Niebuhr, although man is a lion – a ferocious and carnivorous 
animal, he is also “a curious kind of lion who dreams of the day when the lion and 
the lamb will lie down together”.209 As Lieven and Hulsman put it, “acknowledging 
reality does not mean approving that reality or abandoning the duty to try to change 
that reality for the better.”210  
 
As a result, despite living in an imperfect world, “individual men may be moral in 
the sense that they are able to consider interests other than their own in determining 
problems of conduct, and are capable, on occasion, of preferring the advantages of 
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others to their own.”211 For that reason, “the dependence of ethical attitudes upon 
personal contacts and direct relations contributes to the moral chaos of a civilization, 
in which life is related to life mechanically and not organically, and in which mutual 
responsibilities increase and personal contacts decrease”.212  
 
This is the same when applied to the international sphere. In distinguishing his 
position of a pragmatic understanding of international morality, Morgenthau wrote: 
“Let me say... in criticism of those who deny that moral principles are applicable to 
international politics, that all human actions in some way are subject to moral 
judgement. We cannot act but morally because we are men.”213 That is to say, 
“morality is an inherent and inescapable element of international relations – as it is of 
any sphere of human relations”. After all, “statespeople are human beings too”.214 
 
As mentioned before, ethical realism claims that the conduct of foreign policy could 
not act only according to national interests and the pursuit of power without taking 
the moral factor into consideration. Ethical realism thus embodies Weber’s notion of 
an ethic of responsibility. Lieven and Hulsman further extend the notion: “Under an 
ethic of responsibility, having good intentions is not remotely adequate. One must 
weigh the likely consequences and, perhaps most important, judge what actions are 
truly necessary to achieve essential goals.” 215  Or, to borrow Jackson’s word, 
‘responsibility’ here, it could be explained as follows:  
 
Anyone who is in a position of responsibility is accountable to somebody and is also answerable for 
something. Both of those dimensions of responsibility are defined constitutionally by the sovereign 
state and the society of states. At a minimum stateleaders are answerable to their citizens and to the 
leaders of other states. Statespeople are answerable for their policies and for failures of policy.216  
 
In other words, it is that the “legal and moral duties of state leaders in exercising the 
powers of their offices in the conduct of foreign policy: the public decisions and 
actions for which they are answerable”. Jackson thus interprets Weber’s notion: “the 
distinctive responsibilities of state leaders derive from their control of the state’s 
monopoly of legitimate force: with power comes responsibility”.217 For those who 
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attain leadership positions of dominant powers in particular, it is expected that they 
use power in relation to its possible political and ethical ramifications in an 
anarchistic international order and a hierarchical international society. In sum, they 
are expected to exercise responsible power by making pragmatic choices without 
ignoring the moral dimension of their decisions when facing morally ambiguous 
situations.  
 
As a result, responsible power “derives its meaning from what the statesman was 
responsible to”.218 It thus involves judgment and accountability, which is similar to 
what utilitarianism emphasises, that the standard of judgement are practical 
results.219 Above all, to quote Lieven and Hulsman:   
 
Ethical realism does not seek to evade responsibility for necessarily ruthless actions or to whitewash 
their cruelty. It does, however, insist that these actions, and the strategies of which they form a part, 
should be truly necessary. For example, Niebuhr argued that the massive Allied bombardment of cities 
in Germany and Japan was morally defensible, but the American bombardment of civilians in Vietnam 
was not. 
 
Indeed, a certain capacity for ruthlessness in making such moral choices lies at the heart of ethical 
realism, though ruthless action is only acceptable if it is truly necessary in defense of the country or 
higher human goals against threats to civilization itself. As Burke said, it all depends on the 
circumstances. The Allied bombardment of Germany and Japan was part of a necessary war to 
preserve humanity from the twin scourges of Nazism and Japanese militarism. On the other hand, 
Niebuhr, like Morgenthau, Kennan …. opposed the war in Vietnam not so much for its cruelty but 
because they rightly saw the war as irrelevant or even detrimental to the basic struggle against Soviet 
Communism. Its cruelty had no moral justification in necessity.220 
 
Consequently, “foreign policy must be carefully calculated and the responsibility for 
its consequences fully accepted”;221 and, “responsibility for making foreign policy 
or military policy clearly rests with the leading officials of the state, particularly the 
politicians”.222  Responsibility, therefore, becomes another key virtue of ethical 
realism. 
 
Furthermore, it is assumed that international ethics must start with “the ethics of 
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statecraft because statespeople – leaders of the major powers especially – are the 
ones who have the greatest ability and opportunity to affect the lives of the largest 
number of people around the world, particularly, with regard to military power”.223 
In the new post-Cold War world system, major powers, including the United States, 
Russia, the European Union, Japan and China, emerge as a new concert of powers to 
control the organization of world order.224 Or more specifically, the five permanent 
members of the UN Security Council could be defined as the foremost military 
powers and the Group of Eight (G8) as leading economic powers.225 For instance, in 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, it indicates: “The Security Council shall determine 
the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and 
shall….. decide what measures shall be taken……to maintain or restore international 
peace and security.” Therefore, the responsibility to uphold international peace and 
security rests on those great powers.226  
 
With regard to “the ethics of statecraft”, as addressed in Weber’s concept of the 
ethics of responsibility, they are understood as situational ethics in which both 
circumstances and judgment have an extremely important place rather than an 
absolute morality divorced from possibility and necessity.227 It is an applied ethics: 
“the normative criteria that apply to state leaders in their conduct of foreign 
policy”. 228  It suggests that stateleaders or foreign policy-makers must make 
responsible choices in confining circumstances. As Jackson expressed: 
 
When we judge the conduct of state leaders with reference to the virtues, we are not judging it by a 
rule or a consequence. Instead, we are judging it in relation to what could reasonably be expected of a 
person of sound mind and good character in the circumstances. For example, we expect leaders to 
base their policies on correct information and to conduct them with due care and attention to the 
situation at hand: in short, we expect them to use prudential ethics. This assumes that leaders are 
responsible agents.229 
 
This reflects what Edmund Burke termed “the empire of circumstances”.230 As 
Burke described: 
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I cannot stand forward and give praise or blame to anything which relates to human actions, and 
human concerns, on a simple view of the object, as it stands stripped of every relation, in all the 
nakedness and solitude of metaphysical abstraction. Circumstances (which with some gentlemen pass 
for nothing) give in reality to every political principle its distinguishing color and discriminating 
effect.231  
 
This is similar to what Weber expressed: “relentlessness in viewing the realities of 
life, and the ability to face such realities and to measure up to them…. [the politician] 
then acts by following an ethic of responsibility and somewhere he reaches the point 
where he says: ‘Here I stand; I can do no other.’”232 
 
Ultimately, it helps powerful states consolidate their standings as moral leaderships if 
they act responsibly. As Joanne B. Ciulla asserts:  
 
Leadership is not a person or a position. It is a complex moral leadership between people, based on 
trust, obligation, commitment, emotion, and a shared vision of the good. Ethics is about how we 
distinguish between right and wrong, or good and evil in relation to the actions, volitions, and 
character of human beings. Ethics lie at the heart of all human relationships and hence at the heart of 
the relationship between leaders and followers.233  
 
Moreover, “a leader helps people change for the better and empowers them to 
improve their lives and lives of others”.234 It therefore applies to relations between 
states. And if leadership is about “change and sharing common purpose and 
values”,235 it thus applies to relations between alliances in particular. Consequently, 
in a global political community, it is expected that great powers should not only 
protect their own national interests but also help other states to protect human rights. 
As Niebuhr demonstrated:  
 
It is possible for both individuals and groups [including nations] to relate concern for the other with 
interest and concern for the self. There are endless varieties of creativity in community; for neither the 
individual nor the community can realize itself except in relation to, and in encounter with, other 
individuals and groups… A valid moral outlook for both individuals and for groups, therefore, sets no 
limits to the creative possibility of concern for others, but makes no claims that such creativity ever 
annuls the power of self-concern or removes the peril of the pretension if the force of residual egotism 
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is not acknowledged.236 
 
Therefore, human beings are willing to do good in relation to others rather than 
simply considering their own concerns and interests. And “the ultimate sources of 
social conflicts and injustices are to be found in the ignorance and selfishness of 
men.”237 For that reason, if leaders or powerful nations sacrifice morality for 
self-interest, it would not only involve ethical failures of leadership, since ethical 
failure of human behaviour is egoistic, but also lead to a world in a state of chaos.  
 
3.3 Ethical Realism and US Foreign Policy 
Ethical realism thus seems especially useful as a potential guiding philosophy for the 
United States and its role as the only superpower in the aftermath of the Cold War. 
Lieven and Hulsman mention that ethical realism combines two essential elements of 
strong US tradition in thinking about the conduct of international affairs. That is, a 
majority of Americans have always wanted their country’s foreign policy to serve the 
interests and security of the United States as well as to conform to certain ethical 
constraints and to pursue certain moral goals.238 This reminds us of the Jeffersonian 
tradition, namely American exceptionalism. Basically, it means that “America is 
unique, is different in crucial ways from most other countries”,239 or in a sense that 
“‘the American way’ is a model that all others would do well to emulate”.240 It 
emphasises that the United States is unique in defining its raison d’être 
ideologically.241 Leo Strauss has stated, “The United States of America may be said 
to be the only country in the world which was founded in explicit opposition to 
Machiavellian principles, to the power of the Prince.”242 Moreover, Thomas Paine 
described that the American Revolution, “was not made for America alone, but for 
mankind”.243  
 
James M. Scott and A. Lane Crothers have attempted to identify the societal impulses 
and foreign policy orientations to connect these aspects of culture and foreign affairs 
within which US foreign policy is made. In term of the societal impulses, it could 
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range between moralism/idealism and pragmatism/realism. Moralism/Idealism tends 
to promote certain values rather than defend various interests in foreign policy. 
Therefore, moralists/idealists assert that the conduct of US foreign policy should be 
motivated by moral principles. In their point of view, “a peaceful and prosperous 
world can be created according to universal (i.e., US) moral principles, so that 
adherence to these (US-defined) principles of right and wrong are as important as 
some conception of interests”. This makes moralism/idealism become the 
“missionary urge to remake the world in the American image” in order to “save” it. 
Consequently, it involves “a sense of duty and destiny best defined as the ‘US 
mission’ to serve as ‘the custodian of the future of humanity’”.  
 
However, pragmatism/realism tends to “eschew broad moral, ideological, or 
doctrinal purposes in favor of a concern with concrete interests and a results-based 
standard of evaluation”. As a result, it turns to pragmatic approaches to problem 
solving, or ad hoc problem solving. 244  Despite still being within the broad 
parameters of US values, it asserts that the conduct of foreign policy should be 
concerned with interests and necessity, “case-by-case-ism,” and “a focus on the short 
term rather than the long term”.245 
 
In term of the foreign policy orientations, it could range between isolationism and 
internationalism. In a simple way, isolationism could be defined as “the desire to 
keep the United States out of substantial political and military involvement with the 
world (especially Europe)”. Or it could be summarized as “a preference for a passive 
response to the world whereby the United States serves chiefly as an example, 
without assuming responsibility for the world, acting as agent to reform the world, or 
intervening in the affairs of others on the world”.246 A symbolic illustration would be 
the speech by Secretary of State John Quincy Adams: “Wherever the standard of 
freedom and independence has been or shall be unfurled, there will [America’s] heart, 
her benedictions, and her prayers be. But she goes not abroad in search of monsters 
to destroy. She is the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all. She is the 
champion and vindicator of her own. She will recommend the general cause by the 
countenance of her voice, and by the benignant sympathy of her example.”247 
Therefore, “it was not for the United States to impose its own principles of 
government upon the rest of mankind, but, rather, to attract the rest of mankind 
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through the example of the United States”.248  
 
On the other hand, internationalism supports the United States to actively get 
involved in the world in order to protect US interests and provide necessary 
American leadership. Therefore, internationalism involves “the willingness to 
exercise power, to intervene – politically, militarily, and economically – in affairs 
around the world, to exercise leadership in world affairs, and even to transplant 
American values and institutions”. An illustration of this can be found in President 
Harry Truman’s statements, “The free people of the world look to us for support in 
maintaining their freedoms… If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the 
peace of the world – and we shall certainly endanger the welfare of our own 
nation.”249  
 
American exceptionalism implies that US foreign policy consists of a combination of 
these dimensions. Good examples were President Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow 
Wilson’s beliefs that US foreign policy “must combine power and principle, realism 
and idealism, national self-interest and an altruistic international mission”. Both of 
them viewed their foreign policies as “motivated by something nobler than the 
cold-blooded calculus of raison d’état or realpolitik”.250 As Deputy Secretary of 
State Strobe Talbott once stated, “The American People want their country’s foreign 
policy rooted in idealpolitik as well as realpolitik.”251 Ultimately, ethical realism fits 
this US tradition.  
 
Another reason for ethical realism to provide a guiding philosophy for US foreign 
policy is that the United States is not merely one of a number of equal powers within 
the Western alliance, but enjoys a position of leadership or primacy in the world 
since the end of the Cold War. Thus, the role of American power has been essential. 
The American power emerged on the world stage when the Second World War came 
to an end. It eventually joined with other great powers in the design and the 
management of international institutions afterwards. For instance, Bretton Woods 
resulted in the establishment of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco in the creation of the UN, and the 
Washington Treaty in the founding of NATO.252 During the Cold War, the United 
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States stood as the role of leadership in the containment of the Soviet Union and 
communism as well as promotion of an open, multilateral economy in a bipolar 
world.253  
 
When the Soviet Union collapsed and the Cold War came to an end, it altered the 
international “playing field” of US foreign policy254 and left the world with only one 
superpower. The post-cold war world era has been accompanied by the notion of 
American decline and the unipolar moment for the United States.255 Nevertheless, 
perhaps the new post-cold war world could be better described as multilevel 
interdependence. As Joseph S. Nye stated: 
 
No single hierarchy describes adequately a world politics with multiple structures. The distribution of 
power in world politics has become like a layer cake. The top military layer is largely unipolar, for 
there is no other military power comparable to the United States. The economic middle layer is 
tripolar (Europe, Japan and the United States account for two-thirds of the world’s products) and has 
been for two decades. The bottom layer of transnational interdependence (e.g. private actors in global 
capital markets, the transnational spread of technology, a number of issues such as drug trade, AIDS, 
migration, global warming flowing across borders outside of governmental control) shows a diffusion 
of power.256 
 
Above all, the United States lacked a consensus on how to exercise its power in the 
post-cold war world. As Scott and Crothers quoted the words of Charles W. Kegley Jr. 
and Eugene R. Wittkopf, “The post-cold war world lacks the “very things that gave 
structure and purpose to post-World War American foreign policy…. Now these 
guideposts, which had imposed a rough sense of order and discipline on the world, 
are gone.”257 Soon after President George H. W. Bush’s New World Order, ethnic 
conflicts and civil wars broke out in different parts of the world, for instance, in 
Yugoslavia and Somalia. It led to the post-cold war world from “new world order” to 
“clash of civilizations”, from the “end of history” to “global chaos”.258  
 
The question soon becomes: How did US military action take place in brutal civil 
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conflicts? As Operation Restore Hope, the US-led United Task Force (UNITAF), 
began in Somalia in December 1992, it sparked the debate whether a humanitarian 
operation was in America’s interest. Acting Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger 
stated: 
 
This debate is around the issue of our national interest, and that’s a legitimate issue. But the fact of the 
matter is that a thousand people are starving to death every day, and that is not going to get better if 
we don’t do something about it, and it is in an area where we can affect events. There are other parts 
of the world where things are equally tragic, but where the cost of trying to change things would be 
monumental. In my view, Bosnia is one of those.259 
 
National Security Adviser Anthony Lake has put it well:  
 
There is a moral imperative that is all the deeper with our superpower status. How can America sit on 
the sidelines when innocent civilians are being slaughtered? We lose credibility on other issues if we 
turn our back on humanitarian tragedies. More important, it is wrong to do so. With our great power 
comes great responsibility and leadership in human as well as geopolitical terms. Not acting when you 
can is as much a decision as becoming involved. This does not mean that we must always act. But 
there are consequences when we do not.260 
 
On 26 February 1999, President Bill Clinton delivered his speech in San Francisco, 
saying: 
 
It’s easy …. to say that we really have no interests in who lives in this or that valley in Bosnia, or who 
owns a strip of brush land in the Horn of Africa, or some piece of parched earth by the Jordan River. 
But the true measure of our interests lies not in how small or distant these places are, or in whether we 
have trouble pronouncing their names. The question we must ask is what are the consequences to our 
security of letting conflicts fester and spread. We cannot, indeed, we should not, do everything or be 
everywhere. But where our values and our interests are at stake, and where we can make a difference, 
we must be prepared to do so.261 
 
Moreover, on 22 June 1999, when Clinton gave a speech to NATO-led Kosovo Force 
(KFOR) in Macedonia, he said:  
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If we can say to the people of the world, whether you live in Africa or central Europe or any other 
place, if somebody comes after innocent civilians and tries to kill them en masse because of their race, 
their ethnic background, or their religion, and it is within our power to stop it, we will stop it.262  
 
The issue of humanitarian interventions gave the United States an opportunity to 
project its power to defend its moral values. Facing such moral quandaries in 
Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Rwanda, and Kosovo, how did the Clinton administration 
develop its foreign policy-making on humanitarian intervention and decide to send 
US troops to save strangers? This thus becomes an important subject for applying 
ethical realism as theoretical framework to explore. 
 
However, before we move on to case studies and evaluate Clinton’s foreign policy on 
humanitarian interventions, we will look at the application of the tenets of ethical 
realism in examining some cases of US foreign policy. First of all, the Marshall Plan 
and containment policy, carried out by the Truman administration, were regarded as 
the best illustrations of the principles of ethical realism. The Marshall Plan, an 
imitative to save Western Europe from Communism, was not only in the national 
interests of the United States but also in the service of higher moral ground. It was a 
mixture of the idealistic and the practical that has characterized US foreign policy at 
its best.263 As President Truman himself commented, “I am doing it because it is 
right, I am doing it because it is necessary to be done if we are going to survive 
ourselves.”264 The central project of containment was neither to engage in regime 
change nor to pursue military supremacy.265 Instead, it aimed to manage potential 
threats in a world of scarce military resources and, more importantly, to involve war 
as a last resort in response to an imminent threat.266  
 
Consequently, when the tenets of ethical realism were applied to the war in 
Afghanistan and to the war in Iraq, they came to support the former and to oppose 
the latter. For Lieven and Hulsman, the Afghan war was justified by the classical 
Christian traditions preached by ethical realism. As they note, “It was not a war of 
choice, but a response to an attack…. and it was supported by the international 
community. None of these standards was met by the Iraq War, and in consequence its 
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abuses must be judged unnecessary and gratuitous.”267 As we can see below, the 
statements President George W. Bush made to justify his military action in Iraq were: 
 
The American people know my position, and that is that regime change is in the interest of the world. 
 
The United States will use this moment of opportunity to extend the benefits of freedom across the 
globe. We will actively work to bring the hope of democracy, development, free markets, and free 
trade to every corner of the world. 
 
To protect our Nation and honor our values, the United States seeks to extend freedom across the 
globe by leading an international effort to end tyranny and to promote effective democracy.268 
 
This is quite opposite to how Kennan once put it: 
 
When we talk about the application of moral standards to foreign policy, therefore, we are not talking 
about compliance with some clear and generally accepted international code of behavior. If the 
policies and actions of the US government are going to be made to conform to moral standards, those 
standards are going to have to be America’s own, founded on traditional American principles of justice 
and propriety. When others fail to conform to those principles, and when their failure to conform has 
an adverse effect on American interests as distinct from political tastes, we have every right to 
complain and, if necessary, to take retaliatory action. What we cannot do is to assume that our moral 
standards are theirs as well, and to appeal to those standards as the source of our grievances.269 
 
Similarly, Morgenthau argued, “Those universal principles the United States had put 
into practice were not to be exported by fire and sword if necessary, but they were to 
be presented to the rest of the world through the successful example of the United 
States.”270 
 
This is the reason why the George W. Bush administration failed to convince many 
traditional allies, especially those who had been part of the 1991 Gulf War coalition 
and supported the Afghanistan operation, and could not gain authorization from the 
UN Security Council to support US military action in Iraq. As Ian Clark argued, “If 
there was consensus that Iraq was such a danger, why was there so much resistance 
to the proposed action.”271 “Five years of the Bush Doctrine have cost the United 
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States huge amounts of moral capital”.272 And it is certain that the United States 
should not lead by an example like this. It will take many years to restore America’s 
moral authority and international image damaged by the Bush Doctrine and the Iraq 
War.273 This is an obvious example of ethical failure of leadership.  
 
As Talbott maintains, “America’s strength depends on the strength of the institutions 
America has, along with its key international partners, put in place over the last 50 
years.”274  “Not even a superpower can afford unilateralism.”275  Therefore, he 
argues, 
 
The key question is whether the US recommits itself to the utility of collaborative institutions and 
consensual arrangements – not just as a participant, but as a leader. There is a difference being a leader 
and a boss, if the US either fails to see that difference or does see it that difference or does see it but 
makes the wrong choice, the result would be the consolidation of exactly the sort of international 
consensus we do not want – a consensus on the part of every country on earth except for the US that 
American power is a problem for the entire world, a problem to be managed, offset and, to borrow a 
phrase from another era that is now actually back in use in another context, to be contained.276   
 
As a result, Clark suggests that the United States should return to “containment” as a 
grand strategy of “the war on terror”.277 Truly, what the postwar grand strategy of 
containment showed was a successful balance which served America and the world 
well. Its success came from cooperation between the United States and traditional 
allies rather than from the projection of US military power.278  
 
To sum up, if the United States wants to lead by example, she has to serve the 
common good in a pragmatic way and help others, especially those who are allied 
with the United States, within the needs of her own capacity. Moreover, she has to 
act responsibly and thus provide moral leadership to attract others who will want to 
follow. 
 
Conclusion 
Modern ethical realists recognize that the controlling nature of selfishness and 
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egoism is inescapable. The natural survival impulse and seeking to overcome 
insecurity inevitably result in man’s struggling for power. As a direct consequence, it 
ultimately leads to an imperfect human world. Despite their pessimistic view of 
human nature, they also emphasise that man is a moral being. Man is not merely 
interested in physical survival but in prestige and social approval. More importantly, 
man seeks to fulfill his life involving self-giving in relation to others. Therefore, if 
one wants to act ethically in the political sphere, one has to recognize the role of 
power and make a choice of the lesser evil rather than of the absolute good in every 
concrete human situation.  
 
In such an ethical dilemma, the morality of an act is judged by the outcomes it 
produces rather than good intention, which has less regard for the actual 
consequences. This conception of ‘ethic of responsibility’ builds a bridge between 
“ethics” and “politics”. When it applies to the conduct of foreign policy, it suggests 
that policies should be not only made on the basis of the rational elements of political 
reality but also ought to be rational in view of its own moral and practical purposes. 
Therefore, ethical realists have a pragmatic conception of morality and a moderate 
approach to diplomacy. The virtue of prudence and a study of interests of other states 
constitute the philosophical root of ethical realism.  
 
Moreover, ethical realism asserts that powerful states should have responsibilities 
and exercise leadership with ethical obligations. Because of the reality that a 
hierarchic relationship exists in an anarchic order, it is assumed that great powers 
have the responsibilities to help other states to improve their lives for the better. In 
doing so, it actually helps powerful states to consolidate their standing as moral 
leaders. On the contrary, if powerful states sacrifice morality for self-interest, it 
would not only involve ethical failures of leadership but also lead to a world in a 
state of chaos. Ethical realism thus seems useful as a guiding philosophy for the 
United States and its role as the only superpower in the aftermath of the Cold War. 
The spirit of American exceptionalism makes American people want their country set 
an example for the rest of mankind. When it comes to the conduct their foreign 
policy, they want it act nobler than the cold-blooded calculus of raison d’état.  
 
Especially since the end of the Cold War, the United States enjoys a position of 
leadership or primacy in the world. Thus the United States has more opportunities to 
exercise its power to achieve its moral goals. The incoming challenge was 
humanitarian intervention issue, whether it should intervene in the countries where 
ethnic conflicts and civil wars, such as in Yugoslavia and Somalia, cause massive 
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human suffering. The next three chapters will look at the first post-Cold War 
president Bill Clinton’s foreign policy and examine its foreign policy-making on 
humanitarian intervention, especially focusing on the Balkans. Finally, it will 
evaluate Clinton’s foreign policy on humanitarian intervention by applying ethical 
realism as a theoretical framework. 
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Chapter 4. 
US Foreign Policy after the Cold War: Clinton’s Foreign Policy 
 
Introduction 
The end of the Cold War left the United States in a world without the Soviet threat. 
There was now no single great power, or coalition of powers, posing an imminent 
danger to the national security of the United States. However, since the single focus 
of the Soviet threat had long occupied US foreign policy during the Cold War, the 
collapse of Soviet communism made it difficult for the United States to set a foreign 
policy course in the post-Cold War world. The United States had to set new 
diplomatic principles or strategies to replace the obsolete “containment” policy that 
had guided America’s diplomatic behaviour for almost half a century after 1947. 
Both the George H. W. Bush and Clinton administrations struggled to search for a 
new strategy. Some commented that it was even more difficult to follow a single 
unified and coherent diplomatic strategy in such an increasingly diverse world.  
 
Apparently, the collapse of the old “bipolar” international system presented 
Americans with a number of problems, the most difficult one of which was how to 
redefine the nation’s role in global affairs in the new era. American commentator 
Norman J. Ornstein raised the question: “What does a superpower do in a world no 
longer dominated by superpower conflict?”279 Further questions posed were: What is 
America’s role in the post-Cold War world? How should US national interests be 
redefined with the passing of the Cold War? George H. W. Bush’s defeat in the 1992 
presidential election appeared to send the message that the United States, as the 
world’s only superpower, would put its own house in order first. It is likely that this 
shift was influenced by the notion of American decline. At the same time the United 
States would not exactly abandon the world. In particular, governmental collapse and 
civil wars in Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo during the 1990s raised 
the issue of humanitarian intervention and dominated the foreign policy agenda.  
 
This chapter will focus on US foreign policy in the 1990s. First, it will discuss 
options for post-Cold War foreign policy. The United States witnessed the 
mobilisation of a wide diversity of opinions among well-informed students of foreign 
relations regarding America’s proper international role. The historical debates over 
isolationism versus interventionism and unilateralism versus multilateralism 
appeared in America’s diplomatic course again; while pragmatic interventionism was 
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emerging. Second, it will review Clinton’s diplomacy. Bill Clinton, the first 
post-Cold War president, focused on America’s pressing problems at home, unlike a 
‘foreign policy’ president such as George H. W. Bush. However, the strategic 
approach of “engagement and enlargement” to foreign policy issues under the 
Clinton administration kept America internationally engaged; especially, “selective 
engagement” led the United States towards a pragmatic approach to foreign policy. 
Finally, it will examine how the Clinton administration responded to humanitarian 
interventions in the case of Somalia and Haiti, as well as the wider debate on the 
issue of humanitarian intervention.  
 
4.1 Options for post-Cold War U.S. Foreign Policy: From 1989 to 2001  
Despite experiencing two momentous events, the end of the Cold War and the 
Persian Gulf War, President George H. W. Bush failed to grab attention with global 
transformation, such as technology revolution and globalization. In particular, the 
public had placed its greatest priority on America’s economic interests rather than 
national security (which motivated American politics during the Cold War).280 Since 
the United States spent its resources combating the Soviet Union during the Cold 
War, the economy went into recession. The Democratic campaign of Bill Clinton 
used Bush’s attention to foreign affairs as a weapon against him and turned it to his 
advantage by making the 1992 presidential election about “it’s the economy, 
stupid”. 281  Bush’s defeat reflected what American people considered as real 
priorities after the Cold War. They turned to candidate Clinton who focused on 
America’s pressing problems at home rather than a ‘foreign policy president’ like 
Bush.  
 
It is likely that this shift was influenced by the notion of American decline. America 
was now the world’s biggest debtor, a problem inherited from the presidency of 
Ronald Reagan.282 Paul Kennedy argued that, although the United States was still 
economically and militarily “the number one” in world affairs, its world power had 
declined relatively faster than Russia’s over the last few decades of the Cold War.283 
“The United States now ran the risk, so familiar to historians of the rise and fall of 
previous Great Powers, of what might roughly be called “imperial overstretch”: that 
is to say, decision-makers in Washington must face the awkward and enduring fact 
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that the sum total of the United States’ global interests and obligations is nowadays 
far larger than the country’s power to defend them all simultaneously”. Consequently, 
“in each case, the declining number-one power faced threats, not so much to the 
security of its own homeland, but to the nation’s interests abroad - interest so 
widespread that it would be difficult to defend them all at once, and yet almost 
equally difficult to abandon any of them without running further risks”.284  
 
Beginning in the late 1980s, the effort to develop possible options for US foreign 
policy without a Soviet threat was first of all the classical isolationist approach, 
known as Buchananism, named after Republican presidential aspirant Patrick 
Buchanan.285 Buchanan urged policy-makers to withdraw US troops from trouble 
spots such as Europe and South Korea, and to abandon most of America’s global 
commitments, for instance to end the mutual security treaty with Tokyo, payments to 
the World Bank and payments to the IMF.286 He was against America’s promotion of 
democracy abroad, saying: “How other people rule themselves is their own business. 
To call it a vital interest of the United States is to contradict history and common 
sense”.287 He further stated that “what we need is a new nationalism, a new 
patriotism, a new foreign policy that puts America first and, not only first, but second 
and third as well.”288 This “America First” theme was persuasive one; especially as 
it came at a time when Americans were looking inward and feeling economic pain 
and frustration over long unsolved domestic problems.289 By the same token, Jeane J. 
Kirkpatrick, former US Ambassador to the UN, argued, “The time when Americans 
should bear such unusual burdens is past. With a return to ‘normal’ times, we can 
again become a normal nation”.290 For Nathan Glazer, it was a time closer to the 
modest role that the Founding Fathers intended.291  
 
It seemed that the American people were not in an expansive mood in the post-Cold 
War era; nevertheless, conservative neo-isolationists supported US action in defense 
of vital US interests.292 However, they were against promoting democracy abroad, 
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particularly in places peripheral to US interests. They preferred working with other 
great powers within international institutions, such as the UN, to serve US interests. 
The best example was the experience of the Persian Gulf War.293 Despite the fact 
that the United States remained a superpower, conservative neo-isolationists assumed 
that its relative power position was declining. Therefore, they urged policy-makers to 
exercise a selective and discriminate diplomacy to scale down America’s 
international obligations and to avoid overcommitment abroad. Since the purpose of 
US foreign policy was primarily to safeguard national security and interests, they 
believed that its external commitments should be focused on the nature and scope of 
US power in the post-Cold War international environment.294 The 1994 Republican 
Congressional election victories illustrated this isolationist strain.295  
 
On the other hand, neo-conservative commentator Charles Krauthammer argued that 
the post-Cold War era was the “unipolar moment” for the United States; as shown in 
the world’s response to the invasion of Kuwait, where the United States did not tread, 
the alliance did not follow. For Krauthammer, “American preeminence is based on 
the fact it is the only country with the military, diplomatic, political and economic 
assets to be a decisive player in any conflict in whatever part of the world it chooses 
to involve itself”.296 Such a unipolar world required US strength and will to lead in 
order to preserve international stability. Therefore, Krauthammer indicated that the 
demand for multilateral action was mainly derived from domestic concerns about the 
legitimacy of US unilateral action. For that reason, US political leaders tried to 
“dress unilateral action in multilateral clothing”.297  
 
Despite the fact that not every international problem required an American solution, 
conservative interventionists claimed that certain problems did require American 
leadership.298 Bob Dole, the Senate majority leader, for instance, supported sending 
US troops to Bosnia in order to preserve NATO’s credibility and provide American 
leadership.299 However, he was against risking American lives in places like Somalia, 
Haiti, and Rwanda with marginal or no American interests at stake.300 On the other 
hand, conservative interventionists claimed that the United States must not rely on 
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naïve multilateralism; 301  instead, policy-makers should exercise preventive 
diplomacy and act unilaterally if necessary.302 They pointed out that the United 
States had failed to respond decisively in time to the Bosnian crisis.303 Other 
analysts argued that in the post-Cold War world the major military danger the United 
States would face was not a particular country but the dangerous proliferation of 
nuclear weapons, especially from rogue states, notably Iraq and North Korea. Those 
countries were openly hostile to the United States. They called for policy-makers to 
take whatever steps necessary to prevent rogue states from acquiring nuclear 
weapons. 304  Moreover, they advocated that the United States should place 
“burden-sharing” among America’s friends, allies and relations with great powers as 
a high priority goal of US foreign policy after the Cold War. For example, the United 
States should shoulder the burden of collective security with its NATO alliance in 
regional conflicts like the Balkan crisis, cooperate with the second and third largest 
economies in the world, Germany and Japan (and support them to gain permanent 
seats on the UN Security Council), and cope with Russia and China, preventing them 
from external aggression, but not respond to each of their action along their 
borders.305  
 
The notion of American decline did not only stem from the Reagan budget deficit but 
also from the perceptions of problems concerning American economic 
competitiveness and the defeat in Vietnam.306 As a result, it was argued that liberal 
neo-isolationists were preoccupied with the lessons of Vietnam. J. William Fulbright 
had concluded in the 1960s that it was the arrogance of US power that led the nation 
to become involved in the Vietnam War and other instances of intervention abroad.307 
Given the fact that few challenges would confront US security after the Cold War, 
many liberals claimed that the destiny of American society would lie in its ability to 
solve pressing internal problems.308 For them, foreign policy was the extension of 
domestic politics. Therefore, when the Clinton administration was distracted by the 
promotion of democracy abroad and humanitarian interventions in Somalia and Haiti, 
                                                 
301 Roman, ‘Points of Order’; Adam Nagourney, ‘Dole Portrays Clinton as ‘Misguided’’, New York 
Times, 26 June 1996. 
302 Crabb, Sarieddine, and Antizzo, Charting A New Diplomatic Course, p. 76. 
303 Lawrence Freedman, ‘Why the West Failed’, Foreign Policy, No. 97 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 57-62. 
304 Michael Mandelbaum, ‘Lessons of the Next Nuclear War’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 2 
(March/April 1995), pp. 22-37. 
305 Michael J. Brenner, ‘EC: Confidence Lost’, Foreign Policy, No. 91 (Summer 1993), pp. 40-41; 
Hanns W. Maull, ‘Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 69, No. 5 
(Winter 1990/1991), pp. 91-106; Fareed Zakaria, ‘The Vision Thing’, New York Times, 21 August 
1996. 
306 Dumbrell, ‘America in the 1990s’, p. 91. 
307 Crabb, Sarieddine, and Antizzo, Charting A New Diplomatic Course, p. 52. 
308 Ibid., p. 67. 
 67
liberal neo-isolationists argued that the United States should look back at its domestic 
troubles, such as drugs, guns, and violence, which were increasingly stratified by 
social class, torn by racial tension, and riven by insecurity. It could be argued that if 
democracy did not work in American society, it would make it difficult to persuade 
others to follow America’s values.  
 
On the other hand, they argued that not only had the collapse of the Soviet Union 
brought about the end of the Cold War, but also that of the allies. Since there was no 
single enemy, alliances had lost their meaning.309 As Ronald Steel observed, “Our 
task today is not so heroic as fighting a war, but it is no less difficult, and in the end it 
may be as important: to recognize our limitations, to reject the vanity of trying to 
remake the world in our image, and to restore the promise of our neglected 
society”.310 Since the end of the Cold War provided the United States with an 
opportunity to disengage from trouble spots around the world, they argued that the 
Clinton administration should not “go abroad in search of monsters to destroy”.311 
At the same time, the United States should not exaggerate the threats posed by the 
Third World, for instance, the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the 
unpredictability of regional aggressors.312 Some analysts stated that the United 
States should only dedicate itself to guaranteeing democracy upon the request of a 
state but not to impose its will or its own version of government on people who did 
not ask for assistance. Moreover, they asserted that policy-makers should have 
appropriate considerations before using force for any interventions. More importantly, 
they mentioned that policy-makers should gain the explicit consent of the 
international community acting through the UN Security Council (UNSC) or a 
regional organization.313  
 
Despite the necessity for American society’s ability to solve its domestic problems, 
liberal interventionists believed that the primary objective of US foreign policy in the 
post-Cold War world would be to extend democracy on a global basis. Since the 
demise of the Soviet Union and the ideological triumph of the West had arrived at 
what Fukuyama called “the end of history”, it helped to expand democratic market 
economy and to accelerate the twin forces of globalization and interdependence, 
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which reduced the distinction between domestic and international issues.314 In the 
liberal mind, they believed in the “democratic peace theory”, in which democratic 
states rarely engage one another with military force and democratically elected 
governments tend to settle their differences in a peaceful and secure way. As a 
consequence, the expansion of democracy throughout the world would increase the 
prospects for international peace and security.315  
 
Given trends such as economic interdependence, transnational actors, nationalism in 
weak states, the spread of technology, and changing political issues in the post-Cold 
War world, it was argued that exercising power in traditional means was less 
effective for achieving purposes than in the past. Joseph Nye developed the idea of 
soft or co-optive power, attracting other countries to follow, rather than using hard or 
coercive power to order them to do what was wanted. For example, a state might get 
other states to willingly follow it because it possessed cultural and ideological 
attraction.316 Clinton’s foreign policy was profoundly influenced by the liberal 
perspective. The term “democratic enlargement” conceived by Jeremy Rosner and 
Anthony Lake was regarded as the winner of the “Kennan sweepstakes”.317 By 
replacing Kennan’s strategy of containment, US officials agreed with the strategy of 
democratic enlargement; that “America wouldn’t be using its power to keep a rival in 
check; it would use its power to expand its circle of friends and spread its values”.318 
National Security Adviser Samuel “Sandy” Berger stressed that America’s 
responsibility to lead the world was inescapable if the United States wanted to 
maintain its security and increase its prosperity.319 
 
Although the 1990s was a time without threats, global economic interdependence 
and regional conflicts in many parts of the developing world were emerging as a 
variety of global challenges to the US foreign policy agenda. As former secretary of 
defense Richard Cheney described, “The Clinton administration faces more difficult 
problems than anything we dealt with over the past five years. The pace of change is 
accelerating rapidly, and rather than making the world safer, it is making things less 
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stable and less predictable.” 320  It could be argued that the post-Cold War 
international system actually complicated US foreign policy. Not only America’s role, 
interests, and priorities must be redefined, but specific strategies and policies must 
aim at dealing with the specific problems and issues in light of the changing world. 
As a result, foreign policy was more about “discrete problem solving”.321 Irving 
Kristol suggested that “relations with other nations will be decided candidly on a 
case-by-case basis” and “there is no general formula that enables us to arrive at easy 
conclusions in any particular case”.322 As Republican Senator Mitch McConnell of 
Kentucky described: “The difficulty of stating foreign policy these days is that it’s of 
necessity ad hoc. There’s no way in this day and age without a clear enemy to have 
an expression of a totally coherent foreign policy.”323  
 
Ultimately, the development of a pragmatic approach to external problems during the 
Clinton administration recognized the essentially pluralistic nature of the post-Cold 
War interventional environment.324 Secretary of State Warren Christopher advocated 
a “pragmatic” relationship between Washington and Moscow: “Pragmatic 
engagement with Russia means that we will continue to co-operate with them when 
our interests coincide and to manage our differences candidly and constructively 
when they do not”.325 Concerning violations of human rights or ethnic cleansing 
within states, the United States could not “adopt a hard-and-fast policy of either cool 
isolation or righteous intervention”.326 As Secretary of State Madeleine Albright 
stated after NATO’s bombing of Kosovo in 1999, “Some hope, and others fear, that 
Kosovo will be a precedent for similar interventions around the globe. I would 
caution against any such sweeping conclusions. Every circumstance is unique. 
Decisions on the use of force will be made by any president on a case-by-case basis 
after weighing a host of factors”.327 Meanwhile, the Clinton administration took a 
“principled and pragmatic” policy towards China. President Clinton explained that 
“it was in Washington’s interest to engage China on shared commercial and security 
issues, while not turning a blind eye to Beijing’s troubling human rights”.328 In 
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dealing with African affairs, the Clinton White House conducted the “new model” 
based on “varying standards”, for instance, working constructively with those 
African leaders who will “manage their governments well, taking care of basic 
services”.329 
 
4.2 Criticisms of Clinton’s Diplomacy  
4.2.1 Clinton and the Search for a Successor to ‘Containment’ 
During the 1992 campaign, candidate Bill Clinton criticized President George H. W. 
Bush’s failure to articulate clear goals for American foreign policy. Clinton outlined 
his own vision that the United States could lead “a global alliance for democracy as 
united and steadfast as the global alliance that defeated Communism”.330 Moreover, 
Clinton attacked National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft’s trips to Beijing 
following the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989 and the George H. W. Bush White 
House’s inaction on Bosnia and its mistreatment of Haitian refugees. The candidate 
and his foreign policy advisors, including Richard Holbrooke, Anthony Lake, and 
Sandy Berger, accused Bush of being vulnerable on human rights issues and passive 
in confronting challenges to democracy. For Clinton, the end of the Cold War 
brought the opportunity that “interests could give way to ideals”. Once elected, 
former Carterites, including National Security Advisor Anthony Lake, Secretary of 
State Warren Christopher, and US Ambassador to the UN Madeleine Albright, 
constituted most of Clinton’s foreign policy team; consequently, it was not 
surprisingly that democracy and human rights-based strategies dominated the new 
administration’s foreign policies.331   
 
In the search for a coherent vision and America’s role in the post-Cold War era, the 
Clinton administration articulated the new strategy of ‘democratic enlargement’, as 
mentioned before, the winner of the “Kennan sweepstakes”. As Lake pointed out, 
“Throughout the Cold War, we contained a global threat to market democracies; now 
we should seek to enlarge their reach, particularly in places of special significant to 
us. The successor to a doctrine of containment must be a strategy of enlargement – 
enlargement of the world’s free community of market democracies”.332 By the same 
token, Clinton delivered a speech at the UN: “In a new era of peril and opportunity, 
our overriding purpose must be to expand and strengthen the world’s community of 
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market-based democracies. During the Cold War we sought to contain a threat to the 
survival of free institutions. Now we seek to enlarge the circle of nations that live 
under those free institutions”.333 With the Cold War over, democracy promotion 
appeared as an appealing theme. As Thomas Carothers pointed out, democracy 
promotion promised to fuse “the traditionally disparate strands of morality and 
realpolitik in US foreign policy”; moreover, “it implies US global leadership through 
the inherent assumption that the United States is especially qualified to promote 
democracy around the world”.334  
 
Two illustrations of these policies were the NATO enlargement and the aid to 
democratize Russia. The goal of US policy for post-Cold War Europe was to 
cooperate with an integrated democratic Europe to keep the peace and to promote 
prosperity;335 and the Clinton foreign policy team perceived an expanded NATO as 
“the engine to create a Europe peaceful, undivided, and democratic”.336 At the 
NATO summit in Brussels in January 1994, Clinton proposed to NATO that the allies 
should enlarge to include the new free market democracies of Central and Eastern 
Europe. NATO alliances accepted a process of enlargement, later called Partnership 
for Peace (PFP), which “would reach to democratic states to our East as part of an 
evolutionary process, taking into account political and security developments in the 
whole of Europe”.337 Consequently, the first post-Cold War NATO enlargement was 
in 1999 when the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland were added to the 
Alliance.338 Meanwhile, Clinton’s policy towards Russia was to assist democratic 
market reform and to integrate Russia into the Western community of democratic 
states. For example, Clinton offered Russia an equal seat in what had been G-7 and 
was now G-8, and worked with institutions including the World Bank and the IMF to 
support Russian internal transformation with financial assistance.339  
 
It is important to note that the Clinton administration attempted to relate the politics 
of democracy promotion to the economics of the global market.340 The Clinton 
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team’s belief that a combination of trade and democracy would build the road to 
international peace reflected a version of the neo-Kantian democratic peace theory 
that democratic states have not fought and will not fight each other.341 In other 
words, the Clinton administration believed that promoting democracy abroad would 
advance US economic as well as security interests.342 This concept was reinforced in 
the report of the National Security Strategy in February 1995: 
 
It is premised on a belief that the line between our domestic and foreign policies is disappearing – that 
we must revitalize our economy if we are to sustain our military forces, foreign initiatives and global 
influence, and that we must engage actively abroad if we are to open foreign markets and create jobs 
for our people. 
 
We believe that our goals of enhancing our security, bolstering our economic prosperity, and 
promoting democracy are mutually supportive. Secure nations are more likely to support free trade 
and maintain democratic structures. Nations with growing economies and strong trade ties are more 
likely feel secure and to work toward freedom. And democratic states are less likely to threaten our 
interest and more likely to cooperate with the US to meet security threats and promote free trade and 
sustainable development.343 
 
In particular, when the phenomenon of globalization, a single global market and 
culture resulted from the integration of trade, finance and information, seemed 
inevitable,344 the Clinton administration embraced the process. Clinton stressed that 
the United States benefited from trade arrangements that reducing barriers to the 
movement of American goods and services across national boundaries. The United 
States would continue to expand exports as it created jobs and opportunities for 
American people and maintained American leadership in the world. 345  He 
announced that “fast track”, the symbol of the US commitment to free trade, was 
about more than economics.346 “It’s about whether other countries will continue to 
look to the United States to lead to a future of peace and freedom and prosperity… 
about whether our economic ties will lead to cultural ties and ties of partnership, or 
whether we will be viewed as somehow withdrawn from the world, not interested in 
leading it, and therefore not nearly as influential as we might otherwise be”.347  
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Nevertheless, Richard Haass criticized the administration’s attempt to articulate a 
strategy of enlargement as the successor to a doctrine of containment, arguing that it 
did little to provide guidelines for pressing foreign policy problems such as those 
presented by Bosnia, Iraq, North Iraq, North Korea, Rwanda, or Somalia. The United 
States still had to deal with other principal interests such as the issues of proliferation 
of nuclear weapons, Western access to oil, regional crises, and potential aggressors, 
rather than democracy promotion.348 Moreover, he argued that NATO enlargement 
not only caused tensions between Washington and Moscow but also was an 
unnecessary initiative and mostly a strategic distraction. The Clinton administration 
must be aware of structural changes in the post-Cold War international system; 
especially the Asia-Pacific region would replace Europe and the Atlantic to become 
the focal point of foreign affairs in the twenty-first century. For example, China was 
emerging as a significant power while the United States had conflicting interests with 
China, such as the Taiwan issue, Chinese provision of nuclear technology to Iran, 
diplomatic cooperation vis-à-vis North Korea and within the UNSC, democracy and 
market reform on the mainland and in Hong Kong, and environmental policy. It 
would be expensive and dangerous to contain an expansionist and hostile China; and 
it was also an unjustifiable luxury to narrowly focus on China’s human rights 
record.349  
 
By the same token, neo-conservative Joshua Muravchik suggested, “At a time of 
peace it is important not only to preserve friendship, but also to think ahead about 
possible future enemies”. He pointed out that Russia and China were the greatest 
potential powers to confront America; and hence the United States should have 
strategies to prevent such conflict. On the other hand, since the developments of 
nuclear programs in Iraq, Iran and North Korea posed threats to international order, 
the United States would be the indispensable role in leading a campaign against 
nuclear proliferation.350  
 
Despite the administration’s attempt to put economic competitiveness at the heart of 
foreign policy,351 some worried that the administration’s economic policy would 
lead to “a growing dependence on outsiders for critical products or technologies, 
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which leaves the nation vulnerable to denial or manipulation by external supplies”.352 
James Schlesinger argued that the fostering of democracy was a delicate and quite 
tenuous guide to policy and would come at a cost by violating the traditional 
diplomacy to involve internal arrangements of other states.353 Similarly, George 
Kennan was doubtful about America’s diplomatic behavior in promoting democracy 
and human rights beyond its own borders. He described the United States under such 
a policy as “a stern schoolmaster clothed in the mantle of perfect virtue, sit in 
judgments over all other governments, looking sharply down the nose of each of 
them to see whether its handling of domestic affairs meets with our approval”. He 
called for “a modest and relatively self-effacing foreign policy” and urged the 
policy-makers to “carry out internal reforms with a minimum of outside interference 
and distraction”.354 Also, some argued that globalization caused job losses, income 
inequality, and stagnant or worse real wages in the United States. Moreover, the rapid 
flow of investment moving in and out of countries due to the change of investor 
sentiment had resulted in the Mexican and Asian financial crises.355  
 
On the other hand, the benefits of globalization also brought risks. As the 1999 
National Security Strategy reported, “Weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, drug 
trafficking and other international crime are global concerns that transcend national 
borders”.356 Also, the National Security Strategy in 2000 reported, “Globalization 
and electronic commerce transcend conventional borders, fast rendering traditional 
border security measures at air, land, and sea ports of entry ineffective or 
obsolete.” 357  The Clinton administration called these challenges “borderless 
threats”.358 Clearly, globalization not only gave a convenient way to international 
terrorism but also stimulated its development. The phenomena brought about by 
globalization such as Internet pornography, US movies and the spread of cultural and 
social values had resulted in many Muslims countries’ discontent with the West. Thus, 
it was argued that it fostered the anger of jihadist groups such as Al Qaeda.359  
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Al Qaeda, led by Osama bin Laden, had been charged with committing several 
terrorist attacks, including the World Trade Center bombing in 1993, the Manila air 
plot in 1995, and the Khobar Towers bombing in 1996. Clinton declared its 
counterterrorism policy - Presidential Decision Directives in 1995 (No. 39) and May 
1998 (No. 62) – which perceived terrorism as a national security problem.360 At the 
same time, Clinton connected Iraq with the phrase “rogue state”, by saying: “In the 
next century, the community of nations may see more and more the very kind of 
threat Iraq poses now – a rogue state with weapons of mass destruction ready to use 
them or provide them to terrorists, drug traffickers, or organized criminals who travel 
the world among us unnoticed”.361 
 
However, it was not until the attacks on the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 
August 1998 that the administration believed that Al Qaeda was responsible for the 
bombings and launched cruise missile strikes. Nevertheless, critics charged the 
President with using the US military strikes to distract the American public’s 
attention to his sex affair and legal jeopardy. Clinton finally admitted his relationship 
with a young White House intern, Monica Lewinsky, on a nationally televised 
statement three days before the US military action against Sudan and Afghanistan.362 
The same criticism was also leveled at the Anglo-American military operation, 
Operation Desert Fox, against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, and NATO’s bombing of 
Kosovo.363 For example, Senate majority leader Trent Lott was against the military 
operation on Iraq and suspected that Clinton “had timed it to trump the House 
impeachment debate”.364 When the US policy on Iraq changed towards a forceful 
posture to replace Saddam Hussein’s regime, by contrast to the coalition allies united 
in the Persian Gulf War, the administration found itself isolated.365 The Clinton 
administration had to go it alone. It was argued that this isolation was partly because 
of “an honest clash of interests over Iraq”. 
 
The military action against Afghanistan, Sudan, Iraq, the decision to intervene in 
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Kosovo without the UNSC authorization, and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 
(CTBT) were illustrations of the Clinton administration’s move in a unilateralist 
direction.366 However, Richard Haass argued that US superiority would not last and 
its strength was limited by the amount of resources (money, time, political capital) it 
could spend. Thus, the United States should avoid unilateralism because it did little 
to promote international order. Instead, multilateralism, working with allies and the 
other great powers such as Russia and China, was the best way to foster a world that 
protected US interests. It helped to distribute the burden of promoting international 
order, to reduce opposition to US actions, and increase the chances of policy 
success.367 It was argued that the tendency towards a unilateralist thrust in Clinton’s 
second term reflected Republican pressure and the administration’s new international 
confidence.368 In his second inaugural address, Clinton described America’s role as 
“the world’s indispensable nation” which was quoted from Secretary Albright, who 
summed up the vision for American power and global responsibility.369 Nevertheless, 
it seemed that the rest of the world did not accept the idea of “indispensable nation”; 
in particular, France was complaining about American “hyperpower”.370  
 
It could be said that following the computer revolution, growth in global free trade 
and the US consumer spending boom in the mid-1990s, Clinton became more 
confident in dealing with a broad range of international problems when he began his 
second term in office. At the same time, the President’s confidence, especially in 
being a commanding leader, also came from the success of NATO’s intervention in 
Bosnia. 371  When the Bosnian War became “a cause for deep skepticism and 
cynicism about whether NATO had any relevance to the post-Cold War world”,372 
NATO’s strikes on Bosnia helped to secure the Dayton Agreement at the end of 1995 
and found its relevance to the post-Cold War world.373  
 
Clinton’s newfound confidence could be seen on his handling of the Taiwan Strait 
crisis in 1996. It was not until 1998 that the reciprocal visits made by Clinton and 
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President Jiang Zemin brought Sino-American relationships to a conciliatory phase. 
During his visit to China, Clinton announced the “three no’s” principle over Taiwan. 
Moreover, he promised to secure China’s most-favored-nation (MFN) status and to 
support China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO). The 
administration attempted to build a constructive “strategic partnership” with 
China.374 However, Stephen Schlesinger criticized the Clinton White House for 
sacrificing human rights issues to increase trade with China.375 Clinton defended his 
policy towards China as a “moderate” course, balancing the belief that the United 
States should isolate China because of its human rights records and slow progress 
towards democracy with the view that expanding business cooperation with Beijing 
was the only policy that could lead to liberalization.376 
 
Above all, critics argued that the Clinton administration encountered many problems, 
such as losing sight of the connections between specific objectives and the overall 
strategic picture, and struggling to prioritize their time and energy.377 Republicans 
argued that Clinton’s foreign policy was weak and visionless. For example, Senator 
John McCain of Arizona, an adviser to Bob Dole, contended that “this administration 
lacks a conceptual framework to shape the world into the next century and [to] 
explain what threatens that vision”. As a direct consequence, “without that global 
strategy’, McCain added, “we keeping getting ourselves involved in peripheral 
matters such as Northern Ireland and Haiti”.378  
 
Henry Kissinger argued that Clinton’s foreign policy had been less a strategy than “a 
series of seemingly unrelated decisions in response to specific crises”.379 John 
Ikenberry argued that the period of the Clinton administration was a “lost decade” in 
which “a distracted Bill Clinton failed to craft a coherent grand strategy or anticipate 
the dangers of the coming terrorist era”.380 Although the Clinton administration 
failed to articulate a strategy to replace Kennan’s ‘containment’ policy, some argue 
that the administration did “find an integrating purpose in its commitment to the 
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expansion of market democracy under conditions on accelerating globalization”.381  
 
Furthermore, in response to former Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger’s 
complaint about the Clinton administration’s lack of “hard strategic thinking about 
how we want to see the world in the first part of the next century”, Douglas Brinkley 
argued that Clinton’s enlargement policy had already catapulted the United States 
into the next millennium.382 More importantly, in defending the administration’s 
approach to foreign policy, Lake characterized the term “Pragmatic 
Neo-Wilsonian” – “to expand democracy and take advantage of the democratic tide 
running in the world… but through a determined pragmatism that then can give 
substance to the general principles”.383 Overall, it seemed that the “democratic 
enlargement” policy could be seen as an effort the Clinton team consistently made to 
craft themselves for the post-Cold War world; while at the same time, the “pragmatic 
engagement” policy, in particular with regard to humanitarian intervention issues and 
the changing international environment, caused disarray and confusion. Moreover, it 
was argued that the tensions within the administration contributed to the difficulty of 
forming a consensus on foreign policy issues. The next two sections will look at 
intra-administration divisions and the challenges humanitarian intervention issues 
posed to the Clinton administration.  
 
4.2.2 Intra-Administration Divisions 
How the notion of enlargement became official policy was not entirely clear. It was 
not initially a consensus amongst the Clinton team. It seemed to be developed after 
some period of discussion and finally was adopted in the autumn of 1993. It was 
mentioned in a speech by the less than enthusiastic Secretary Christopher at 
Columbia University on 20 September 1993. Then it was addressed in the 
centrepiece of a speech made by Lake at the School of Advanced International 
Studies. It was referred to in Albright’s speech at the Naval War College two days 
later. Finally, Clinton addressed it openly in his speech to the UN on 27 September. 
As a direct consequence, the idea of enlargement was granted the official seal of 
approval.384 However, Christopher was cautious about what Lake called democratic 
enlargement as a “grand strategy”. As Douglas Brinkley described, “To Christopher’s 
lawyerly way of thinking, enlargement was little more than neat packaging.” 
Secretary Christopher still preferred diplomacy conducted in the old-fashioned way, 
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by which international problems could best be solved case by case. Perhaps Vice 
President Al Gore was the most ardent booster of enlargement within the 
administration. Gore was convinced that open market democracies flourishing 
worldwide were essential for America’s economic prosperity.385  
 
Meanwhile, Albright outlined a vision of “assertive multilateralism”. She indicated 
that to promote democracy and human rights in a fragmented world, the United 
States could exert its moral leadership through multilateral diplomacy, for example, 
working with international institutions, notably the UN.386 Nevertheless, it seemed 
that the Clinton team was unable to share a single concept to replace containment.  
 
On the other hand, Clinton’s foreign policy team was divided on the means of 
achieving political purposes, especially with regard to the use of force in regional 
conflicts. The State Department tended to use military deployments as one more tool 
to shape a negotiated outcome, but the Defense Department preferred to hold troops 
back until a political outcome was reached.387 Moreover, the Clinton administration 
had a troubled relationship with the Pentagon. During the presidential campaign, 
Clinton had promised to remove the ban on gay persons serving in the military. 
Nevertheless, the gay issue angered the military.388 Some analysts interpreted the 
tensions between the administration and the military as a sign of Clinton’s 
uncertainty of the purpose and use of American power itself; and as a result, of his 
lack of a sense of priority and confidence in dealing with foreign affairs and the role 
of American leadership.389  
 
However, Clinton’s second administration no longer tried to search for one-word 
encapsulations of national security strategy.390 National Security Advisor Sandy 
Berger described that “they usually emerge from a particular set of circumstances 
and you get into trouble when you try to apply them to others”. He added, “We tried 
to establish common law rather than canon law. We set out to build a new role for the 
US in the world by experience rather than doctrine”.391 Interestingly, it was assumed 
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that Lake’s pragmatism also pushed him to reject doctrines.392  
 
4.2.3 The Clinton Administration and Humanitarian Intervention 
Some argued that the Clinton administration’s attempt to build a new vision for the 
post-Cold War era died in October 1993, when 18 American soldiers were killed in 
Somalia. That same month also saw the embarrassing return of the United States ship 
Harlan County from Haiti.393 The debacles of that October reflected the challenges 
of the crises inherited from the George H. W. Bush administration that Clinton’s 
foreign policy team faced. The administration’s inaction to genocide in Rwanda in 
1994 reflected the shadow of the memory of Somalia.394 However, the Clinton 
administration decided to get involved in Haiti in the same year that the genocide in 
Rwanda occurred. The Clinton White House was reluctant to intervene in Bosnia in 
1995 but quick to respond to the Kosovo conflict when it exploded again between 
1998 and 1999.  
 
The 1990s witnessed several humanitarian crises caused by armed ethnic conflicts, 
civil wars and the collapse of governmental authority in some states. It thus resulted 
in the emergence of peace enforcement operations involving the threat or the use of 
force, which was more challenging than traditional peacekeeping operations.395 And 
these humanitarian crises, as Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger wrote in his 
memo, would confront the United States with “the dilemma of whether to take part in 
limited military interventions in situations which do not directly threaten our 
interests. . .”396 As a consequence, during the Clinton administration, events such as 
the starvation in Somalia, genocide in Rwanda, refugee crisis in Haiti, and ethnic 
cleansing in Bosnia and Kosovo all dominated the foreign policy agenda. The criteria 
to underpin American engagement and questions such as under what kind of 
circumstances the United States should intervene and how (military or diplomatic) 
dominated Clinton’s foreign policy agenda.  
 
Despite their support for peacekeeping under the theme of multilateralism, the 
administration steadily moved away from it. For instance, Secretary Christopher 
announced: “Multilateralism is a means, not an end. It is one of the many foreign 
policy tools at our disposal. And it is warranted only when it serves the central 
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purpose of American foreign policy: to protect American interests”.397 Furthermore, 
Anthony Lake noted: “Only one overriding fact can determine whether the US 
should act multilaterally or unilaterally, and that is America’s interests. We should act 
multilaterally where doing so advances our interests, and we should act unilaterally 
when that will serve our purpose”.398  
 
US Ambassador to the UN Madeleine Albright, acknowledged: “The world has 
changed, and the Cold War national security framework is now obsolete. The Clinton 
Administration is fashioning a new framework that is more diverse and flexible than 
the old – a framework that will advance American interests, promote American 
values, and preserve American leadership. We will choose the means to implement 
this framework on a case-by-case basis, relying on diplomacy whenever possible, on 
force when absolutely necessary”.399 In his UN speech in September 1993, Clinton 
highlighted the criteria for UN peacekeeping missions, which implied that the United 
States would participate, provided the missions included a real threat to international 
peace, clear objectives, an identifiable end point, and anticipatable costs.400 However, 
it seemed that the principal force behind interventions during the Clinton 
administration varied from case to case. 
 
Undoubtedly, the Clinton White House received criticism from different points of 
view. First of all, Michael Mandelbaum’s famous description of Clinton’s “foreign 
policy as social work” was a symbolic example. Mandelbaum argued that “the 
foreign policy of the United States has, historically, centered on American interests, 
defined as developments that could affect the lives of American citizens”; the 
interventions in these countries such as Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia did not fit that 
criterion. He claimed that the Clinton administration had tried to turn American 
foreign policy into a branch of “social work”. It was an expensive proposition to 
serve as Mother Teresa in conducting foreign policy and “sometimes it is necessary 
to sacrifice good will for the sake of more important goals”, especially if the purpose 
of foreign policy was to maintain the best possible relations consistent with national 
interests.401  
 
In her critiques of Clinton’s foreign policy on multilateralism in general and the 
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Somalia mission in particular, former US Ambassador to the UN Jeane J. Kirkpatrick 
stated: 
 
The Clinton administration offers us a vision of foreign policy from which national self-interest of 
purged. And it proposes to forgo US control over important decisions and rely instead on the judgment 
of international bodies and officials. The reason the Clinton administration’s foreign policy seems 
indecisive is that multilateral decision-making is characteristically complicated and inconclusive. The 
reason Clinton policy seems ineffective is that UN operations – in Bosnia or Somalia or wherever – 
are characteristically ineffective. The reason [Senate Minority Leader Bob] Dole demands an 
explanation of our purposes in Somalia, now that starvation no longer looms, is that it is difficult to 
relate Somalia’s international political struggles to any US goals except the goal of honoring the 
priorities of the UN secretary general.402 
 
By the same token, Henry Kissinger described the administration’s policy towards 
multilateral peace operations as “a recipe for chaos”. He wrote: 
 
If these statements imply that international consensus is the prerequisite for the employment of 
American power, the result may be ineffective dithering, as has happened over Bosnia. If they mean 
that international machinery can commit US forces, the risk is American military involvement in 
issues of no fundamental national interest, as is happening in Somalia.403 
 
Moreover, Kissinger argued that “the implication that the absence of any definable 
national interest is a valid criterion for risking American lives could erode the 
willingness of the American people to support any use of military power for any 
purpose”.404 
 
Stephen John Stedman suggested that interventions had to be “selective”. The 
Clinton White House had to avoid an expansive doctrine that risked extending 
American intervention to all areas of the globe; instead, “selective engagement” 
should be applied. For example, the war in the Balkans was more threatening to 
international security than civil war in Somalia because it posed a greater danger to 
Europe’s political stability and economic productivity, prerequisites for Third World 
development and its refugee problems placed heavy burdens on newly independent 
east European states undergoing transitions to democracy. Furthermore, the purpose 
of military intervention had to be defined according to what was in America’s own 
interests, for instance, that it was necessary to prevent a possibly larger interstate war 
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that might involve the NATO alliance. Even though there was an emerging notion in 
the international community that the interests of people should come before the 
interests of states, the Clinton administration must “avoid the temptation of rhetoric 
that speaks of upholding the rights of people everywhere, of supporting the dictates 
of international morality or of doing, in President [George H. W.] Bush’s phrase, 
‘God’s work’.”405  
 
However, Charles Krauthammer was doubtful that military involvement in Bosnian 
conflict would face up to its real costs. “I do not believe that we can possibly do what 
needs to be done at any cost remotely commensurate with our interests in the 
conflict”, he wrote in Washington Post.406 Christopher Layne and Benjamin Schwarz 
complained that US intervention in places like the Balkans, which are of marginal 
strategic importance, had similarities with its intervention in Vietnam. They argued 
that in a post-Cold War world, the United States should carefully reassess its costs 
and benefits of interdependence in Europe and East Asia in favor of a more 
discriminating grand strategy.407 James Schlesinger argued that the administration 
had engaged in Somalia or Bosnia on impulse because the TV cameras were there for 
the public’s attention. Since America’s political capital, both domestic and foreign, 
was limited, national policy should focus on those substantial matters that might pose 
a direct threat to national interests and not on action without reckoning the costs.408 
Some also suggested that when American troops were to be put in harm’s way in 
non-strategic areas, the President needed to explain the reasons to the country 
through effective means of communication.409  
 
It seemed that there were no agreed rules for dealing with humanitarian cases. 
However, this research will examine how and under what conditions the United 
States decided to intervene, especially by looking at the experiences of dealing with 
humanitarian interventions in Bosnia in Clinton’s first term of administration and 
Kosovo in his second term. How did the United States perceive its national interest in 
the Balkans and define its relationship with US national security, especially in the 
post-Cold War period? How did the United States perceive the implications of the 
Balkan war for international relations and international order? What kind of factors 
influenced and motivated the Clinton administration’s decision-making on 
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humanitarian intervention in Bosnia and Kosovo? What role did moral conscience 
and the interests of humanity play in the process of decision-making? Why was the 
Clinton administration slow to respond to the Bosnian crisis in the early 1990s, but 
quick to respond to the Kosovo conflict in the late 1990s? Before moving on to the 
two case studies, the next section will analyze the reasons for the Clinton 
administration’s interventions in Somalia and Haiti and their impacts on its handling 
of the following humanitarian crises. 
 
4.3 Humanitarian Interventions during the Clinton Administration (Somalia 
and Haiti) 
Somalia 
In January 1991, the power vacuum inside Somalia when President Mohammed Siad 
Barre was forced from power by a coalition of opposition forces caused it to implode 
into clan-based civil war. The Djibouti Accord, which was reached after a series of 
talks in June and July, appointed Ai Mahdi Mohamed as interim president. However, 
the Somali warlord Mohammed Farrar Aideed rejected the accords. Consequently, 
the clan warfare in Somalia intensified, and the capital Mogadishu was divided into 
the forces of Ali Mahdi Mohamed in the north and the forces of Mohammed Farrar 
Aideed in the south. The conflict resulted in massive flow of refugees and severe 
food shortages. Somalia was regarded as a “failed state”.410  
 
Since the Cold War was over, both Washington and Moscow no longer competed 
with regional allies and thus did not regard Somalia as a strategic prize on the Horn 
of Africa.411 Therefore, despite the description of the man-made famine in Somalia 
as “the most acute humanitarian tragedy in the world today” by Andrew Natsios, the 
overseas relief chief of the Agency for International Development (AID), it was not 
until the cable “A Day in Hell” from Smith Hempstone, US Ambassador to Kenya, 
got to President George H. W. Bush that the Somali crisis drew the administration’s 
attention. After reading the New York Times report of 19 July 1992 on death and 
starvation in Somalia, President Bush “was very upset by these reports and he 
wanted something done, both in Somalia and northern Kenya”. As a result of 
interagency meetings on Somalia, the White House announced that the United States 
would take the leadership and work with other nations and international 
organizations to offer an emergency food airlift to Mogadishu.412  
                                                 
410 Thomas G. Weiss and Don Hubert, The Responsibility to Protect: Research, Bibliography, 
Background (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001) 
[http://www.idrc.ca/openebooks/963-1/] 27 May 2009; DiPrizio, Armed Humanitarians, pp. 44-45. 
411 ‘Who Cares About Somalia?’, New York Times, 8 January 1991. 
412 Don Oberdorfer, ‘US Took Slow Approach to Somali Crisis’, Washington Post, 24 August 1992. 
 85
 
On 25 November, President Bush proposed to UN Secretary-General Boutros 
Boutros-Ghali that the United States would carry out a UN-sponsored intervention to 
secure the immediate delivery of humanitarian aid. Considering the ineffectiveness 
of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I), a US-led multinational 
force, known as the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), was authorized by Security 
Council Resolution 794 on 3 December “to use all necessary means to establish as 
soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in 
Somalia”.413 President Bush sent roughly 28,000 US troops as part of Operation 
Restore Hope. Bush clearly indicated that the mission had a limited objective: “to 
open the supply routes, to get the food moving, and to prepare the way for a UN 
peacekeeping force to keep it moving”. The US troops would withdraw from the 
region once a secure environment was established. “Our mission is humanitarian,” 
the President said to the American armed forces. “As commander in chief, I assure 
you …we will bring you home as soon as possible.”414 
 
On the path towards new international roles in the post-Cold War world, the United 
States recognized that the action in Somalia had more than a fleeting significance. 
Since the United States had no strategic or economic interest in Somalia, the George 
H. W. Bush team acknowledged that the involvement in Somalia would be very 
different from previous large-scale military operations. The scale of the disaster and 
the likely effectiveness of US intervention became the two important criteria for the 
administration to intervene in the Somali crisis. As acting Secretary of State 
Lawrence Eagleburger said, “This is a tragedy of massive proportions, and, underline 
this, one that we could do something about. We had to act.”415  
 
In addition to humanitarian concern, it was believed that “the CNN effect” forced the 
George H. W. Bush administration to pay attention to Somalia “because the TV 
cameras were there”.416 Similarly, George Kennan wrote that “there can be no 
question that the reason for this acceptance lies primarily with the exposure of the 
Somalia situation by the American media, above all, television”. He argued, “The 
reaction would have been unthinkable without this exposure. The reaction was an 
emotional one, occasioned by the sight of the suffering of the starving people in 
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question.”417 Thus, it was televised pictures of humanitarian suffering from Somalia 
that “goaded a reluctant Administration to act”.418  
 
Meanwhile, another reason was that George H. W. Bush’s new world order was 
embarrassed by the characteristics of the mass starvation of Somali children.419 The 
administration faced the growing restlessness among Islamic nations and the 
developing world, who pointed out that the West only went to war with Muslims (as 
with Iraq) but did not come to their aid in either Bosnia or Somalia. Moreover, they 
criticized that the developed world made use of the Security Council only to deal 
with the problems they were interested in;420 under these circumstances, the George 
H. W. Bush administration concluded that an intervention in Somalia would be easier 
than one in Bosnia. As Secretary Eagleburger said, “We knew the costs weren’t so 
great and there were some potential benefits.” The administration officials viewed 
the intervention as ‘doable’. They stressed, “There are always risks in any operation 
but this time they are relatively small.”421  
 
The Clinton administration inherited the operation in Somalia when it came into 
office in 1993. On 26 March, UN Security Council Resolution 814 recognized the 
need for “a prompt, smooth and phased transition from the Unified Task Force 
(UNITAF) to the expanded United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II)”, 
and requested Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali “to direct the Force Commander of 
UNOSOM II to assume responsibility for the consolidation, expansion, and 
maintenance of a secure environment throughout Somalia”. Moreover, UNOSOM II 
would be “to promote the process of political settlement and national reconciliation 
and to assist the people of Somalia in rehabilitating their political institutions and 
economy”. Those efforts were expected to establish representative democratic 
institutions in Somalia.422 In early May, UNITAF was replaced by UNOSOM II. 
When the armed forces returned from Somalia, President Clinton declared, “Mission 
accomplished.” Meanwhile, the United States continued to contribute forces as part 
of the UN-led UNOSOM II operation. Clinton stated that the mission would be “to 
complete the work of rebuilding and creating a peaceful, self-sustaining, and 
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democratic civil society”. Consequently, the mission in Somalia turned from a 
“humanitarian mission” into “nation building”.423  
 
On 5 June, 24 Pakistani peacekeepers from UNOSOM II were killed in Mogadishu 
and the forces under the command of General Aideed were suspected of carrying out 
the attack. The Security Council passed Resolution 837, authorizing the 
Secretary-General to “take all necessary measures against all those responsible for 
the armed attacks”. Now, the UN-US forces had done more than nation building, 
they were conducting combat operations. The two UN resolutions, according to John 
R. Bolton, marked a deliberate experiment in “assertive humanitarianism”.424 As 
Clinton said to the American people after the UN-US forces attacked the military 
positions of General Aideed, “The US must continue to play its unique role of 
leadership in the world. But now we can increasingly express that leadership through 
multilateral means such as the United Nations”.425     
 
Nevertheless, criticism of the continuing US presence in Somalia mounted. The New 
York Times, which earlier had drawn George H. W. Bush’s attention to the Somali 
crisis, now criticized Clinton’s deep involvement in Somalia’s internal politics,426 
and the Washington Post criticized that the hunt for Aideed had made the United 
States, together with the UN, co-warmakers.427 Republican Senator Larry Pressler of 
South Dakota stated that “we had a moral obligation to the starving Somalis, but we 
have no obligation to referee a civil war”. He pointed out that since the United States 
had fulfilled their original mission of securing the supply lines for humanitarian aid 
distribution, US troops should withdraw from Somalia as soon as possible. The US 
armed forces did not serve the purpose of getting bogged down in a civil war.428  
 
In August, when more US troops, including the Army Rangers and the Delta units, 
were requested to beef up the Quick Reaction Force (QRF) after four US soldiers had 
been killed in Somalia, it smelled like Vietnam. For General Powell, the Vietnam 
experience had made him distrust nation building by well-meaning foreigners.429 
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Despite these problems, the New Yorker described the mission as a “moral advance” 
for US foreign policy which set an example for similar actions in the future.430 By 
the same token, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Peter Tarnoff called 
UNOSOM a model of advancing American humanitarian values with limited US 
military involvement.431 In his speech on August 27, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin 
reaffirmed the administration’s “staying the course” policy. He said, “We went there 
to save a people, and we succeeded. We are staying there now to help those same 
people rebuild their nation.”432 At the same time, he acknowledged the need for the 
disarmament of the clans in Somalia.433 
 
However, on October 3, in their attempt to capture General Aideed, three US Black 
Hawk helicopters were shot down by his forces. Afterwards, the gun battle between 
the Somali militia and the US Army Rangers and Delta commandos led to 18 US 
soldiers being killed. The most disastrous thing was that the bodies of several US 
casualties of the conflict were dragged by Aideed’s men through the streets of 
Mogadishu past jeering crowds of Somalis. Instantaneously, the ‘Black Hawk Down’ 
incident appeared in the world’s headlines and became an enduring image of the risks 
of humanitarian impulses. There was a widespread demand calling for the 
withdrawal of all American forces from Somalia. Several days later, President 
Clinton ordered US troops to completely withdraw from Somalia by March 1994. 
Hence, as Thomas G. Weiss and Don Hubert described, “Those who saw a ‘CNN 
effect’ encouraging intervention also saw the impact of unpalatable images forcing 
the withdrawal of military forces”.434  
 
Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst argued that the failure of the Somali mission was 
because of the Clinton administration’s attempt to shift from humanitarian relief to 
“nation building”, which the George H. W. Bush administration had tried to avoid.435 
Richard Haass countered Michael Mandelbaum’s claim that humanitarian 
intervention inevitably led to political tasks. He argued that the expanded mission in 
Somalia failed because “policy-makers got ambitious” but “did not match their 
ambition with adequate force”.436 Meanwhile, the Somali experience reinforced the 
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Powell Doctrine of using decisive force in places where there was a clear US interest 
and an equally clear way out. “Be careful what you get into,” Powell emphasised 
again. “We have to better understand our national interest.”437  
 
The events of October 1993 also reflected that the UN and the United States had 
based their policies on poor understandings of Somali society and culture. 
Mohammad Sahnoun, a former UN envoy to Somalia, stated, “In Somali culture, the 
worst thing you can do is humiliate them, to do something to them you are not doing 
to another clan…” Therefore, the hunt for Aideed had instead elevated the warlord’s 
standing in Somalia. “He appears, because so much effort is focused on him, kind of 
like Saddam Hussein,” Robert Oakley, US special envoy to Somalia from December 
1992 to March 1993, said. Also, US forces were just seen as another militia by many 
Somalis.438 Moreover, it had been argued that there was a lack of policy direction 
towards Somalia because the Clinton administration was more concerned with 
domestic agenda and not fully engaged with the Somalia policy. Besides, the 
administration had a poor relationship with the military. As a result, it seemed that 
the administration did not care about what was going on in Somalia, and was naively 
reliant on its “assertive multilateralist” foreign policy. Unfortunately, the relationship 
between the United States and the UN did not go very well throughout the Somali 
operation. Because of the distrust and split between the United States and the UN, 
the US Rangers did not tell other UN forces when they launched the raid on October 
3.439 For many observers, this was viewed as a watershed in US-UN relations.440  
 
The probable cause of the rift between the United States and the UN was the 
complicated command structure. The traditional UN peacekeeping force, the US 
QRF, and the US Army Rangers had formed “three distinct forces with three different 
missions and three separate command-and-control structures”.441 The failure in 
Somalia raised questions about whether US forces could or should operate under UN 
command. As the third-ranking National Security Council (NSC) staff Nancy 
Soderberg wrote, “Never again would President Clinton allow US forces to take part 
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in an enforcement operation under UN command”.442 Meanwhile, Ivo H. Daalder, 
also an NSC staffer in the Clinton administration, pointed out, “Critics also attacked 
the administration’s commitment to multilateralism, arguing that this both 
undermined much-needed American leadership and subordinated US national 
interests to the concerns of multilateral bodies like the United Nations”. 443 
Consequently, as Republican Senator Mitch McConnell of Kentucky concluded, 
“Creeping multilateralism died on the streets of Mogadishu.”444 The policy of 
“assertive multilateralism” that the Clinton administration had promoted in its early 
days ended with the Somalian episode.445  
 
On the other hand, Congress, and the Republican Party in particular, increasingly 
criticized the mounting cost of UN-driven peace operations. The United States was 
obligated to pay about one-third of a UN peacekeeping operation. Although President 
Clinton informed the UN that they “must know when to say no” in the autumn of 
1993, the Security Council had expanded its peacekeeping operations in 
Mozambique, on the Iraq-Kuwait border, in Somalia, Georgia, Cyprus, El Salvador, 
Haiti, Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia and Liberia. The Senate Minority Leader Bob 
Dole, a Republican from Kansas, complained that the UN was even considering new 
operations in places like Tajikistan, Angola and Nagorno-Karabakh. The only “say 
no” case was Burundi. Dole claimed that US troops should be led by US 
commanders and prohibited from serving under foreign command in UN operations. 
Moreover, he stressed that US soldiers should only be asked to risk their lives in 
support of US interests.446  
 
Shortly after the retreat of US forces from Somalia, Presidential Decision Directive 
25 (PDD 25) was released by the administration on 3 May 1994. It set guidelines for 
US decision-making on issues of peacekeeping and peace enforcement suited to the 
realities of the post-Cold War period and aimed to impose discipline on both the UN 
and the United States to make peace operations a more effective instrument of 
collective security. The Directive was the result of a one year-long interagency policy 
review and extensive consultations with dozens of members of Congress from both 
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parties. It showed that peace operations could be a useful tool to advance US national 
interests and pursue US national security objectives; however, as the United States 
could not be the world’s policeman, the use of peacekeeping should be selective and 
more effective.447 After completing the policy review, Lake claimed, “Peacekeeping 
is not at the centre of our foreign or defense policy. Our armed forces’ primary 
mission is not to conduct peace operations but to win wars.” He further stated that 
the United States had learned from the lesson of Somalia that “peacekeepers can 
create an opportunity for peace, but the responsibility for the future of a society must 
always rest with its own people”.448  
 
The Somalia debacle had a significant effect on the administration’s subsequent 
military decisions such as the fear of “crossing the Mogadishu line” in Bosnia.449 
One of the direct effects of the Somalia disaster was America’s failure to support the 
UN peacekeeping force in Rwanda.450 As Harry Johnston and Ted Dagne described: 
 
The Somalia debacle had serious ramifications for the foreign policy agenda of the Clinton 
administration. Its delayed action in mid-1994 at the United Nations Security Council, which sought 
US logistical support to deploy an African-led UN peacekeeping force to Rwanda, contributed to the 
unnecessary deaths of many Rwandans. The stalling at the United Nations, no doubt, was to appease 
the administration’s critics in Congress and to demonstrate that the administration could be tough on 
the United Nations. Rwanda, therefore, became the first victim of the administration’s Presidential 
Decision Directive 25 (PDD 25).451   
 
Serious tensions between the minority Tutsi and the majority Hutu populations in 
Rwanda resulted in massive ethnic violence in April 1994. During the three months 
of the genocide, Clinton did not gather his top policy advisers to discuss the killings, 
nor did Lake convene a single ‘principals’ meeting, consisting of the cabinet-level 
members of the foreign policy team. If the subject was brought up at top-level 
meetings, it was only along with, and “subordinate to”, discussions of Somalia, Haiti, 
and Bosnia.452 Clinton’s refusal to respond to the genocide in Rwanda became one 
of the greatest regrets of his presidency. As he wrote in his memoir, “We were so 
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preoccupied with Bosnia, with the memory of Somalia just six months old, and with 
opposition in Congress to military deployments in faraway places not vital to our 
national interests that neither I nor anyone on my foreign policy team adequately 
focused on sending troops to stop the slaughter.”453  
 
However, the administration’s nonintervention policy towards Rwanda was largely 
concerned with insufficient national interests to justify the use of American military 
power. As President Clinton stated in a commencement address at the United States 
Naval Academy, “We cannot solve every such outburst of civil strife or militant 
nationalism simply by sending in our forces.”454 Also, when James Woods, Deputy 
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs at the Defense Department, added Rwanda as 
potential serious crises, he was told, “Look, if something happens in 
Rwanda-Burundi, we don’t care. Take it off the list. US national interest is not 
involved and we can’t put all these silly humanitarian issues on lists, like important 
problems like the Middle East, North Korea and so on. Just make it go away.”455 
Moreover, a Washington Post editorial commented on the inaction to stop the killings 
in Rwanda:  
 
The United States has no recognizable national interest in taking a role, certainly not a leading role. In 
theory, international fire-engine service is available to all houses in the global village. Imagine a fire 
department that would respond only to the lesser blazes. But in a world of limited political and 
economic resources, not all of the many fires will be equally tended. Rwanda is in an unpreferred 
class. It received a UN peacekeeping force last October, but then its political class chose to renew 
tribal carnage. Second chances don’t come easily. Its disintegration cannot fairly be blamed on a lapse 
of the “international community”.456   
 
As a consequence, the Clinton administration did not take any military action to stop 
genocide in Rwanda. Instead, the administration only provided humanitarian aid such 
as delivering food, medicine, and supplies to Rwanda’s refugees.457 
 
Haiti  
In September 1991, the first democratically elected president in Haiti, Jean-Bertrand 
Aristide, was overthrown by the General Raoul Cedras-led military forces and fled to 
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the United States. The military coup caused massive human rights problems, and it 
was reported that 60,000 to 100,000 refugees fled to the shores of Florida and the 
Dominican Republic between 1991 and 1994. Although there was a national interest 
in restoring democracy, the George H. W. Bush administration believed that there 
was not a sufficiently vital interest to use military force in Haiti. Therefore, the 
George H. W. Bush administration’s decision was to join with the UN and the 
Organization of American States (OAS) to impose economic sanctions on the Haitian 
military junta.  
 
During his presidential campaign, Clinton criticized George H. W. Bush’s policy of 
forcibly returning Haitian boat refugees. Moreover, he called for the removal of the 
military rulers and the return to power of Aristide. Nevertheless, once in office, 
Clinton did not make his promise a reality. The new administration continued Bush’s 
policy on Haiti. In July 1993, with the backing of the United States and the UN, 
Cedras and Aristide signed the Governor’s Island Agreement (GIA), which agreed to 
a transition to democracy and set a deadline of October 30 for Aristide’s return.  
 
On October 11, only one week after the “Black Hawk Down” incident, when the 
USS Harlan County, carrying more than 200 American and Canadian troops under 
the UN flags sent to help implement the agreement, arrived at Port-au-Prince, Haitian 
mobs and armed militants threatened waiting diplomats and reporters with a crowd 
shouting: “Kill the whites!” and “Somalia! Somalia!”458 With the graphic images of 
the Somalia debacle still fresh in minds of most American people, Clinton ordered 
the ship to return. The humiliating retreat from Port-au-Prince showed that the 
agreement had collapsed. As result of the embarrassment in Somalia, few 
administration officials were enthusiastic about “gunboat diplomacy” in a troubled 
country. Thus, the Clinton administration renewed economic sanctions that had been 
lifted.459  
 
From October 1993 to April 1994, Clinton sought economic sanctions and diplomacy 
other than the use of force to oust the junta in Haiti and restore Aristide to power. 
However, those efforts were unsuccessful. In April 1994, the Congressional Black 
Caucus, as well as human rights groups, Hollywood stars, and several prominent 
Democratic senators began to show a growing impatience with the administration’s 
Haiti policy. For example, Democrat Representative David R. Obey of Wisconsin 
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called for an American invasion to restore democracy in Haiti. In the meantime, as 
the Haitian refugee problem got worse, Randall Robinson, the head of the 
TransAfrica organization, began a protest against Washington’s policy of direct 
return. He described the Clinton administration’s Haitian refugee policy as “cruel, 
grossly discriminatory and profoundly racist”.460  
 
The administration conducted a policy review of Haiti. At a principal meeting on 7 
May, Lake proposed a military intervention. Learning from the Somalia and Bosnia 
experiences, Lake suggested that the United States had to show its willingness to use 
force unilaterally before the UN would follow. The disenchantment with the UN 
became a remarkable turning point for the administration. “It realized the power of 
the lone superpower. When the United States acted, others would follow. That 
principle would guide much of the rest of Clinton’s foreign policy.”461 However, 
Clinton was not yet ready to commit the use of force; instead, he tightened economic 
sanctions and still sought a “peaceful, negotiated settlement” in Haiti. The President 
did not seek other options should the Haitian military rulers refuse to compromise.462  
 
Nevertheless, the deteriorating refugee crisis and domestic pressure for more 
effective action led the administration to press the UN for military intervention in 
Haiti. At the end of July, the Security Council passed Resolution 940, authorizing 
member states to form a multinational force to “use all necessary means” to remove 
Cedras from power.463 But the administration was divided over the deployment of 
US armed forces in Haiti. Lake, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, and 
Deputy National Security Adviser Sandy Berger favored an invasion of Haiti and 
continued to urge the President for the use of force. But the Pentagon opposed such 
action. Talbott argued that avoiding an invasion was “morally repugnant”. Defense 
Secretary William Perry (Aspin had resigned over the Somalia disaster) countered 
Talbott’s “strange morality” and claimed, “It would be immoral for the United States 
not to do whatever it could to avoid the deaths of American soldiers.”464  
 
However, the Clinton administration’s domestic and international credibility was at 
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stake. The President did not show much promise to remove the military junta, while 
the political and humanitarian situation in Haiti was getting worse because of 
sanctions. On 26 August, the President approved the invasion plan.465 In his speech 
to the nation on 15 September, Clinton warned the Haitian dictators: “Your time is up. 
Leave now or we will force you from power.”466 On 17 September, before the 
deployment of military forces, Clinton sent former president Jimmy Carter, former 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell, and Chairman of the 
Senate Armed Services Committee Senator Sam Nunn to negotiate with Cedras for a 
peaceful transfer of power.467 The negotiation team succeeded in their mission. On 
19 and 20 September, the US-led multinational force, called Operation Restore 
Democracy, peacefully landed in Haiti. The military rulers left and Aristide was soon 
returned to power.468  
 
Why did the Clinton administration decide to take military action towards Haiti? 
Since Clinton had spoken grandly of a “hemisphere of democracies”, it was hard to 
ignore “the fact that an authoritarian regime was thumbing its nose at the United 
States from the nearby Caribbean”. In early September 1994, Lake pointed out that 
American “essential reliability” was at stake. The crisis in Haiti became “a test of US 
commitments to defend democracy, to prevent further destabilization in the region 
and resulting flights of refugees, and to curb ‘gross abuses of human rights’”.469 The 
four major issues: human rights, refugee problems, democracy, and American 
credibility were restated in Clinton’s televised speech to explain why the United 
States had to move beyond sanctions to military force: 
 
Now the United States must protect our interests…. with the cold war over that so many Americans 
are reluctant to commit military resources and our personnel beyond our borders. But when brutality 
occurs close to your shores, it affects our national interests. And we have a responsibility to act…. 
Three hundred thousand more Haitians – 5 percent of their entire population – are in hiding in their 
own country. If we don’t act, they could be the next wave of refugees at our door. We will continue to 
face the threat of a mass exodus of refugees and its constant threat to stability in our region and 
control of our borders…. History has taught us that preserving democracy in our own hemisphere 
strengthens America’s security and prosperity. Democracies here are more likely to keep the peace and 
to stabilize our region…. Beyond the human rights violations, the immigration problems, the 
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importance of democracy, the United States also has a strong interest in not letting dictators, especially 
in our region; break their word to the United States and the United Nations.470    
 
Later, when NSC staff Nancy Soderberg gave a speech at United States Institute of 
Peace (USIP), she stressed again that it were democracy, human rights, and refugee 
problem that drove the administration to take decisive action. She stated: 
 
We had important interests in shoring up democracy in our hemisphere, ending the abuse of human 
rights, and stemming the tide of desperate refugees… and we tried every peaceful avenue to achieve 
our goals. But when it became clear that peaceful means alone would not succeed, the President 
decided to back his diplomacy with force.471  
 
Furthermore, as Taylor Branch suggested to Clinton, “If democracy could take root 
there, it would nurture hope everywhere from Saudi Arabia to China.” And it was 
possible that Haiti could aspire to another miracle from the bright side of American 
heritage.472 However, William Hyland indicated that the administration’s “rationale 
for occupying Haiti had reflected less of the human-rights and democracy-building 
ethic of his aides and more of a traditional geopolitical framework”. In particular, the 
phrase “close to our shore” the President used reflected “the quaint aura of the 
Monroe Doctrine”.473 
 
Beyond these concerns, it was also argued that the Clinton administration was driven 
by “naked political fear – the fear of domestic fallout over continued flows of Haitian 
refugees and of the righteous wrath of the US community that supported President 
Aristide”. Since it had become “a major headache” for the Clinton administration by 
the summer of 1994, the President and his foreign policy team decided to “get Haiti 
off Washington’s political agenda”.474 Moreover, within the administration, a group 
of moralists led by Lake, known as “Haiti hawks”, who had served under the Carter 
administration and were speaking the same language - “the Carteresque human rights 
first policy”, were also considered as the catalyst for driving the administration into 
action.475  
 
Conclusion 
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Different schools of thought had offered alternative diplomatic courses for post-Cold 
War US foreign policy. Classical isolationists suggested the United States should 
look inward and return to a normal nation again. They proposed putting “America 
First” and abandoning most of America’s global commitments. Influenced by the 
notion of American decline, the conservative neo-isolationist approach suggested a 
selective and discriminate diplomacy to scale down America’s international 
obligations and avoid overcommitment abroad. They advocated that the United 
States should only act in world affairs in defense of its vital interests. Although the 
United States could not solve every international problem, conservative 
interventionists claimed that certain problems required American leadership, such as 
the issues of proliferation of nuclear weapons and regional conflicts. They suggested 
the United States should share the burden with allies and friends and work with other 
great powers to solve international issues. Preoccupied by the lesson of Vietnam War, 
liberal neo-isolationists called for policy-makers to solve pressing internal problems. 
They advocated a foreign policy that was an extension of domestic politics. It was 
only when the United States could solve its domestic problems first that it could 
persuade others to follow it. On the other hand, liberal interventionists perceived the 
post-Cold War environment as an opportunity to promote American values such as 
democracy and human rights. They believed in the democratic peace theory and 
assumed that the expansion of democracy would bring prospects of international 
peace and security.  
 
The Clinton administration’s foreign policy was profoundly influenced by the liberal 
perspective. In the search for a successor to containment policy, the new strategy of 
‘democratic enlargement’ was the winner of the Kennan sweepstakes. Two examples 
of these policies were NATO enlargement and aid to democratize Russia. In addition, 
the administration attempted to relate the politics of democracy promotion to the 
economics of the global market. Clinton’s foreign policy had put democratic peace 
theory into practice. However, critics argued that the strategy of enlargement did 
little to provide guidelines for foreign policy issues such as threats posed by rogue 
states, notably Iraq and North Korea, and humanitarian crises caused by intrastate 
conflicts in Bosnia, Rwanda, or Somalia. Moreover, some argued that at a time of 
peace it was important to prevent potential future threats. For example, Russia and 
China were the greatest potential powers that might confront the United States.  
 
On the other hand, accompanied by the process of globalization, borderless threats, 
such as WMD and international terrorism, were emerging. It was assumed that the 
development of global economic interdependence and regional conflicts in the 1990s 
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complicated US foreign policy. It could be argued that specific strategies and policies 
needed to aim at dealing with the specific problems and issues in light of the 
changing world. As a result, the Clinton administration ultimately developed a 
pragmatic approach to external problems, such as its policy of pragmatic and 
principled engagement with China. Overall, critics argued that Clinton’s foreign 
policy lacked strategic visions and specific objectives. However, some analysts 
claimed that the administration did follow such a strategy, which essentially 
consisted of the intertwined concepts of economic globalization and political 
democratization. Perhaps the inability to shape a single concept to replace 
containment within the administration and an incoherent handling of humanitarian 
intervention issues resulted in disarray and confusion.  
 
The Clinton administration inherited the peace operation in Somalia when it came 
into office in 1993. Relying on an assertive multilateralism policy, the Clinton White 
House worked closely with the UN to promote an assertive humanitarianism policy. 
However, the ‘Black Hawk Down’ incident demonstrated the policy failure of 
turning a peace operation to one of nation building. The Somalia debacle had a 
significant effect on the administration’s subsequent military decisions. It was 
Rwanda that suffered first and most. Nevertheless, it was argued that the 
nonintervention policy towards Rwanda was rooted in insufficient national interest. 
As a result, it was assumed that the reason for the Clinton administration to intervene 
in Haiti was largely because of the consideration of geopolitical interests based on 
the Monroe Doctrine; while at the same time, the intervention helped to promote 
American ideals such as democracy and human rights.  
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Chapter 5. 
The Clinton Administration’s Intervention in Bosnia 
 
Introduction 
The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), generally known as 
Yugoslavia, was formed in 1945 and divided into the six Republics of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (hereinafter “Bosnia”), Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Slovenia, and 
Serbia until it was formally dissolved in 1992. In the first post-Communist elections 
of 1990 in Yugoslavia, nationalist parties won electoral victories in most of the 
republics. Following the Yugoslav constitutional crisis and increasingly disturbed by 
growing Serbian nationalist belligerency, Croatia and Slovenia declared 
independence on 25 June 1991 and the wars soon broke out in Yugoslavia. The 
Bosnian War started after a referendum on independence in March and the 
declaration of independence in April 1992.  
 
Bosnia was a multiethnic fabric, which consisted of about 45 percent Muslim, 32 
percent Serb (majority were Orthodox Christians), and 18 percent Croat (majority 
were Roman Catholic). However, they had conflicting goals. Bosnian Serbs wanted 
to remain with the Belgrade-dominated rump Yugoslavia and intended to divide the 
republic along ethnic lines to create a “Greater Serbia”. On the other hand, Bosnian 
Muslims wanted to establish a centralized independent Bosnia, and Croats wanted to 
unite with an independent Croatian state. When the War broke out, Bosnian Serbs, 
supported by neighboring Serbia, soon controlled over half the republic. Although it 
was marked by evidence of widespread killings, the siege of Sarajevo, mass rape, 
and ethnic cleansing conducted by different Serb forces, the fighting on the ground 
was extremely complex. In Herzegovina, Muslims sided with Serbs against Croats; 
in north-west Bosnia, rival Muslim forces were against each other; and in central 
Bosnia, Croats and Serbs formed an alliance against Muslims.  
 
Just a few days before Croatia and Slovenia’s declarations of independence, US 
Secretary of State James Baker met with leaders of all the Yugoslav republics to 
support a united Yugoslavia with no border changes. However, the United States 
recognized the independence of Bosnia as well as Croatia and Slovenia in April 1992, 
and these three newly independent states were admitted to the UN in May 1992. 
Although Serbia and Montenegro formed the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), 
and was proclaimed the successor to the SFRY in April 1992, the United States did 
not recognize this new state. 
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The UN Security Council (UNSC) imposed an arms embargo on Yugoslavia after the 
failure to secure a cease-fire in the early days of the fighting. In February 1992, the 
UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR), as a peacekeeping operation for the former 
Yugoslavia, was initially established. On 30 May, the UN imposed economic 
sanctions on Serbia according to Security Council Resolution 757.476  
 
The collapse of communism and the end of the Cold War had made the Balkans lose 
its strategic importance from the perspectives of most Western policy makers. The 
George H. W. Bush administration found it difficult to come up with good policy 
options to deal with the Yugoslav crisis and define American interests in the 
region.477 For a year and a half, the administration had no intention of leading a 
Western coalition to put military pressure on the Serbs.478 As President George H. W. 
Bush remarked on Bosnia: “I do not want to see the United States bogged down in 
any way into some guerrilla warfare…. There are a lot of voices out there in the 
United States today that say use force, but they don’t have the responsibility of 
sending somebody else’s son or somebody else’s daughter into harm’s way. And I 
do.”479  
 
Despite the triumph in the Gulf War against Iraqi aggression and the talk of a new 
world order, Serbian aggression against non-Serbs in Bosnia, an internationally 
recognized state, was regarded as a civil war by top US officials.480 Most of Bush’s 
foreign policy advisers were traditional realists. Baker’s famous quip - “we didn’t 
have a dog in that fight” - was an illustration. They believed that the United States 
did not have “the most powerful military in the history of the world” to undertake 
humanitarian “social work”; nevertheless, the United States should act in response to 
aggression that would affect US strategic interests, whether economic or security 
related. For example, the Gulf War was fought in order to prevent Saddam Hussein’s 
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regime from becoming regionally domain and to maintain US access to cheap oil.481  
 
Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, preceded by Baker, was influenced by 
memories of Vietnam. He questioned whether the complex Bosnian crisis could meet 
the criteria for military intervention, a view defined by the Powell Doctrine. It argued 
that the use of force should be matched to clear political objectives and “restricted to 
occasions where it can do some good and where the good will outweighs the loss of 
lives and other costs that will surely ensue”. 482  The representatives of the 
Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff consistently opposed military 
intervention there. As Baker recalled in his memoir, “Their model for using force 
was, understandably, the Gulf War - and Bosnia had more characteristics of Vietnam 
than Iraq.”483 As a result, Warren Zimmermann, Ambassador to Yugoslavia from 
1989 to 1992, concluded, “The Vietnam syndrome and the Powell doctrine proved to 
be powerful dampers on action by the Bush administration, particularly in an election 
year.”484  
 
In the meantime, Foreign Minister of Luxembourg Jacques Poos, whose country then 
held the rotating presidency of the European Community (EC), later renamed the 
European Union (EU), confidently stated: “If anyone can do anything here, it is the 
EC. It is not the US or the USSR or anyone else.” It was “the hour of Europe”. The 
United States was happy to let the Europeans take on a leadership role since the 
George H. W. Bush administration did not want to get involved diplomatically, not to 
mention militarily.485  
 
During the presidential election campaign in 1992, Democratic Party candidate Bill 
Clinton criticized the George H. W. Bush administration’s inaction, saying: 
“President Bush’s policy toward former Yugoslavia mirrors his indifference to the 
massacre at Tiananmen Square and his coddling of Saddam Hussein  ...… Once 
again; the administration is turning its back on violations of basic human rights and 
our own democratic values.”486 “We cannot afford to ignore what appears to be a 
deliberate and systematic extermination of human beings based on their ethnic 
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origin,” the candidate said in a campaign speech on 5 August, “I would begin with air 
power against the Serbs to try to restore the basic conditions of humanity.” Moreover, 
on 11 October, he claimed that he would support lifting the arms embargo against the 
Bosnian Muslims as “they were in no way in a fair fight with a heavily armed 
opponent bent on ‘ethnic cleansing’”. Based on moral obligation, Clinton claimed 
that the United States should take forceful action to halt Serbian aggression.487   
 
This chapter examines how and under what circumstances the Clinton administration 
eventually decided to intervene in the Bosnian conflict. It first divides the response 
of the administration to the Bosnian War into three stages and looks at the process of 
the administration’s key decision-making during each stage. The first stage was an 
approach called “lift and strike”, which would use NATO air strikes to frighten the 
Serbs into signing the Vance-Owen peace accord with a combination of lifting the 
arms embargo against the out-gunned Bosnian Muslims to enable them to better fight 
their own battles. However, it encountered the European allies’ opposition. Afterward, 
the administration lacked any effective strategy or action. It was not until the events 
of the Srebrenica massacre that the Clinton White House started to commit the full 
force of diplomacy, including the threat of unilateral military force if necessary. In 
the final section, this chapter will provide an in-depth analysis of the Clinton 
administration’s decisions to intervene.  
 
5.1 The Clinton Administration’s Decision-making Process on Bosnia 
5.1.1 Decision-making Stage 1: January ~ May 1993  
When the Clinton administration entered office in January 1993, the Bosnian crisis 
was the highest priority on the National Security Council (NSC)’s agenda.488 
However, the administration’s foreign policy team held numerous rambling and 
inconclusive meetings about the crisis without achieving a consensus.489 Colin 
Powell, still Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time, described the meetings 
“like graduate-student bull sessions or the think-tank seminars”.490 One top-level 
official even described, “It wasn’t policy making. It was group therapy – an 
existential debate over what was the role of America.”491 Although Clinton had 
pushed for a changed policy during the campaign, such as ending the arms embargo 
against Bosnia and using US air power to deter Serbian aggression; once in office, he 
was confronted by not only the hostility of the Europeans to any change but also the 
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cautiousness of his own military. This led to his interest in Bosnia getting more 
“episodic”.492  
 
Within the administration, Vice President Al Gore, National Security Advisor 
Anthony Lake, and US Ambassador to the United Nations Madeleine Albright were 
the most hawkish proponents, favoring the use of air strikes against the Bosnian 
Serbs on moral grounds. Despite his push for a tougher line against the Serbs, Gore 
soon recognized the classic limitations of being a vice president. Lake, regarded as a 
moralist and a true Wilsonian, also believed in the moral aspects of foreign policy, 
but faced a situation filled with moral complexity in the case of Bosnia. Influenced 
by his Vietnam experiences, he did not want to send US troops to fight an 
unwinnable war, but thought that the conflict in Bosnia threatened European security 
and therefore America’s own interests, a view shared by Albright. However, he was 
unable to push the President to make a decision.  
 
Albright had passionately called for military action; unfortunately, her views had not 
carried much weight. Secretary of State Warren Christopher wanted to avoid another 
Vietnam War. On the other hand, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, “like a graduate 
student in classical rhetoric”, was taking on different sides of the issue at different 
times. He acknowledged that dealing with the Bosnian crisis required enormous 
military force, but neither the United States nor Europe was willing to pay that price. 
In place, he favoured a cease-fire and doing as little as possible in Bosnia.493  
 
Richard Holbrooke, who was one of Clinton’s foreign policy advisors during the 
presidential campaign and later played a major role in the Bosnian crisis, had urged 
“a more vigorous policy against Serb aggression”. In a memorandum to Christopher 
and Lake before the Clinton administration assumed office, he wrote: “Continued 
inaction carries long-term risks which could be disruptive to US-European relations, 
weaken NATO, increase tension in Greece and Turkey, and cause havoc with 
Moscow.” Moreover, he pointed out the so-called “not-so-secret” secret arms 
shipments to the Bosnian Muslims from Iran: “An important reason the Bosnian 
Muslims are surviving is that they are beginning to get significant weapons 
shipments from Islamic nations, apparently including Iran.” Moreover, a growing 
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numbers of “freedom fighters” or “mujahideen” were joining the Bosnian forces.494 
 
The Pentagon retained the position of not intervening in Bosnia as the George H. W. 
Bush administration had done. As Powell declared,  
 
Whenever the military had a clear set of objectives, I pointed out – as in Panama, the Philippine coup, 
and Desert Storm – the result had been success. When the nation’s policy was murky or nonexistent – 
the Bay of Pigs, Vietnam, creating a Marine “presence” in Lebanon – the result had been disaster. In 
Bosnia, we were dealing with an ethnic tangle with roots reaching back a thousand years. The 
fundamental decision was simple, but harsh.495 
 
Aspin shared Powell’s view. However, Albright confronted Powell at one session, 
“What’s the point of having this superb military… if we can’t use it?” Powell later 
wrote in his memoir, “I thought I would have an aneurysm. American GIs were not 
toy soldiers to be moved around on some sort of global game board.”496 The 
revelation of this exchange reflected the Clinton administration’s uneasy relationship 
with the military.497 
 
Meanwhile, the Clinton administration viewed the Vance-Owen plan, proposed by 
UN Representative Cyrus Vance and EC Representative Lord David Owen and 
calling for the division of Bosnia into ten ethnically autonomous provinces under a 
central government in Sarajevo (the capital of Bosnia) as a flawed initiative due to its 
disadvantages for Bosnian Muslims.498 This was because it would legitimize Serb 
control of the land from which the Muslims had been driven by ethnic cleansing.  
 
Despite its criticisms of the plan, the administration embraced it when unveiling its 
long-awaited Balkan policy on 10 February.499 Secretary Christopher outlined six 
steps for the Bosnian crisis:  
 
1. To engage actively and directly in the Vance-Owen negotiations and support 
the efforts of the United Nations and the European Community through the 
Vance-Owen negotiations to arrive at peace agreement.  
2. To communicate to the Bosnians, Serbs, and Croatians through negotiation to 
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end the conflict.  
3. To work with allies and the Russians to tighten the economic sanctions and 
put political pressure on Serbia and deter Serbia from widening the war.  
4. To enforce the no-fly zone over Bosnia under a UN resolution.  
5. To prepare to join with the United Nations, NATO, and others in 
implementing and enforcing an agreement, including possible military 
participation.  
6. To consult with friends and allies on these actions; in particular, to work 
closely and cooperatively with Russia in search for a peaceful resolution.500 
  
He explained the administration’s decisions to engage diplomatically in resolving the 
Bosnian conflict:  
 
We cannot ignore the human toll. Serbian “ethnic cleansing” has been pursued through mass murders, 
systematic beatings and rapes of Muslims and others, prolonged shelling of innocents in Sarajevo and 
elsewhere, forced displacement of entire villages, inhumane treatment of prisoners in detention camps, 
and the blockading of relief to sick and starving civilians. Atrocities have been committed by other 
parties as well. Our conscience revolts at the idea of passively accepting such brutality. 
 
Beyond these humanitarian interests, we have direct strategic concerns as well. The continuing 
destruction of a new UN member state challenges the principle that internationally recognized borders 
should not be altered by force. In addition, this conflict itself has no natural borders. It threatens to 
spill over into new regions, such as Kosovo and Macedonia. It could then become a greater Balkan 
war, like those that preceded World War I. Broader hostilities could touch additional nations, such as 
Greece, Albania, and Turkey. The river of fleeing refugees, which has already reached the hundreds of 
thousands, would swell. The political and economic vigor of Europe, already tested by the integration 
of former communist states, would be further strained.501 
 
Christopher described Bosnia as a crucial test that would address America’s 
post-Cold War role in Europe and the world, as well as the willingness of the United 
States and its allies to commit to their institutions of collective security, such as 
NATO, in meeting the demands if this new age.502  
 
President Clinton further stressed the importance of US engagement in multilateral 
efforts to reach a solution to the conflict – a lesson learned from the Gulf War: “If we 
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operate with the support of the United Nations and with the support of Europe and 
with the support of allies, we can do a lot of things at an acceptably low cost of life, 
and get something done. If we go off on our own and everybody else is over here, we 
can’t get it done.”503  
 
Agreeing with Christopher’s emphasis on strategic interests, retired General William 
Odom advocated that stability in Europe would be disturbed by the Bosnian conflict 
spilling over into neighboring countries. If this happened, General Odom told the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s European Subcommittee, “Russia might 
eventually be more clearly sided with Serbia and the Central European powers more 
openly sided with Croatia, Turkey and other Moslem countries being very much on 
the side of Bosnia, that is not a formula for economic prosperity and international 
stability in a key region of the world. Eventually it would adversely affect US jobs 
through our interdependency with Europe. And therefore a large intervention force 
just may be an overhead cost that one has to pay.” He claimed that unless the United 
States took the lead in contributing mightily, there would not be any action taken by 
the Europeans. Meanwhile, former UN Ambassador Jeane J. Kirkpatrick urged the 
administration to act unilaterally if necessary.504  
 
In March, Lake began a new round of meetings to search for a new policy. Options 
were discussed and refined but no decisions had been made. The administration’s 
policy on Bosnia continued to tighten the embargo to press both sides to negotiate 
and insisted on working in concert with the allies.505 In mid-April, it was reported 
that Serbian forces had moved in on the besieged Muslim town of Srebrenica. The 
West, and above all the Clinton administration, were humiliated by the news seeping 
out of Srebrenica.  
 
At a press conference, President Clinton emphasised: 
 
We are reviewing other options. I think we should act. We should lead – the United States should 
lead… but I do not think we should act alone, unilaterally… the United States, even as the last 
remaining superpower, has to act consistent with international law under some mandate of the United 
Nations. 
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He further stated: 
 
I think that’s a good argument against the United States itself becoming involved as a belligerent in a 
war there. But we are, after all, the world’s only super power. We do have to lead the world and there 
is a very serious problem of systematic ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia, which could have 
not only enormous further humanitarian consequences…but also could have other practical 
consequences in other nearby regions where the same sorts of ethnic tensions exist.506 
  
“The principle of ethnic cleansing is something we ought to stand up against,” 
Clinton said.507  
 
However, some argued that the President seemed to have “a tendency to pronounce 
on principle, prevaricate in practice and preempt the policies and plans of others.”508 
His position showed a sense of confusion and uncertainty, as his advisors were 
uncertain whether or not the United States should take military action in the Balkans. 
On the other hand, his foreign policy aides also had to interpret what he wanted. 
Gradually, a consensus was reached about lifting the arms embargo and using 
airpower.509  
 
As a result of a principals’ meeting on 1 May, Clinton agreed to the “lift and strike” 
approach. It was proposed by Gore, Lake, and Albright, and would use NATO air 
strikes to force the Serbs into signing the Vance-Owen peace accord and lift the arms 
embargo to enable Bosnian Muslims to fight their own battles. The final decision 
would depend on consultation with European allies to see if they would join the 
operation. On the same day, Christopher left for Europe to sell the American 
strategy.510  
 
Unfortunately, Christopher encountered strong opposition from European allies, 
particularly Britain, France, and Russia.511 One British official countered that ending 
the embargo would result in all three warring parties being armed and escalate the 
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fighting.512 French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe said: “There is a division of tasks 
which I don’t think is acceptable, that of having some flying in planes and dropping 
bombs and others, the Europeans – especially the French – on the ground”, which 
indirectly reflected Washington’s refusal to contribute peacekeeping troops to 
Bosnia.513  
 
As a result of consultations with the allies, although none embraced the core of 
Clinton’s proposal for lifting the UN arms embargo, they agreed in principle to use 
NATO air strikes only if the Serbs launched new attacks.514 When Christopher 
reported back, he said: “Our central concept of lifting the arms embargo ran into stiff 
resistance.” The allies were worried about the safety of their peacekeepers on the 
ground.515 Now, Christopher “understood what a ‘loser’ the lift and strike policy was 
and he tried to turn the Bosnia issue off. He was convinced that any serious US 
involvement in Bosnia would be politically disastrous for Clinton”.516 Furthermore, 
“he felt that if the US got out too far ahead of the Europeans and then couldn’t 
persuade them to come along, it would hurt American leadership on this and other 
issues. And that, in turn, would hurt Clinton’s Presidency. This reasoning closed the 
circle on American leadership”.517  
 
However, it was argued that Clinton’s indecisiveness and unenthusiastic support for 
“lift and strike” doomed the initiative. Clinton feared that pushing the issue would 
affect his support for the reform policies of Russia. Russian President Boris Yeltsin 
had warned Clinton not to counter military action against the Serbs. Moreover, he 
was afraid that the issue might become a new American quagmire.518 Clinton’s 
political adviser Dick Morris had warned him to avoid involvement in Bosnia, “You 
don’t want to be Lyndon Johnson. Sacrificing your potential for doing good on the 
domestic front by a destructive, never-ending foreign involvement. It’s Democrats’ 
disease to take the same compassion that motivates their domestic policies and let it 
lure them into heroic but ill-considered foreign wars.”519  
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Despite Lake’s effort to craft a strategy to proactively resolve the Bosnian crisis, it 
appeared that Clinton usually reacted to the events in Bosnia rather than shaping 
them.520 During his European trip, Christopher was told by Aspin that Clinton had 
changed his mind about the policy. “The president’s gone south on us,” Aspin said. In 
the bureaucracy, it was widely said that one of the reasons for Clinton’s pull back 
was because the President had read Robert Kaplan’s Balkan Ghosts. “To Clinton, it 
seemed to say that the people in the Balkans had been killing each other for centuries 
and nothing could be done about it”.521 It could be said that the costs would be too 
high for the United States to intervene in the Balkans; and the opposition from 
European allies strengthened this argument. Ultimately, the administration’s Bosnia 
policy turned towards preventing the conflict from spreading and dealing with the 
humanitarian issues.522 
 
In spite of the failure to gain support from European allies for the “lift and strike” 
policy, the administration still insisted on resolving the Bosnian crisis cooperatively 
with allies. Moreover, Christopher indicated that any intervention in a situation he 
once called “a problem from hell” would have to embody a clear view of what 
American interests were. He pointed out the principles that guided the President to 
respond to the Bosnian conflict:   
 
The first principle is that we will not act alone in taking actions in the former Yugoslavia. This is a 
multilateral problem, and it must have a multilateral response. There are a number of countries already 
involved on the ground, and a number of countries have moral, political, and strategic interests at 
stake here. Furthermore, at heart this is a European problem. We will do what we can, in concert with 
our allies and friends, to respond to the violence and contain the conflict; but we will not act 
unilaterally.   
 
Second, the United States will not send ground troops into Bosnia to engage in military action. … we 
are prepared to commit our military forces to implement a peace settlement entered into consensually 
and in good faith by the parties, but we will not use our military forces to impose a settlement in the 
Balkans.523 
 
On 22 May, Christopher announced that the United States, Russia, France, Spain, and 
Britain had agreed a new policy on Bosnia, known as the Joint Action Program, 
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which would implement humanitarian assistance to Bosnia, enforce economic 
sanctions under UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 820 against Serbia, 
secure Bosnia’s borders from Serbia, enforce the no-fly zone; work a new UN 
Security Council Resolution on “safe areas” in Bosnia, support the establishment of 
the War Crimes Tribunal, reach a negotiated settlement on the basis of the 
Vance-Owen plan, and contain the conflict with joint efforts to prevent it from 
spilling over into neighboring countries.524 After the declaration of Srebrenica as a 
safe area under UNSCR 819 in April, the concept of “safe areas”, which was 
proposed by France during Christopher’s European trip, was extended to the towns 
of Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde, and Bihac under UNSCR 824 in May.525 
Nevertheless, the Bosnian Serb parliament overwhelmingly rejected the Vance-Owen 
plan in their referendum.526 On the other hand, some argued that the EC was 
reluctant to support the formation of an autonomous Muslim state as it would lead to 
some major problems in the region.527 
 
Nevertheless, the joint action program was regarded as “a holding action” rather than 
a policy for Bosnia. It was the administration’s effort to try to restore allied unity.528 
Some argued that the Clinton administration’s Bosnia policy changed to be one of 
containment, which showed a “sort of encircling [of] Bosnia, forgetting about what’s 
happening inside Bosnia and just preventing the whole thing from spreading”. Dee 
Dee Myers, one of the administration officials, responded that the Clinton White 
House had two objectives: “One is to contain the conflict to keep it from spilling 
over into other regions, and the other is to stop Serbian aggression and the policy of 
ethnic cleansing.” However, the administration still tried to search for what kind of 
measures should be undertaken to achieve the objectives.  
 
On the other hand, some were doubtful whether or not the United States should 
continue to get involved in Bosnia. Myers said:  
 
The president believes that, as the only superpower left in the world, that the United States has a 
responsibility to lead, not just to stand by. The United States – the world community cannot stand by 
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in the face of ethnic cleansing in an ethnic conflict like this and allow it to happen without registering 
a protest and doing something to try to stop it.  
 
In the face of the further question of whether the American people still wanted to be 
this world power that intervened overseas, Myers stated:  
 
That is an enduring value of the American people, and particularly now in the wake of the Cold War 
where there is only one superpower left. It has always been a pillar of American foreign policy that we 
have a special role in the world.529 
 
However, some argued that “Clinton was confused, in policy terms, between the 
emphasis on domestic affairs in his Administration and his personal reaction both to 
the events in Bosnia and to the charges of others”.530 While Clinton was focused like 
a laser on the economy, his indecisive policy on Bosnia had damaged the 
effectiveness of his whole presidency, both at home and abroad. Obviously, how the 
President dealt with the Bosnia issue would have an impact on his domestic 
initiatives, such as health care, budget, and national service plans.531  
 
The Congress was divided over US involvement in Bosnia. The Democrats were still 
shadowed by their Vietnam experiences and were struggling to see if they were 
capable of leading the world, while the Republicans were debating whether the 
country should return to its isolationist roots and adopt an “America First” foreign 
policy or remain in its position as leader of the free world engaged in foreign affairs 
in the aftermath of the Cold War. For example, Republican Trent Lott of Mississippi, 
Thad Cochran of Mississippi, and John McCain of Arizona, who were some of the 
most conservative leaders in the US Senate, were all Bosnia doves. These 
conservatives did not believe that there was any US interest in Bosnia. They were, 
ironically, paralyzed by the Vietnam syndrome and opposed US involvement in 
Bosnia.  
 
Senator Lott described that Bosnia would be a Vietnam-type quagmire. Senator 
McCain argued that Europe should take care of its own backyard. The conservative 
National Review advocated that the United States had no vital interests at stake in 
Bosnia and that arguments such as avoiding a wider Balkan war and re-establishing 
American leadership across the Atlantic were only justified as “modest risks”. 
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However, Republican Minority Leader, Bob Dole of Kansas, allied with liberal 
Democrat Joseph Biden of Delaware, was the Senate’s leading Bosnia hawk and 
called for stronger US action in the Bosnian crisis.532        
 
During the early stages of the decision-making on Bosnia, as NSC staff Nancy 
Soderberg recalled: 
 
Essentially, we had as a central question to define the role of the use of force in the post-Cold War era. 
When we won the Cold War, people wanted the troops to come home. They didn’t understand the 
need to continue to engage and use force…. when you’re in there it’s not obvious what the right 
courses are. For example, in these cases we had there was not a threat on the par of World War II or 
even Vietnam or Saddam Hussein being in Kuwait. And for the military, the use of force threshold was 
very high…  It was just not clear to most policy makers in 1993 that we actually had to use force to 
stop the killing in Bosnia. Although Clinton called for it during the campaign, when he got in he 
learned…none of the European allies were there, nobody wanted to do it.533 
 
The new Clinton administration, like the George H. W. Bush administration, 
struggled to determine its own vital interests in the Balkans. Clinton was criticized as 
being “never really on board”, “disengaged”, having “lack of commitments”, and 
“less a concrete plan than a proposed ‘direction’” on the subject. On the other hand, 
the administration insisted on a multilateral effort to resolve the Bosnian conflict.534  
 
5.1.2 Decision-making Stage 2: June 1993 ~ April 1995  
In June 1993, the administration moved to accept the partition of Bosnia into three 
ethnically-based states proposed by President Franjo Tudjman of Croatia and 
President Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia, which would allow the Serbs to keep the 
territory they seized by force if Bosnian Muslims and Croats agreed.535  The 
three-way partition plan was then promoted by EC Representative Lord Owen and 
UN Representative Thorvald Stoltenberg. The Owen-Stoltenberg proposal called for 
the division of Bosnia into the three constituent entities leaving only a loose 
federation as central authority. It granted the possibility for future reunification 
between the Bosnian Serbs and Serbia and the Bosnian Croats and Croatia. However, 
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the Bosnian leaders opposed the plan and warned that it would reward aggression.536  
 
In early July, the TV pictures of the deteriorating humanitarian situation in and 
around Sarajevo made Bosnia return to the headlines. Clinton’s foreign policy team 
suggested that the use of air power in the service of diplomacy would be necessary to 
end the siege of Sarajevo and to force the Serbs into peace negotiations and 
cease-fire agreements.537 One senior administration official demonstrated that the 
United States would take stronger measures, which was “lifting the arms embargo 
against the Bosnian government with compensatory air strikes until they receive 
weapons to defend themselves”. However, the Clinton White House still waited for 
an affirmation from the Europeans.538 At the end of the month, Clinton wrote to 
NATO Heads of State and Government, saying: “The Serbs’ efforts to strangle the 
city of Sarajevo -- through continued artillery attacks, military offensives, and 
cut-offs of food, water and fuel -- had reached a critical point, threatening a 
humanitarian disaster and undermining prospects for the negotiations”. He suggested 
“putting NATO air power in the service of diplomacy”; that is to say, using air strikes, 
if necessary, “to relieve the siege of Sarajevo and to promote a peaceful settlement at 
the Geneva talks”.  
 
On 2 August, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) meeting confirmed the view from 
Washington that the situation in Bosnia was “unacceptable”.539 The Allies agreed to 
undertake air strikes against the Serbs and reached a “dual-key” agreement, in which 
the use of air strikes should be authorized by the UNSC and the NAC.540 In February 
1994, due to the shelling of Sarajevo’s marketplace and the violation of the no-fly 
zone by Bosnian Serbs, NATO, with the approval of the UN, conducted a series of 
air strikes. It was the first military action in the 44-year history of the alliance. “We 
have an interest in showing that NATO, history’s greatest military alliance, remains a 
credible force for peace in post-cold-war Europe,” Clinton said.541  
 
At the same time, Congress pushed for a unilateral lifting of the UN arms embargo, a 
move strongly backed by Senator Dole. Despite support for lifting the embargo, most 
of Congress still opposed the possibility of direct US military involvement. “They 
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wanted a ‘free lunch’: to help the Muslims militarily and to keep the United States 
out,” Zimmermann described in his memoir.542 Clinton considered that NATO had 
just received the green light for air strikes, and a unilateral abandonment of the 
Bosnian embargo would be used as an excuse to disregard the embargoes the US 
supported in Haiti, Libya, and Iraq.543 On the other hand, as Taylor Branch described, 
“‘Unilateral lift’ was a euphemism for violating the embargo. Doing so would 
compel Russia and other countries to send offsetting weapons to the Serbs, and it 
would undermine international impact all over the world.”544  
 
Despite the division, the Clinton administration became more active in diplomatic 
negotiations. For Clinton, “Bosnia was more than a religious kinship. Bosnia tested 
their reform platforms against fundamentalist propaganda that Western democracy 
was a façade for corrupt, postcolonial domination of Muslim nations”.545 The United 
States began a diplomatic effort to bring the Muslims and Croats together to establish 
a joint Muslim-Croat federation that would consist of about half of Bosnia’s territory, 
in what came to be known as the Washington Agreement. The cooperation between 
the Muslims and Croats would end the Muslim-Croat conflict in central Bosnia. Most 
importantly, it would change the military balance of power on the ground and isolate 
the Serbs at the negotiating table.546 Clinton claimed:  
 
The United States has clear interests at stake, an interest in helping prevent the spread of a wider war 
in Europe, an interest in showing that NATO remains a credible force for peace, and interest in 
helping to stem the terrible, destabilizing flows of refugees this struggle is generating, and perhaps 
clearly, a humanitarian interest we all share in stopping the continuing slaughter of innocents in 
Bosnia.547  
 
Meanwhile, Russia emerged as a major player on the Bosnian peace-negotiating 
scene. In April, the Contact Group, consisting of the United States, Britain, France, 
Germany, and Russia, was formed. The international community’s diplomatic efforts 
in the Balkans entered a new forum. The Contact Group provided an international 
stage for Russia to confirm its continued standing as a major power. As Deputy 
Secretary of State Strobe Talbott recalled,  
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The Contact Group existed for the sole purpose of including Russia in a kind of steering committee 
otherwise made up of key NATO allies. Its stated objective was to revive the peace process in Bosnia, 
but its real purpose, in the minds of the allied foreign ministers, was to keep Russia, as they variously 
put it, inside the tent, on the reservation or, in Chris’s [Secretary Christopher’s] phrase, sullen but not 
obstructionist.548  
 
Throughout the spring and early summer of 1994, the Contact Group developed the 
Owen-Stoltenberg plan into the Contact Group plan, which called for the territorial 
division of a sovereign Bosnia into two entities, 51 percent controlled by the 
Muslim-Croat Federation and 49 percent by the Bosnian Serbs. However, the Serbs, 
who controlled 70 percent of Bosnia’s territory, turned the plan down.549  
 
In a CNN interview, President Clinton demonstrated that the leadership of the United 
States was indispensable in resolving humanitarian crises. He said: 
 
This era has seen an epidemic of humanitarian catastrophes, many caused by ethnic conflicts or the 
collapse of governments. Some, such as Bosnia, clearly affect our interests. Other, such as Rwanda, 
less directly affect our own security interests but still warrant our concern and our assistance. America 
cannot solve every problem and must not become the world’s policeman. But we do have an 
obligation to join with others to do what we can to relieve suffering and to restore peace.  
 
The means we use will and must vary from circumstance to circumstance. When our most important 
interests are at stake, we will not hesitate to act alone if necessary. Where we share an interest in 
action with the international community, we work perhaps through the United Nations.  
 
In other cases we will work in partnership with other nations. In Bosnia, for example, we have stepped 
up our diplomatic involvement, alone with Russia and others. We supported NATO enforcement 
measures and committed to provide United States forces as a part of a NATO enforcement mission if 
and when the parties can reach a workable peace agreement.550 
 
In late 1994, the Clinton administration suffered not only an electoral defeat when 
the Republicans won both houses of Congress, but also differences within NATO 
over the Bosnia policy. Due to Congress’s vote to cut off all funds for enforcing the 
arms embargo against the Bosnian Government by November 15 if the Bosnian 
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Serbs had not agreed to a peace settlement, the administration announced on 
November 10 that the US military would stop enforcing the embargo. Although it 
meant that the United States would not unilaterally break the UN Resolution or 
supply arms, at the same time they would not stop others from shipping weapons to 
the Muslim-led Bosnian Government. Moreover, Dole, the likely majority leader 
after the Republican gains in the elections, continued to push for a unilateral lifting 
of the arms embargo. However, the European allies responded that the unilateral 
move would expose their peacekeeping troops to greater risks. Also, it would 
undermine NATO and lead to an intensified war rather than a negotiated peace.551  
 
In late November, in response to the Serbian advance on the Muslim enclave of 
Bihac, a UN-designated “safe area”, NATO launched a three-day bombing of Serbian 
targets. However, facing 250 UN peacekeepers immobilized by the Bosnian Serbs, 
NATO air strikes were hardly decisive, and were labeled “pinpricks” by the press. At 
a NATO meeting in Brussels, the United States’ proposal for further NATO air 
attacks against the Bosnian Serbs unless they withdrew from Bihac met with 
resistance, especially from France (who provided about 7,000 troops in UNPROFOR) 
and Britain (who provided 4,000). France, the largest contributor to UNPROFOR, 
criticized that the United States only wanted to rely on the threat of air strikes to stop 
the fighting but refused to get involved on the ground.552 By the same token, British 
Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd defended that Europe had “no reason to be 
ashamed” of its diplomatic efforts, especially when the United States would not take 
part in an allied ground operation.553  
 
It was NATO’s worst dispute since the Suez crisis of 1956. The fact that the allies 
failed to act in Bihac had implications beyond the Balkans. It was about the role of 
the 45-year old NATO alliance in a world without a common enemy (the Soviet 
Union). The United States, Britain, and France found it difficult to define the point 
where their national security interests converged. Gradually, Clinton’s foreign policy 
aides recognized that the American effort “to use NATO air strikes to prevent the fall 
of Bihac had only intensified trans-Atlantic frictions”. Spending his Thanksgiving 
weekend working on a memorandum to the President on what the Bihac crisis meant, 
Lake wrote: “Bihac’s fall has exposed the inherent contradictions in trying to use 
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NATO air power coercively against the Bosnian Serbs when our allies have troops on 
the ground attempting to maintain impartiality in performing a humanitarian 
mission.”  
 
Then, at a principals’ meeting chaired by Lake, was agreed that NATO’s unity was 
more important than the Bosnian crisis. One senior Administration official described 
the conclusion of the meeting: “We have been putting straws on the back of NATO 
solidarity over Bosnia for the last two years. We have been pushing them over and 
over to use military force, to the point where we have come to threaten the 
destruction of the transatlantic treaty. We are not going to do that anymore. We are 
not going to break NATO over this. If the Europeans generally reject the use of air 
power, we’re not going to put up a big fight on this anymore.” Lake suggested that 
the United States should put its diplomatic efforts into securing a cease-fire 
agreement instead of further pushing for bombings. Consequently, in order to be 
close ranks with its European allies, the United States abandoned its proposal of 
using NATO air power coercively against the Bosnian Serbs to save Bihac. Now, 
“the primary goal of the United States’ Bosnian policy - saving Bosnia - had become 
a secondary concern to salvaging NATO”. Some even argued that the United States’ 
policy “had never been concerned with saving Bosnia, only with preserving 
America’s global leadership”. Ironically, when these monumental changes to the 
most serious foreign policy mission this administration had ever faced were under 
way, one official said, “Bill Clinton isn’t in the room.”554 
 
In the face of humiliation and harassment by the Bosnian Serb forces, the UN 
announced that it would withdraw its peacekeepers unless there was reached a 
countrywide cease-fire agreement. Each time in response to NATO’s air strikes, the 
Serbs had usually harassed the peacekeepers and taken some hostages. However, the 
withdrawal of UNPROFOR would show the failure of Western powers in Bosnia, 
especially for the EU, which thought that it could solve the Yugoslav crisis without 
direct American help. Britain and France, with the largest military forces in the UN 
mission, would be the most embarrassed.555  
 
In response to the possibility of a UNPROFOR withdrawal, the Clinton 
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administration decided to send 25,000 US troops to Bosnia to assist if a pullout was 
requested. In the past, the administration had made clear that the United States would 
send forces to Bosnia only to enforce a peace agreement. Now, “the President 
believes it is important that the United States, as a leader of NATO, be ready to assist 
our allies if their forces are in danger,” the State Department spokeswoman Christine 
Shelly said. “It is a test of solidarity,” one administration official said.556 
 
On the other hand, Newt Gingrich, the incoming Speaker of the House, claimed that 
the allies should pull peacekeeping forces out of Bosnia since the troops had become 
“hostages”. Then, they should arm and train Muslim-led Bosnian Government forces, 
and conduct an all-out air attack if the Serbs responded with a general offensive. 
However, Christopher commented, “The United States, having caused the 
withdrawal of UNPROFOR, lifting the arms embargo, starting a bombing campaign, 
would have its commitment made. Our national interest would have been engaged 
there. And I think we would probably have to vindicate that interest by then putting 
in ground troops.”557  
 
William J. Perry, who succeeded Aspin as Secretary of Defense, stated that unilateral 
action by the United States would result in the withdrawal of British and French 
troops, and that this probably required at least 10,000 troops to help get them out. 
Nevertheless, Dole countered, “If President Clinton had been providing leadership 
the last 16 to 18 months; we wouldn’t be where we are today. And now how do we 
get out? We just give the Serbs everything they want and say we’ve had a victory.” 
Obviously, the Republican pressure for a more forceful Bosnia policy would 
challenge the Clinton administration when the Republican majority took control of 
Congress in January 1995.558  
 
In mid-December, as a result of the deadlock between the Clinton administration and 
its European allies, former president Jimmy Carter, as a private mediator, went to 
Bosnia to negotiate with the warring parties. On 21 December, Carter announced that 
a nationwide four-month cease-fire agreement had been reached. However, there was 
still the deep territorial dispute over the Contact Group plan, which would result in 
the Serbs’ holdings of Bosnia’s territory being reduced from 70 percent to 49 percent. 
The Bosnian Serbs ultimately wanted to secede from Bosnia and did not want to 
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become a minority under a Muslim-led government.559  
 
During the period of cease-fire, which went into effect on 1 January 1995, the 
Contact Group offered a lifting of economic sanctions on Serbia in exchange for their 
recognition of Bosnia and Croatia. However, Serbian President Milosevic rejected 
the proposal. He informed Russian Foreign Minister Andrei V. Kozyrev that most 
people in Serbia would view the recognition of Croatia and Bosnia as betraying more 
than one million Serbs who had fought to change the borders of those countries.560  
 
In the meantime, it was reported by the Washington Post that over the past six 
months the Clinton administration had been silent about Iran’s arms deliveries to the 
Muslim-led Bosnian Government. Having viewed Bosnian Muslims as the victim of 
aggression by better-armed Serbs, the Clinton administration tended to support their 
obtaining of arms to fight back. Despite this, the United States could not violate the 
UN arms ban unilaterally because of the opposition from its European allies. The fact 
that arms shipments from Iran to Bosnia occurred was actually discovered the 
previous year. Also, another issue was that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard was 
training the Muslims in Bosnia. It raised the concern that the Bosnian Muslims might 
be radicalized by the Iranians since Iran had been suspected of sowing seeds of 
Islamic revolutions abroad. In particular, the Clinton administration, conversely, had 
put much effort into containing the fundamentalist threat emanating from Iran.561   
 
At this stage, despite the achievements of some diplomatic efforts, it was criticized 
that the administration’s Bosnian policy ended basically where it had begun: 
“without a diplomatic initiative, without the threat of military action, and without 
much credibility to deliver on either”. Moreover, “led by the United States, the 
international community appeared only capable of carrying out policies to contain 
and limit the Bosnian tragedy, not end it”.562  
 
5.1.3 Decision-making Stage 3: May ~ December 1995  
When the four-month cease-fire expired, the fighting in Bosnia escalated again. In 
May 1995, the Bosnian Serbs began shelling the capital Sarajevo. UN and European 
allies used NATO air strikes to intimidate the Serbs. In response to “pinprick” 
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NATO air strikes, the Bosnian Serbs took more UN personnel hostage and threatened 
to chain them to possible air targets for use as human shields if the strikes continued. 
Those embarrassing and humiliating images were broadcast to the world.  
 
For Britain and France, the hostage-taking had led to domestic political crises.563 
Senior French officials asked for broader powers for their soldiers to shoot back and 
protect themselves. British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd requested the 
withdrawal of its troops from the UN force unless the security condition in Bosnia 
was improved. The UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali considered the 
possibility of UNPROFOR’s withdrawal, since the four-month cease-fire had ended. 
Moreover, in order to avoid a recurrence of the “Somalia syndrome”, in which the 
US and other governments backed away from a peacekeeping mission after a 
frustrating experience, Boutros-Ghali called for a redefined mandate in Bosnia.564   
 
Meanwhile, the newly-elected French president Jacques Chirac proposed to dispatch 
a rapid-reaction force of up to 10,000 troops to Bosnia to protect UN peacekeepers. 
The proposal was adopted by the Contact Group on May 30, by NATO on June 3, 
and by the UN Security Council on June 16. The Clinton administration promised to 
provide air support, intelligence, and transport to boost the capability of the new 
multinational force, but ruled out any US role on the ground. As Perry said, “We will 
lean forward as far as we can to provide all of the support that the United States has 
available, not including putting ground forces in.”  
 
Being aware of the consequences of a complete UN withdrawal and the possibility of 
sending 25,000 US troops to Bosnia to assist the withdrawal as he had promised last 
December, Clinton was now “clearly in command of the subject, of his government, 
and of himself” when it came to Bosnia. “All meetings with him,” Lake described, 
“were far more crisp and presidential.” Clinton was kept informed by General John 
Shalikashvili when the Pentagon developed contingency plans for a rescue operation. 
Shalikashvili had replaced Powell as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff when 
Powell retired in September 1993.565  
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The contingency plans approved by Clinton required US troops to enforce a peace 
agreement if the Bosnian Serbs and Muslim-led Bosnian Government reached such 
an agreement, or to help facilitate UNPROFOR’s withdrawal. The latter contingency, 
then approved by the NAC, became known as OPLAN 40104, and called for about 
20,000 US troops to go to Bosnia as part of a 60,000-member NATO-led force. Perry 
explained to House and Senate panels that “the United States did not have a vital 
interest in Bosnia but held a security interest in containing the war”. However, 
“American troops would only be used under the “remote possibility” of a UN plea 
for help”.566  
 
While 10,000 members of the RRF, consisting of French, British, and Dutch troops, 
began their operations in Bosnia, leaders in Washington, London, and Paris insisted 
on keeping UN peacekeepers in the Balkans. This was because the withdrawal of the 
UN troops would commit up to 60,000 European and American troops and cost $2 
billion to help them fight their way out of the country. The OPLAN 40104 
withdrawal plan would be the greatest fear for the Clinton administration. It would 
send American soldiers to a place which Clinton called a “shooting gallery”.567 As 
Lake recalled, “We all agreed that [a UN] collapse would mean that American troops 
would have to go into Bosnia in order to rescue UNPROFOR, which meant that we 
were going in the context of a defeat. And nobody wanted that.”568  
 
The question of the withdrawal or not of UN troops had caused the worst tensions 
between the United States and its European allies since the creation of NATO after 
World War II. Since France and Britain had large contingents of soldiers in 
UNPROFOR, they were deeply concerned about risking their soldiers and charged 
the United States with sitting on the sidelines.569 Holbrooke argued that “the strains 
endangered NATO itself just as Washington sought to enlarge it.” Therefore, “the 
Clinton Administration was severely criticized for reneging on our commitments to 
European security and for lowering the general priority accorded to foreign affairs – 
in short, for weak leadership in foreign policy”.570 Similarly, Democratic Senator 
Joseph Biden made the link between Bosnia and NATO enlargement, “A failure in 
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Bosnia would signal the beginning of the end for NATO, which is currently 
restructuring itself to meet Bosnia-like challenges in the twenty-first century.”571 
When French President Chirac returned home after his visit to Washington in June, 
he said, “The position of leader of the free world was vacant.”572  
 
From 6 to 16 July, the Bosnian Serb forces killed more than 7,000 Muslim men in 
Srebrenica, a UN-designated “safe haven” under the protection of Dutch 
peacekeepers, and drove 23,000 women and children to Bosnian Muslim territory 
near Tuzla.573 Despite the UN flag over Srebrenica, this single most genocidal act of 
the Bosnian War was regarded as the West’s greatest shame. The mass murder was on 
a scale that had not been witnessed in Europe since the end of World War II.574  
 
“I’m getting creamed on Bosnia… Why aren’t you all giving me better options? 
Chirac at least has some new ideas [which meant Chirac’s proposal for a new 10,000 
strong European Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) on the ground to protect the UN 
peacekeepers],” Clinton shouted at his NSC staff at one of their meetings.575 
Realizing the war in Bosnia “was killing the US position of strength in the world”, 
Clinton was determined to get the war off the front pages before the presidential 
election of autumn 1996.576 Consequently, “his attention was gradually becoming 
less episodic. It was the simplest of equations: the more open the sore, the less it was 
about foreign policy and the more it was about presidential effectiveness. Thus it was 
tied to his political future and he had to pay more attention”.577  
 
Concerning the UN’s inability to draw firm lines against the Bosnian Serbs, Senator 
Dole, now the Republican Majority Leader, was urging a quick vote to end US 
participation in the UN arms embargo against Bosnia. But French President Chirac 
warned that a unilateral American decision to lift the embargo would result in an 
immediate withdrawal of UNPROFOR. He described the fall of Srebrenica as a 
major defeat for the United Nations, the NATO alliance, and all democracies. In 
order to restore Western credibility in the former Yugoslavia, he called on the United 
States and Britain for an aggressive armed force against the Bosnian Serbs to save 
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other UN-designated “safe zones” - Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde, and Bihac – 
from attack, while Zepa was already under Serb bombardment. French officials 
stated, “We do not expect American troops on the ground. What we want from them 
is air and helicopter transport”. Nevertheless, if France’s partners did not agree to 
intervene militarily, France would pull its peacekeeping troops out of Bosnia, setting 
the stage for a full-fledged UN withdrawal.578  
 
In response to French proposals for US air support and for NATO military air power 
to protect that operation, Clinton decided, with the Pentagon’s indispensable support, 
to use NATO air strikes (unrestrained by the UN’s “dual-key” agreement) to defend 
Gorazde. He then sent Christopher, Perry, and Shalikashvili to the London 
conference, called by British Prime Minister John Major because of the worsening 
situation in Bosnia, to discuss this proposal with allied defense ministers. Opinions 
were divided. Reluctantly, the allies agreed to Clinton’s proposal: NATO would 
respond to any attack on a safe area with a “substantial and decisive” air campaign.  
 
Though the removal of “dual key” decision-making system was still debated and 
came into force later, Christopher, Perry, and Shalikashvilli all viewed the London 
meeting as a turning point; it was America’s first real success concerning Bosnia.579 
Christopher said, “We finally decided to put some real muscle behind our 
rhetoric.”580 The agreement later became the framework for the first sustained 
NATO air campaign in Bosnia, Operation Deliberate Force, which was to commence 
on 30 August 1995.581  
 
Nevertheless, the Clinton administration still wanted to avoid deploying US ground 
troops into Bosnia. According to a Washington Post - ABC News poll, 58 percent of 
respondents opposed US ground forces into the conflict and 50 percent supported 
“keeping in place the UN arms embargo of Bosnia” which was an essential element 
of Clinton’s policy, although 56 percent disapproved of the way Clinton was 
handling Bosnia.582 Clinton had been unwilling to commit US ground troops to the 
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Bosnian conflict ever since he had entered into office. However, as one senior 
Administration official said, “It is very hard to claim your rightful place at the head 
of the table as the world’s only superpower when we’re not playing the lead role 
there.”583  
 
France and Britain were unhappy about American efforts to avoid military 
involvement in Bosnia. They indicated that the basis of the Atlantic Alliance and the 
future existence of NATO would be in doubt if the United States refused to live up to 
its promise to bail out its allies. Moreover, if the United States delayed in halting 
Serb aggression now, the result would require greater US involvement in the future, 
such as sending 25,000 US soldiers to help extricate all UN peacekeepers from 
Bosnia.584  
 
While the allies discussed military measures to protect the enclaves, the Bosnian 
Serbs continued the shelling of the UN-designated safe areas in Bihac, Zepa, and 
Sarajevo.585 In late July, the 69-29 Senate vote, including 21 Democrats jointly with 
48 Republicans, passed the legislation (S 21) lifting the Bosnian arms embargo. Dole, 
the Republican top presidential candidate, indicated that the issue “was not about 
philosophy. It’s not about politics. It was about whether some small country that had 
been ravaged on all sides, pillaged, women raped, and children killed – do they have 
any rights in this world?”586 He argued, “The bottom line is that since the war 
against Bosnia began, America has been a follower, not a leader.” In the absence of 
American leadership and as a result of the West’s indecisiveness and ineffectiveness, 
the Serbs had moved rapidly on all fronts.587  
 
Clinton vetoed the legislation on 11 August. He responded that a unilateral embargo 
lift would mean unilateral American responsibility and “Americanize” the conflict. 
This was because breaking the embargo would lead to the retreat of UNPROFOR 
from the Balkans, and Clinton had promised to commit US ground troops to assist 
the withdrawal. “It would intensify the fighting, jeopardize diplomacy and make the 
outcome of the war in Bosnia an American responsibility,” Clinton said. Undoubtedly, 
it would damage Clinton’s standing as a world leader if Congress succeeded in 
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overriding his veto.588 Overall, the pressure from the Republican Congress made 
President Clinton, as Taylor Branch described, feel that “to accomplish anything was 
like threading a needle”.589 
 
According to a New York Times - CBS News poll, 61 percent of respondents favored 
ending US participation in the UN arms embargo against Bosnia, with 24 percent 
opposed; however, most Americans did not believe that the United States had a 
responsibility to end the fighting in Bosnia. France, Britain, and some other countries 
with their troops in Bosnia as part of UNPROFOR threatened to withdraw if the 
United States acted on its own to lift the embargo.590 Holbrooke, now Assistant 
Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs, indicated, “A vote for lifting 
the arms embargo is also a vote for the UN’s withdrawal, which is also a vote for the 
25,000 troops to assist in the withdrawal.” He claimed that NATO would come to an 
end if the United States, as the leader of NATO, failed to support NATO allies in a 
difficult mission.591  
 
In early August, the success of the Croatian offensive to retake the Krajina area 
started to change the balance of power in the region and began a dramatic turn in the 
Balkan game. It was the first time that the Serbs had suffered a military setback in 
four years.592 Clinton perceived it as an opportunity to open up for peace. The 
abandonment of the Croatian Serbs by Milosevic and the Croatian success on the 
battlefield also changed the psychology of all the parties and proved helpful in 
resolving the conflict.593 Clinton sent Lake and Undersecretary of State for Political 
Affairs Peter Tarnoff to Europe to promote a new version of the peace plan.594  
 
Under the proposal, seven points were outlined:  
 
(1) a “comprehensive peace settlement”; 
(2) a three-way recognition among Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and the Federal Republic of 
                                                 
588 Bill Clinton, ‘The Risk of ‘Americanizing’ the War’’, Newsweek, 7 August 1995, p.26; Carroll J. 
Doherty, ‘Clinton Vetos Bill Forcing Him To End Arms Embargo’, Congressional Quarterly, 12 
August 1995, p. 2455; Jonathan Freedland, ‘Congress Votes To Arm Bosnians’, The Guardian, 2 
August 1995. 
589 Branch, The Clinton Tapes, p. 277. 
590 Elaine Sciolino, ‘Defiant Senators Vote to Override Bosnian Arms Ban’, New York Times, 27 July 
1995. 
591 House Committee on International Relations, ‘Overview of US Policy in Europe’, 28 July 1995 
(Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1996), p. 24, 25, 53, 50, 51. 
592 Holbrooke, To End a War, pp. 72-73. 
593 Clinton, My Life, p. 667. 
594 R. W. Apple Jr, ‘Clinton Sending 2 Foreign Policy Advisers to Europe With New Proposal on 
Balkans’, New York Times, 9 August 1995. 
 126
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro); 
(3) the full lifting of all economic sanctions against Yugoslavia if a settlement was reached, and an 
American-backed program to equip and train the Croat-Muslim Federation forces if there was a 
settlement; 
(4) the peaceful return to Croatia of eastern Slavonia - the tiny, oil-rich sliver of Croatian land on the 
Serbian border that had been seized by the Serbs; 
(5) an all-out effort to pursue a cease-fire or an end to all offensive operations; 
(6) a reaffirmation of support for the so-called Contact Group plan agreed to in June 1994 by the 
Foreign Ministers of the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, and Russia – dividing 
Bosnia into two entities, 49 percent of the land going to the Bosnian Serbs, 51 percent to the 
Croat-Muslim Federation; 
(7) a comprehensive program for regional economic reconstruction.595 
 
The Lake-Tarnoff presentation to the Europeans was the “endgame” strategy, which 
was produced through the interagency process. In early 1995, Lake directed national 
security officials to review all policy options and to begin studying a final settlement 
of the Bosnian conflict. In late June, Lake reported the idea of the endgame strategy 
to Clinton. In early July, Lake began a series of weekly meetings that included 
Albright, Shalikashvili, Perry, and Christopher. On 9 August, Lake discussed the 
31-page package of “endgame” papers, which was the result of work from the State 
Department, the Defense Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the NSC Staff, and 
the office of the UN Ambassador, together with Clinton and top foreign policy 
advisors. “Muddling through,” Lake wrote on the papers’ memo, “was no longer an 
option.” Clinton liked Lake’s approach, both in terms of the sticks and the carrots – 
bombing of the Serbs and peace talks. On the same day, with the administration’s full 
backing, Lake and Tarnoff were dispatched as presidential emissaries to Europe to 
sell the strategy to allies.596  
 
Two years earlier, Christopher had made a similar trip to consult the allies about the 
administration’s proposal, “lift and strike”: to arm the Bosnian Government and 
bomb the Serbs. The European allies had rebelled and charged the United States with 
having no peacekeeping troops in Bosnia facing retaliation from the Serbs. The issue 
was that as long as the United States had no troops in Bosnia, the administration was 
put in the uncomfortable position of “leading from behind”. However, “this time 
Lake did not ask – he informed”. Lake gave the European leaders a very clear 
message: it was time for UNPROFOR to withdraw if it had to, so that UNPROFOR’s 
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credibility would not continue to stagger; and the United States would use much 
more vigorous bombing if necessary. Lake declared, “The President has made the 
following decisions. We want you to be with us; however, if you don’t, we’re going 
to go ahead and do it, anyway.” Surprisingly, the Europeans were ready to go ahead 
with the United States.597 Despite some skepticism, especially in Paris, and dislike 
of the idea of bombing, the allies were pleased to see the United States become 
engaged and willing to take the lead.598  
 
The next stage of the President’s strategy was to send Holbrooke with a team of 
American diplomats to Bosnia to begin negotiations among the parties. The 
American plan included the Contact Group plan (the 51-49 territorial divisions 
between the Muslim-Croat Federation and the Bosnian Serbs) and if the Bosnian 
Serbs objected, Western countries would jointly lift the arms embargo on Bosnia and 
train Bosnian troops, while halting the Serbs’ attacks with air strikes.599 On their 
way crossing Mount Igman to Sarajevo, three members of the Holbrooke team were 
killed. This tragedy became an emotional blow to Washington and stiffened the 
administration’s resolve to push forward.600 Holbrooke later described in his memoir 
that during his first ten months as Assistant Secretary, “most high-level meetings on 
Bosnia had a dispirited, inconclusive quality” and “there was little enthusiasm for 
any proposal of action”, and “the result was often inaction or half-measures instead 
of a clear strategy.” However, “the loss of three friends infused our meetings with a 
somber sense that there was no turning back.” In particular, Clinton was showing his 
own sense of urgency now.601  
 
In late August, in response to the Bosnian Serb shelling of Sarajevo, killing 38 
people, NATO Operation Deliberate Force began three days of air strikes on Serb 
targets in Bosnia. This time there were sustained NATO attacks on military targets 
instead of “pinpricks”. Holbrooke, who was initiating his diplomatic mission in the 
Balkans, described NATO’s response as the “most important test of American 
leadership since the end of the Cold War… not only in Bosnia but in Europe.”602 In 
September, the foreign ministers of Bosnia, Croatia, and the FRY agreed that a new 
republic of Bosnia would consist of two entities – a Muslim-Croat Federation and 
Republika Srpska (a new Serbian republic), sharing territory on a 51-49 percent basis. 
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Holbrooke regarded the Joint Agreed Principles as “an important milestone in the 
search for peace”.603 In the meantime, NATO air strikes continued to pound Bosnian 
Serb positions until mid-September when Holbrooke succeeded in reaching an 
agreement signed by the Bosnian Serb political leader Radovan Karadzic and the 
military leader General Ratko Mladic to end the three-year siege of Sarajevo.604  
 
In October, Clinton announced that the parties had agreed to a nationwide cease-fire, 
and soon they were scheduled to arrive in Dayton, Ohio, for the final talks. As a 
result of the combination of the Muslim-Croat ground offensive and NATO bombing, 
the Bosnian Serbs had lost almost 20 percent of the Bosnian territory it had 
controlled since the summer of 1992. Fearing more military and territorial losses, the 
Bosnian Serbs were ready to settle. Milosevic was also ready to compromise, since a 
peace agreement would lead to the end of economic sanctions and the possible 
reintegration of Serbia into the community of nations.605  
 
When the conference opened on 1 November at Dayton, Christopher remarked in his 
opening speech: 
 
The United States and the international community [also] have a vital stake in sustaining progress 
toward peace. If war in the Balkans is reunited, it could spark a wider conflict like those that drew 
American soldiers in huge numbers into two European wars in this century. If this conflict continues – 
and certainly if it spreads – it would jeopardize our efforts to promote stability and security in Europe 
as a Whole. It would threaten the viability of NATO, which has been the bedrock if European security 
for 50 years. If the conflict continues, so would the worst atrocities Europe has been since World War 
II. As President Clinton has said, the “only way to stop these horrors is to make peace”. We must and 
we will stay engaged to advance our interests and to uphold our values.606 
 
In his address to the Nation on 27 November, Clinton explained to the American 
people why the United States had to act on Bosnia. Firstly, the United States acted to 
end the suffering of the Bosnian people, and it fulfilled American ideals. Secondly, 
he highlighted that Europe’s stability was vital to US national interest and security: 
 
Securing peace in Bosnia will [also] help to build a free and stable Europe. Bosnia lies at the very 
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heart of Europe, next-door to many of its fragile new democracies and some of our closest allies. 
Generations of Americans have understood that Europe’s freedom and Europe’s stability is vital to our 
own national security. That’s why we fought two wars in Europe. That’s why we created NATO and 
waged the cold war. And that’s why we must help the nations of Europe to end their worst nightmare 
since World War II, now.607 
 
Thirdly, NATO’s credibility was also a major concern. The President said: 
 
The only force capable of getting this job done is NATO, the powerful military alliance of 
democracies that has guaranteed our security for half a century now. And as NATO’s leader and the 
primary broker of the peace agreement, the United States must be an essential part of the mission. If 
we’re not there, NATO will not be there; the peace will collapse; the war will reignite; the slaughter of 
innocents will begin again. A conflict that already has claimed so many victims could spread like 
poison throughout the region, eat away at Europe’s stability, and erode our partnership with our 
European allies.608 
 
Finally, America’s leadership would be questioned if the conflict continued. Clinton 
made clear that: 
 
When America’s partnerships are weak and our leadership is in doubt, it undermines our ability to 
secure our interest and to convince others to work with us. If we do maintain our partnerships and 
leadership, we need not act alone. As we saw in the Gulf war and in Haiti, many other nations who 
share our goals will also share our burdens. But when America does not lead, the consequences can be 
very grave, not only for others but eventually for us as well.609 
 
Later, Clinton reinforced the importance of Europe’s stability, NATO’s viability, and 
American leadership to US strategic interests as a whole: 
 
Europe’s security is still inextricably tied to America’s. We need a strong Europe as a strong partner 
on the problem from terrorism to the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Europe’s stability is 
threatened as long as this war burns at its center. We have to stand with the Europeans on Bosnia if 
we’re going to stand with them and if we expect them to stand with us, on the whole range of other 
issues we clearly are going to face together in the years ahead. Our engagement in Bosnia is also 
essential for the continued viability of NATO. All the parties there, asked for NATO’s help in securing 
this peace. If we’re going to be NATO’s leader, we have to be part of this mission. It we turn our backs 
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on Bosnia now; our allies will do the same… NATO would be shaken at its core. Its ability to shape a 
stable, undivided Europe would be thrown into doubt, and our leadership in Europe and around the 
world would pay a terrible price… We cannot be the world’s policeman. But when our leadership can 
make a difference between war and peace and when our interests are engaged, we have a duty to 
act.610 
 
At the end of the Dayton talks, the presidents of Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia finally 
reached a peace agreement, the Dayton Peace Accords. It was formally signed in 
Paris on 14 December 1995. It ended the worst conflict in Europe since World War II. 
Albright concluded that three factors contributed to ending the Bosnian war: the 
overreaching on the part of the Bosnian Serbs, the changing military situation 
engineered by the successful Croatian offensive, and Clinton’s willingness to lead.611 
Furthermore, James Gow commented that the critical difference between the failure 
of Vance-Owen in 1993 and the success of Dayton in 1995 was the absence of unity 
and, after all, “the lack of political will, particularly with regard to the use of force 
which was necessary if there were to be any chance of success.”612 
 
The success of the Dayton agreement and the end of the Bosnian War was a crucial 
achievement for the Clinton administration’s foreign policy. Firstly, it reinforced the 
unity of the Transatlantic Alliance and reaffirmed the role of American leadership in 
the Alliance. Secondly, it defined a new purpose for the role of NATO in Europe’s 
security architecture in the post-Cold War era, transforming from a mere mutual 
defense organization into an instrument of collective security beyond its borders. 
Thirdly, the involvement of Russia and Central European countries in the military 
Implementation Force (IFOR) proved that NATO and former Warsaw Pact nations 
could build a cooperative relationship. Finally, it demonstrated that the Clinton’s 
vision of a Europe that was undivided, peaceful, and democratic was well on the way 
to come into effect. The core element of this vision was NATO enlargement, and it 
was NATO’s air campaign that had helped end the war and reach the Dayton 
agreement that brought to an end one of the most difficult periods in the history of 
US-European relations. Without Dayton, an expanded NATO might appear 
meaningless and irrelevant to the future.613  
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At this stage, in Holbrooke’s words, “in only eighteen weeks in 1995 – when the 
situation seemed most hopeless – the United States put its prestige on the line with a 
rapid and dramatic series of high-risk actions: an all-out diplomatic effort in August, 
heavy NATO bombing in September, a cease-fire in October, Dayton in November, 
and, in December, the deployment of twenty thousand American troops to Bosnia. 
Suddenly, the war was over – and America’s role in post-Cold War Europe 
redefined.”614  
 
5.2 Explaining the Clinton Administration’s Intervention in Bosnia  
Why did the Clinton administration decide to intervene in Bosnia and ultimately to 
take the lead to end Europe’s most bloody war since World War II? From the 
beginning of the Bosnian War, there were two voices within the United States: one 
was supporting a US intervention for either moral or strategic reasons; the other was 
opposing any intervention because of the fear of becoming entangled in a 
Vietnam-like quagmire.615 As James Goldgeier described, 
 
…because he [President Clinton] asked Colin Powell the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff how 
many troops would be required to do Bosnia. Colin Powell tells him, you would need 200,000 
American troops and it’s jungle fighting and mountain fighting and, yeah, they weren’t going to do 
it.616 
 
At the time, Powell was a powerful figure within the administration. He dominated 
Clinton’s foreign policy councils until his departure in September 1993.  
 
The Powell Doctrine, based on his understanding of the Vietnam War, had a powerful 
influence on the public’s mind. Since it was not clear whether there was any national 
interest at stake in Bosnia, Clinton was unsure about whether or not to use force there 
and feared that there would be a lack of public support. Even the strongest hawks in 
the Congress were dead against putting any US troops on the ground. The first year 
of Clinton’s presidency was undoubtedly the test of the Powell Doctrine. On the 
other hand, there was a general consensus that Bosnia was “a European problem” in 
the early Clinton administration.617  
 
The strains within the alliance over Bosnia mounted after the assault by the Serbs on 
Bihac. Many of the administration’s officials worried that “continued squabbling 
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over Bosnian tactics was eating away at the foundation of the Atlantic alliance”.618 
Clinton’s foreign policy aides became gradually aware that the tensions with NATO’s 
allies resulted from the lack of American leadership. The Clinton White House had 
come to the conclusion that “as the months of war turned into years, it became clear 
that Europe alone could not end the conflict”.619 “The longer the war dragged on, the 
greater it undermined the credibility of NATO, the United Nations, and the United 
States, making Clinton look unsure, weak, and ineffective”.620  
 
By the summer of 1995, the crisis in Bosnia had reached a new level. In May, in 
response to “pinprick” NATO air strikes, the Bosnian Serb forces took hundreds of 
UNPROFOR personnel hostage. The UN exposed its incompetence and weakness in 
the Balkan quagmire and thus gained a humiliating international image.621 There 
was a wide debate over UNPROFOR’s withdrawal. “If this happened,” Christopher 
recalled, “the United States was committed to contributing ground troops to a NATO 
force that would help ensure a safe withdrawal. I felt that this would be an 
embarrassing as well as perilous use of American forces, but, on the other hand, 
failure to keep our commitment would undermine our credibility as the leader of the 
Alliance.”622 Holbrooke argued, “We need to work in partnership with the Alliance 
on a large number of other issues – the enlargement of NATO, a common policy 
toward the former Soviet Union, the Mideast, and Iran, terrorism, human rights, the 
environment, and organized crime – but Bosnia had begun to adversely affect 
everything.”623 
 
At the same time, Senator Dole, the majority leader and the likely Republican 
presidential candidate for 1996, was leading a campaign in Congress to urge a 
unilateral lifting of the UN arms embargo, which would result in an immediate 
withdrawal of UNPROFOR and the deployment of US ground troops to help the 
withdrawal. This was the kind of risk-taking behaviour that the administration tried 
to avoid in resolving the Bosnia issue. 624  On the other hand, the Clinton 
administration controversially allowed Iranian arms to flow into Bosnia, something 
which might further destabilize the region.625 Above all, the loss of both houses of 
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the Congress in the 1994 election “added to all the failures of the past two years and 
raised doubts in the entire Clinton team about whether it was up to the job”. “The 
story in Bosnia, then, was in transition from being a foreign one to a domestic one, 
like Vietnam”, especially as the Bosnia tragedy had the capacity to occupy all front 
pages and headline news as long as it continued. Clinton was beginning to see that 
Bosnia had influenced judgements on his presidency, both internationally and 
domestically, and blocked progress on other aspects of his presidency.626 Most 
importantly, it could have a severe impact on his 1996 reelection campaign.  
 
To sum up, the undermining of credibility at home and abroad, NATO’s credibility 
and stability in Europe, the challenge from Capitol Hill, and the incoming reelection 
campaign all drove the Clinton administration’s decision to use force against the 
Serbs in mid-1995. It seemed that the Srebrenica Massacre was the catalyst for a 
180-degree turn in Clinton’s attitude and policies;627 however, David Halberstam 
argued that Bosnia had not become “an all-consuming issue”. Yet many of Clinton’s 
top advisors started to worry that Bosnia was becoming “not just a moral problem 
but potentially a domestic political one as well”. From the beginning, Lake had 
warned that it would become a cancer that could destroy the Clinton administration’s 
entire foreign policy if they failed to come up with a viable policy on Bosnia.628  
 
“There is no question that the President’s support for the Bosnia initiative in 1995 
was driven not only by his horror at the suffering abroad and damage to our interests, 
but also by the sense that the ongoing conflict was starting to damage him at home”, 
Lake recalled, “And there is no question that for political reasons Morris urged the 
President to act.”629 During the 1992 presidential campaign, Clinton made his first 
speech on Bosnia in July at Little Rock, saying:  
 
The continuing attacks by Serbian elements in Bosnia threaten the delivery of urgently needed 
humanitarian aid, jeopardize the safety of UN personnel and put at risk the lives of thousands of 
citizens….. The United States should take the lead in seeking UN Security Council authorization for 
air strikes against those who are attacking the relief effort. The United States should be prepared to 
lend appropriate military support to that operation. Air and naval forces adequate to carry out these 
operations should be visibly in position.630  
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Nevertheless, for nearly two and a half years of his presidency, what he promised on 
Bosnia did not come into effect. His own credibility was being undermined. The 
news of Bosnia was kept in headlines across all the media, but by 1995, the Clinton 
administration still could not accomplish anything. Lake argued that the war was 
gradually becoming a symbol of the administration’s foreign policy as a whole. 
Ultimately, facing the upcoming election year of 1996, the administration decided 
that they had to “do something about it” before the reelection campaign.631  
 
Besides, as Ivo H. Daalder, an NSC staffer working on the Bosnia issue at the time, 
argued, “The day-to-day crisis management approach that had characterized the 
Clinton administration’s Bosnia strategy had lost virtually all credibility. It was clear 
that events on the ground and decisions in allied capital’s as well as on the Capitol 
Hill were forcing the administration to seek an alternative to muddling through.”632 
On the other hand, the more confrontational Congress also drove the President’s 
decision to get more involved. As Gore stated, “It’s driving us into a brick wall with 
Congress.” Moreover, one advisor said, “He [Clinton] was about to lose control of 
foreign policy on a fundamental issue. The passage of the Dole bill made the 
President and others more aware of the political danger, that Congress could do real 
damage to American foreign policy, and of the problems presented by Presidential 
politics – meaning Dole.”633 Dole had criticized the administration’s fecklessness 
and weakness in Bosnia for years. It was believed that “the Republican majority in 
both the House and Senate was behind Dole on this one, pushing legislation aimed 
right at the heart of the United Nations’ and the Clinton administration’s policy”.634  
 
Perhaps it was right to say, as with Baker’s phrase (the US ‘had no dog in this fight’), 
that the United States had no primary vital interest at stake in the Balkans; however, 
the United States had to deal with European security and the NATO alliance, which 
were considered as secondary interests.635 For instance, Daniel P. Sewer stated: 
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James Baker in the beginning of the 90s said we had no dog in that fight. He was right, there are no 
vital American interests at stake in the Balkans. The trouble was, that there was an accumulation of 
secondary interests, not primary interests but secondary, having to do with the NATO alliance, holding 
it together, having to do with the CNN effect, the impact on the Muslim population in the Balkans. It 
was a series of secondary interests that accumulated to the point that we might not have a dog in that 
fight but the Europeans did and we were gonna have to help out.636 
 
Similarly, Goldgeier said: 
 
I don’t think there was a huge national interest in the Balkans, but to the extent that the United States 
felt that there was any kind of national interest I think you sort of had two things. One, a general 
notion that stability in Europe was important for American interests and if there was an unstable part 
of Europe then the United States needed to do something about that. And just fears that there would be 
other types of situations like that, that would emerge in other parts of Europe. And then the second 
was NATO, that the United States wanted to ensure that NATO continued to function effectively after 
the end of the Cold War, and even though this wasn’t a mission that was a traditional NATO mission, 
it did come to be seen as influencing the credibility of NATO, that there was this sense that if NATO 
couldn’t deal with something right there in Europe that it wasn’t going to be able to deal with things 
outside, that it wasn’t going to be relevant to the post-Cold War world. So I think both stability in 
Europe and NATO’s credibility were things that were important to people in Washington.637 
 
Ambassador Kirkpatrick pointed out regarding US strategic interests in Yugoslavia:  
 
They are manifest in our participation in World War I and in World War II and in the long decades of 
the cold war afterward. Our own society is grounded in European civilization. We share a civilization. 
I do not believe countries either thrive or survive without the survival of the civilizations of which 
they are a part.638  
 
Furthermore, Holbrooke stated: 
 
America’s strategic political and economic interests in Europe remain as vital to us now as they have 
been at any time since 1945. And we are not going to allow the tragedy in Bosnia to wreck American’s 
long-term national security and economic interests in the rest of Europe. 
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We have, for example, a high priority of extending the institutions of Europe eastward into Central 
Europe and bringing stability and democracy to the rest of Central Europe. Bosnia is an object lesson 
in why that has to be done since Bosnia is clearly the greatest collective failure of the West since the 
late 1930’s.639 
 
After all, “the value of the Administration’s other achievements in Europe would be 
dependent on what happened in Bosnia”.640 Therefore, the United States had to 
intervene for the sake of a larger US-European interest. The idea of building a 
Europe that was whole, free, and democratic also made the United States feel 
compelled to assist Europe to stop genocidal wars taking place on European territory. 
As John Sitilides described, 
 
I think especially on the first front [Bosnia] there was far less of a perceived direct threat to US 
national security than a larger threat to what one might call a new international balance in Europe 
between the European Union and our European allies in the NATO alliance and forces that were just 
emerging into democracy in Eastern Europe with the collapse of the Cold War, and the idea that 
Europe, half a century after World War II, was in the grips of yet another genocidal onslaught and was 
politically and diplomatically ill-suited to stop the genocide and to engage the perpetrators of genocide 
militarily after repeated diplomatic and political failures, compelled the United States to intervene at a 
leadership level to help restore balance between forces on the ground and allow for a diplomatic 
solution to the Serbia-Bosnia conflict after a greater balance of forces militarily, so essentially it was 
because Europe was unable to prevent war in Europe that the United States had to intervene for the 
sake of a larger US-European interest, not because American interests were directly imperiled by what 
Serbs were doing to Bosniacs or the three-way war between Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia.641 
 
Moreover, the United States, as a leader of NATO, was looking weaker as NATO 
looked weaker in terms of protecting the UN force. During his trip to Europe in late 
1994, Dole argued that the alliance was in jeopardy of becoming “irrelevant” as a 
result of its performance in Bosnia. Thus, “the need for us to protect and preserve the 
alliance is driving our policy,” as Vice President Gore said. 642  “Even the 
sophisticated countries of Europe were not yet capable of maintaining regional 
security agreements without US leadership, and our assurance means more to them 
than we realize,” President Clinton said.643  This was the key reason for the 
intervention, as Janusz Bugajski stated,  
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The war began in 91/92 and it went on for three years in Croatia and Bosnia before intervention. The 
US was losing a lot of prestige that it wasn’t intervening, that it was allowing for mass slaughters in 
Bosnia, the European Union itself was not being very effective, NATO was not involved, so the 
alliance was losing credibility and I think this was the key reason for the intervention, a reason in 
other words to restore the credibility of NATO, to give really NATO a purpose, a mission in the 
post-Cold War world.644  
 
It was also about affirming US leadership.645 Gary Schmitt emphasized,  
 
I think the primary reason why the US eventually decided to intervene in the Balkans was because it 
saw itself as having a position of transatlantic leadership and then indirectly global leadership. I would 
say the real concern was its capacity to, or the ramifications for not leading within the transatlantic 
relationship and what that would do to the alliance and then secondarily if the alliance was not healthy 
how that would impact on our capacity to lead globally. So there’s a kind of a very subtle interplay 
between our alliance partners that needs to be understood to understand what the US was thinking so 
it wasn’t…Washington wasn’t simply looking ay the Balkans from its own perspective it was also 
looking at the Balkans from the perspective of the alliance which of course is of interest to us to 
maintain its being healthy so it’s a national interest but it’s a more complex national interest than is 
commonly understood. 646  
 
Another concern was to prevent the creation of “a non-viable rump Muslim state” 
that would be a platform for Iranian terrorism in Europe. Since Iran was equipping 
the Bosnian Muslims with weapons and training them, there was a fear that Iran 
would gain a foot-hold in Bosnia. As Samantha Power stated: 
 
People victimized by genocide or abandoned by the international community do not make good 
neighbors, as their thirst for vengeance, their irredentism, and their acceptance of violence as a means 
of generating change can turn them into future threats. In Bosnia, where the United States and Europe 
maintained an arms embargo against the Muslims, extremist Islamic fighters and proselytizers 
eventually turned up to offer support… The failed state of Bosnia became a haven for Islamic 
terrorists shunned elsewhere in the world.647 
 
Thus, Serwer stated,  
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… the reason we intervened, more than anything else, more I think even than the humanitarian 
considerations, was to prevent the creation of this Islamic state..… So it wasn’t a primary vital 
American interest, it wasn’t the United States that was really at risk from the creation of this Islamic 
state in Bosnia, it was Europe that was at risk. But, you know, it was right after the Cold War, we still 
believed that our security and European security were very closely tied.648  
 
One critical aspect of the Dayton process was to remove Iranian Revolutionary 
Guards or foreign mujahideen fighters from Bosnia, and to end the Bosnian 
Government’s military and intelligence relationship with Iran.649 The investigations 
into the administration’s secret policy of permitting Iran to arm the Bosnian Muslims, 
which resulted in Iran’s influence expanding in Bosnia, began in April 1994. In 1996, 
the Senate Intelligence Committee held several hearings concerning the events.650 
 
Lastly, the reasons for the Clinton administration to intervene in Bosnia could be 
summarised as follows: 
 
Policymakers had very real concerns: the potential for Europe cleaving along Christian-Muslim lines, 
unchecked flows of drugs, guns, and people through a no-man’s land in southeastern Europe, and the 
unwanted economic consequences of war and instability in the heart of Europe. Standing on the 
sidelines had by 1995 damaged the United States’ prestige and moral authority. Especially in the new 
globalized age, the superpower was expected to act in the face of Europe’s obvious inability to stem 
the slaughter of innocent that had pledged “never again” just fifty years before….651 
 
Conclusion 
In the first stage of decision-making on Bosnia, as William Hyland put it, “the United 
States had no real strategy: Vance-Owen was dead; lift and strike was dead; military 
intervention had been ruled out; there was no prospect of a settlement.”652 In order 
to discourage a wider war, it seemed that “constrict and contain” had replaced “lift 
and strike”.653 The primary reason for the failure of the “lift and strike” policy was 
the Europeans’ concern about the safety of their peacekeepers on the ground. Despite 
that, the Clinton administration still insisted on a multilateral effort to resolve the 
Bosnian conflict.  
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Obviously, Clinton was clear that the United States ought to stand up against the 
principle of ethnic cleansing, and as the only superpower, the United States had the 
responsibility to lead. But he was uncertain about what kind of measures should be 
undertaken to achieve the objectives. In particular, there were debates over whether 
the United States had any interest in Bosnia. Some claimed that with the Cold War 
over, the country should keep its distance from engaging in foreign affairs, in 
particular as there was no vital interest at stake in Bosnia. However, some argued that 
the United States had strategic interests, for example that the conflict could spill over 
into neighboring countries and disturb Europe’s stability, which would indirectly 
affect US interests. Although the Clinton administration recognized that there were 
humanitarian interests and a potential for regional instability in Europe (which would 
impact US interests), it seemed that these were not sufficient to justify using military 
force to intervene.  
 
In the next stage, the Clinton administration was diplomatically active. It succeeded 
in persuading NATO allies to conduct air strikes against the Serbs and in brokering 
the Muslim-Croat Federation. Also, with the administration’s support, the Contact 
Group and its plan were created and Russia was brought into the process. However, 
the Clinton White House encountered intensified criticism and difficulties on its 
Bosnia policy with the electoral victories of the Republicans in both houses of 
Congress in late 1994; in particular, Senator Dole continued to push for a unilateral 
lifting of the arms embargo.  
 
The unilateral move received strong resistance from the European allies as it would 
expose their peacekeeping troops to greater risks. This also led to the allies’ criticism 
that the United States refused to take part in an allied ground operation and only 
wanted to rely on the threat of NATO air strikes. In face of increasing intensified 
trans-Atlantic frictions and the possibility of UN withdrawal, the administration’s 
ultimate decision to contribute troops to assist the withdrawal was considered more 
associated with NATO solidarity than the Bosnia conflict itself. In the meantime, 
Iran’s arms deliveries to the Muslim-led Bosnian Government eventually raised the 
concern that Bosnia would be a link to terrorism.  
 
Due to the escalation of fighting after the four-month cease-fire, the decision-making 
process entered into a new stage. The Clinton administration faced more challenges 
from the allies’ criticism, in particular from the newly-elected French president 
Jacques Chirac, as a result of the ineffectiveness of UNPROFOR and its possibility 
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of withdrawal. Ultimately, the Srebrenica massacre stimulated the moral 
consciousness of people around the world as well as driving more attention to the 
world’s only superpower, the United States. As long as the Bosnia conflict endured, it 
seemed that it was more associated with presidential effectiveness rather than foreign 
policy. The administration developed the “endgame” strategy, which would commit 
the full force of US diplomacy, including the threat of unilateral military force if 
necessary. As Herbert Okun, Vance’s deputy at the International Conference on the 
Former Yugoslavia (ICFY), stated: “Diplomacy without the threat of force is like 
baseball without a bat”.654  
 
On the other hand, Chirac’s statements and requests, the pictures on television of the 
refugees’ horrible conditions from Srebrenica, and the pressure from Capitol Hill all 
contributed to the President’s decision to become engaged in August 1995. The 
Clinton administration hoped to show significant progress towards a settlement 
before Congress returned to override the President’s veto of legislation lifting the 
arms embargo on the Bosnian Government by early September. Moreover, the 
President gradually recognized both that the Bosnia issue would be a political time 
bomb that could go off in the coming 1996 presidential campaign,655 and the dangers 
Bosnia posed to America’s relationship with Europe, the United Nations, and NATO.  
 
“For three years, the Clinton Administration felt constrained by fears that decisive 
action would damage relations with Europe; now it believed that the relationship 
would be hurt without decisive action. It believed that nothing less than the 
credibility and solidarity of the entire Transatlantic Alliance was at stake”.656 As a 
result of the Muslim-Croat offensive (the renewed determination of European allies 
with the combination of NATO’s continuous air strikes), the Bosnian Serbs were 
forced to the negotiation table. 657  Finally, the peace settlement, the Dayton 
agreement, was reached at the end of 1995.  
 
Overall, the Clinton administration’s intervention in Bosnia was for secondary, not 
primary, interests, such as NATO’s credibility and European stability and security. 
Domestic concerns such as the challenge from Capitol Hill and the incoming 
reelection campaign also drove the administration to use force against the Serbs in 
mid-1995. Moreover, the position of American leadership in the world and the 
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president’s own credibility at home and abroad were some of the reasons for the 
United States to become fully engaged in resolving the Bosnian crisis. However, it 
seemed that humanitarian interest alone was not sufficient to justify sending military 
forces to save innocent civilians in Bosnia.  
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Chapter 6. 
The Clinton Administration’s Intervention in Kosovo 
 
Introduction 
At the close of the Cold War, Kosovo was an Albanian-inhabited autonomous 
province of Serbia within the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). The 
majority ethnic Albanian population was Muslim, while the ethnic Serb population 
was Orthodox. Slav and Albanian populations had been settled in Kosovo since the 
8th century, and Muslim Albanians shifted to this region in the later Ottoman period. 
After the First Balkan War, there was an eastward expansion of the Albanian 
population again and a frontier was formed between the two main ethnic groups – 
Serbs and Albanians - in Serbia. Serb-Albanian relations, as a result of the different 
roots - cultural and religious alignments, and regional variations - had experienced a 
series of bloody encounters in historical record.  
 
The 1974 Yugoslav Constitution under Josef Tito’s government granted Kosovo a 
significant degree of political autonomy, which was substantively identical to that of 
the six constituent socialist republics of Yugoslavia. However, when Slobodan 
Milosevic, a Serb nationalist, became President of Serbia, he illegally revoked 
Kosovo’s autonomy in 1989 and replaced it with direct rule from Belgrade. Kosovar 
Albanians were excluded from all forms of public life.  
 
In the early 1990s, Dr Ibrahim Rugova, leader of the Democratic League of Kosovo 
(LDK), began to campaign for a peaceful resistance movement against Serbia. The 
LDK created a new republican assembly and government, and Rugova was elected as 
the president of the “Republic of Kosovo”. They pursued various policies: nonviolent 
revolt; international political involvement, such as visiting foreign capitals and 
setting up a UN Trusteeship over Kosovo in order to internationalize the problem and 
change Western powers’ perception that the Kosovo issue was an internal issue for 
Serbia; and denial of the legitimacy of Serbian rule.658  
 
Despite the awareness of Kosovo as a powder keg in the middle of a highly volatile 
region which include Albania, Greece, and Turkey, Kosovo was not the centrepiece 
of American and European Balkan policy. On the other hand, Western policy-makers 
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tended to view Kosovar Albanians as a minority ethnic group which might express 
their individual human rights to claim political and cultural status but not the right to 
form a state by applying the principle of self-determination. The European 
Community (EC) rejected Kosovo’s request for recognition as an independent state 
in December 1991.659  
 
Fearing that the war in the former Yugoslavia could spread into Kosovo as tensions 
increased there, the George H. W. Bush administration warned Serbian President 
Milosevic, “In the event of conflict in Kosovo caused by Serbian action, the United 
States will be prepared to employ military force against the Serbs in Kosovo and in 
Serbia proper.”660 This so-called Christmas warning was reaffirmed in Secretary of 
State Warren Christopher’s statement on 10 February 1993, “We remain prepared to 
respond against the Serbians in the event of conflict in Kosovo caused by Serbian 
action.”661 As Christopher stated before a House Committee in March, “We fear that 
if the Serbian influence extends into either of these areas, it will bring into the fray 
other countries in that region – Albania, Greece, Turkey and from there, on it could 
extend very broadly.” He further stated, “So the stakes for the United States, are to 
prevent the broadening of that conflict to bring in our NATO allies, and to bring vast 
sections of Europe, and perhaps as happened before, broadening into a world war.”662 
Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs Richard Holbrooke 
repeated the Christmas warning to Serbia during the Dayton negotiations. However, 
in order to affirm Serbia’s territorial integrity, the Dayton Peace Accords did not 
address the Kosovo issue to any significant degree. 
  
Frustrated by Rugova’s lack of progress, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), whose 
primary goal was to secure the independence of Kosovo, emerged in 1997. The KLA 
smuggled arms from its anarchic neighbor, Albania, and initiated a series of attacks 
against Serb targets in order to get international attention.663 The aggressive action 
against Serbian forces by the KLA and ethnic cleansing against Kosovar Albanians 
by Serbian forces resulted in an intensified internal armed conflict in Kosovo 
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between February 1998 and March 1999.664  
 
This chapter will examine the reasons for the Clinton administration’s decisions to 
intervene in the Kosovo conflict. In the first section, it divides the decision-making 
process into three stages. The news about the killings of Kosovar Albanians by Serb 
forces in Prekaz (in Kosovo) as well as conflicts between Serbian and Yugoslav 
security forces and the KLA in late February and early March of 1998 began to draw 
the Clinton White House’s attention. However, it was not until the Racak incident in 
January 1999 that Washington started to take meaningful action.  
 
The Clinton administration supported the Rambouillet peace talks initiated by the 
Contact Group; while at the same time was united with the NATO alliance on the 
readiness to launch air strikes against Serbia if the Serb side rejected the peace plan. 
As a result of the Serb rejection of the plan, the administration, unlike in Bosnia, was 
quick to respond to the Kosovo conflict and take the lead. In the second section, this 
chapter will explore the reasons why the Clinton administration decided to become 
engaged in the Kosovo conflict. 
 
6.1 The Clinton Administration’s Decision-making Process on Kosovo  
6.1.1 Decision-making Stage 1: February ~ November 1998 
In late February and early March 1998, the clashes between Serbian security forces 
and the KLA in the Drenica region, a stronghold of the KLA, led to about 70 dead.  
This included Adem Jashari, the KLA commander, and twenty members of his family. 
The violence was the worst since Kosovar Albanians had begun to campaign for 
regaining their autonomy status. The event in some ways paralleled the actions of 
Serbian forces during the Bosnian War.665 The Kosovo conflict thus began to 
command the Clinton administration’s attention.  
 
On 23 February, when Robert Gelbard, who had taken Holbrooke’s former position 
as US special envoy to the Balkans, visited Pristina, the capital of Kosovo, he 
described the KLA as “a terrorist group”. Yet even he changed his statement to say 
that the KLA had “committed terrorist acts” but “not been classified legally by the 
US Government as a terrorist organization” before the House International Relations 
Committee one month later.666 His description of KLA as a terrorist group was 
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accused as giving the Serbian authorities a “green light” with a legitimate pretext for 
brutally unlawful measures. For example, Gorica Gajeric, secretary-general of the 
ruling Socialist Party, defended their position in Belgrade; “Serbia will fight 
terrorism the same way the rest of the world does”.667  
 
President Bill Clinton remarked on the violence in Kosovo, “We do not want the 
Balkans to have more pictures like we’ve seen in the last few days, so reminiscent of 
what Bosnia endured.”668 Madeleine Albright, who now was Secretary of State, 
urged the administration to stop Milosevic (then Yugoslav president)669 immediately. 
As she wrote in her memoir, “With Franjo Tudjman’s health failing in Croatia and 
Bosnia finally stable, Milosevic was the last powerful obstacle to the integration of 
the Balkans into a democratic Europe.” Since the Kosovo conflict erupted, she had 
tried to ‘lead’ European allies, US public opinion, and her own government “through 
rhetoric”. She stressed, “We are not going to stand by and watch the Serbian 
authorities do in Kosovo what they can no longer get away with doing in Bosnia.”670  
 
Within days of the Serb attacks in the Drenica region, the foreign ministers of the 
Contact Group, the same group dealing with the Bosnian War and later joined by 
Italy, met in London to discuss the situation in Kosovo. At the London conference, 
Secretary Albright urged immediate action, saying:  
 
When the war in the former Yugoslavia began in 1991, the international community did not react with 
sufficient vigor and force. Each small act of aggression that we did not oppose led to larger acts of 
aggression that we could not oppose without great risk to ourselves. Only when those responsible paid 
for their actions with isolation and hardship did the war end. It took us seven years to bring Bosnia to 
this moment of hope. It must not take us that long to resolve the crisis that is growing in Kosovo; and 
it does not have to if we apply the lessons of 1991. This time, we must act with unity and resolve. This 
time, we must respond before it is too late.671 
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The main point of Albright’s view was not to make the same mistake as in Bosnia. 
Albright’s enthusiasm for compelling Milosevic to change his policies on Kosovo 
was shared by British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook. Cook suggested a “stick, carrot, 
stick” approach, which imposed sanctions on Milosevic, and those sanctions were 
only to get lifted when Milosevic took steps and to be tightened if he did not.  
 
Despite the disputes between the foreign ministers of the Contact Group at the 
beginning of the meeting, they, except for Russia, achieved a consensus on the threat 
of sanctions. The second Contact Group meeting was held on 25 March in Bonn. 
France and Germany were ready to confront Moscow. Russian Foreign Minister 
Yevgeny Primakov contended that Kosovo was a domestic matter and that sanctions 
against Milosevic would only inflame Serb nationalists.672 However, in Albright’s 
view, “Russia’s position was shaped less by solidarity with their fellow Slavs than by 
the possibility that international action there would serve as a precedent for outside 
intervention in Russia, where Chechen separatists regularly clashed with the 
army.”673  
 
The result of the Contact Group meetings led to UN Security Council Resolution 
(UNSCR) 1160 on 31 March. The resolution condemned the use of force by Serbian 
police against civilians in Kosovo and terrorist action by the KLA, and imposed an 
arms embargo on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). It called upon the 
Serbian government to withdraw special police units from Kosovo and to enter into a 
dialogue on political status issues with the leadership of the Kosovar Albanian 
community.674  
 
Nevertheless, Albright felt that this was not sufficient. She raised the possibility of 
NATO bombing to press Milosevic for a political solution, and it was crucial that the 
United States took the lead in this issue. Albright found that the first step to achieve 
this was to forge a consensus within the administration. However, it seemed that the 
NSC and the Pentagon were not willing to follow Albright’s resolve. For instance, 
National Security Adviser Sandy Berger responded, “You can’t just talk about 
bombing in the middle of Europe. What targets would you want to hit? What would 
you do the day after? It’s irresponsible to keep making threatening statements outside 
of some coherent plan. The way you people at the State Department talk about 
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bombing, you sound like lunatics.”675 And, having put troops in Bosnia, the Defense 
Department did not want to get involved in another confrontation using the threat of 
force.  
 
Moreover, Berger expressed that the Christmas warning was a unilateral American 
commitment by President George H. W. Bush in December 1992, but the Clinton 
administration believed that it would be meaningful to work multilaterally with 
NATO allies and to gain a consensus on how the conflict might be resolved.676 The 
fact that NATO troops were in neighbouring Bosnia showed that NATO was the 
principal instrument for exerting military pressure and influence in the region. In 
addition, it implied that any NATO military action would have to gain allied consent. 
As one policy-maker said, “The idea of using force over the objection of allies who 
have troops on the ground, subject to retaliation, is fantasy-land. Allies do not do that 
to each other.”677  
 
However, the largely European ground forces implementing the Dayton Peace 
Agreement had an impact on the decision-making. For example, Secretary of 
Defense William Cohen was concerned about whether NATO allies were willing to 
invest in another campaign. Thus, he said, “I was absolutely convinced that the 
United States could not afford to take any kind of unilateral action from a political 
point of view, and certainly we were not going to recommend to the president and to 
the Congress that we intervene unilaterally without NATO consensus and 
support.”678  
 
In addition, despite the concern about potential instability in the region, in particular 
with an influx of refugees entering into their borders, a majority of NATO countries 
claimed that they would not take any action without a UN Security Council (UNSC) 
resolution. At the time, there was heated debate over whether NATO had any legal 
authority to take military action, since it was unreasonable to expect the Security 
Council to authorize any kind of force to prevent what was taking place.679 
Consequently, as one official said after a defense planners’ meeting, “The first 
question we had to ask was whether the Christmas warning was still on the table. 
And the fact is the Christmas warning was not on the table. We were not prepared for 
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unilateral action.”680  
 
In the meantime, Clinton and his aides were distracted by the Monica Lewinsky 
affair. As one of Clinton’s political advisers recalled, “I hardly remember Kosovo in 
political discussions. It was all impeachment, impeachment, and impeachment. There 
was nothing else.”681 Also, the Clinton team concentrated on upcoming presidential 
trips to China and Africa and on Russia’s economic implosion. On the other hand, it 
is worthy to note that the emergence of the guerrilla force, the KLA, also had an 
influence on the decision-making. The KLA not only fought against Serb army and 
security forces but also attacked Serb civilians and others associated with Belgrade. 
As one policymaker stated, “We weren’t in a situation where there was a Serb 
crackdown on an unarmed, peaceful Albanian populace.”682 Thus, Cohen stressed, 
“My concern was that NATO not be seen as the air force of the KLA. If any kind of 
action were to be taken, it must be consistent with making sure that we were entirely 
neutral, and that the KLA not use NATO to serve its own purposes.”683  
 
In May, Ambassadors Holbrooke (Richard Holbrooke) and Gelbard (Robert Gelbard) 
arranged the first meeting between Rugova and Milosevic to resolve the Kosovo 
conflict. The payoff for Rugova was a visit to Washington to meet with Clinton.684 
However, peace talks between Rugova and Milosevic broke down after the Serb 
shelling of Kosovar Albanians in the Decani region in June.685 In order to deter 
further brutal ethnic cleansing by the FRY, British Prime Minister Tony Blair, who 
had succeeded John Major in 1997, and Secretary Cook pushed the Western powers 
to conduct “a much tougher policy, both politically and militarily”. They urged 
NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana to study various military options “with a 
good deal of urgency”.  
 
As a result, Britain drafted a UNSC resolution calling for the authorization of NATO 
to use force “in or over Kosovo”. This was also considered as an attempt to put 
pressure on Russia, the Serbs’ traditional ally, to act more aggressively against 
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Serbia.686 At a NATO meeting in Brussels, NATO defense ministers directed their 
military authorities to conduct air exercises in Albania and Macedonia, aimed to 
demonstrate NATO’s capability to project power rapidly into the region.687 As 
NATO Supreme Commander General Wesley Clark recalled, “It was a critical 
meeting, because that’s the meeting in which NATO began to seriously discuss the 
process of taking action, if necessary.”688  
 
Nevertheless, there were three obstacles for the allies to overcome before they could 
reach a consensus on the issue. Firstly, some allies argued that NATO military 
intervention against Serb forces would favor the KLA. In mid-June, following 
Milosevic’s visit to Russian President Boris Yeltsin in Moscow, Serb forces had 
moderated their actions in Kosovo. On the other hand, the KLA used the relative 
Serb passivity in early summer to take control of as much as 40 percent of Kosovo’s 
territory. The consequence of the shifting situation on the ground made the imminent 
NATO intervention less likely. NATO allies feared that military intervention would 
strengthen the military and political fortunes of the KLA more than weaken 
Milosevic’s forces.689  
 
Secondly, there were disagreements among allied governments over how the alliance 
ought to intervene and how to do it effectively with the least risk. Britain was most 
strongly in favour of the possible use of force. However, the NATO alliance had still 
not worked out what military strikes would be used to harm the Yugoslav Army. As 
one US diplomat said, “You can’t use ground troops. If you strike with cruise 
missiles, then it becomes solely a US operation, because no one else has them. The 
US doesn’t want to act alone. So then you are left with air strikes. But NATO doesn’t 
want to use air strikes if it means that first you have to take out the entire Yugoslav 
integrated air-defense system.”690  
 
Thirdly, there was considerable disagreement over what would constitute the legal 
basis of a NATO military action; in particular, Russia threatened a veto at the 
UNSC.691 The debate was that NATO was a defensive military organization that 
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could exercise the right of collective self-defense, recognised by Article 51 of the UN 
Charter - that an armed attack against one or more of its members shall be considered 
an attack against them all. It was obvious that Kosovo was not a member of NATO 
and therefore it was not a question of self-defense. On the other hand, NATO 
members agreed that Kosovo was an integral part of the FRY. As a result, NATO 
military intervention in Kosovo would violate the sovereignty and territorial integrity 
of the FRY, the principles of state sovereignty, and non-intervention enshrined in 
Articles 2 (4) and (7) of the UN Charter.  
 
In the case of Kosovo, the possibility of using force against the FRY would only be 
possible with the explicit authorization of the UNSC under one interpretation of 
international law. However, Russia and China had claimed that the Kosovo issue was 
an internal affair of the FRY and made clear that they would veto authorizing the use 
of force. The international community, and Russia and France in particular, insisted 
on getting a UN mandate, while “the United States [did] not feel it’s imperative. It’s 
desirable, not imperative”, as Secretary Cohen stated.692 
 
Overall, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright was the leading hawk in favour of 
using NATO airpower against Milosevic. Her view was shared by US special envoy 
to the Balkans Robert Gelbard in the administration and by NATO Supreme 
Commander General Wesley Clark, British Prime Minister Tony Blair, and Foreign 
Secretary Robin Cook in the international community. The chief negotiator with 
Serbia, Richard Holbrooke, might have been an ally although he was out of 
government. But his rivalry-driven relationship with Albright got in the way.  
 
On the other hand, Secretary of Defense William Cohen and Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff General Henry Shelton, who had replaced John Shalikashvili, were 
dovish and cautious about any US military involvement. National Security Adviser 
Sandy Berger was viewed as “a weather vane to Clinton’s political mood and needs” 
and therefore, “reading him was the purest litmus test as to where the president stood 
politically on any foreign policy issue”. “Berger most emphatically reflected the 
president’s desire, if at all possible, to delay any action”. The Congress worried about 
the uncertainty of what the next military step might be. The Europeans were reluctant 
to contribute to any additional use of force. Or more precisely, the Europeans were 
“waiting for American leadership”.693 
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Since the conflict between Serb security forces and the KLA had broken out in 
March, it had driven tens of thousands of Kosovar Albanians from home. In late July, 
the Belgrade government countered the KLA’s “summer offensive”, which had 
succeeded in taking control of a substantial part of Kosovo, by seizing control of 
areas along the province’s border with Albania and then expelling the insurgent 
forces from “literally every village”. The strategy was to destroy the guerrillas’ 
supply lines. The Serb counteroffensive resulted in driving hundreds of thousands of 
Kosovar Albanians along with KLA fighters into the mountains and woods. When 
visiting the areas where the military had conducted its offensive, German diplomat 
Wolfgang Ischinger described Kosovo as “an empty country, a wasteland… {with} 
quite a bit of destruction of property”.694  
 
The United States, acting with the involvement and support of the Contact Group, 
remained engaged in the diplomatic efforts in Kosovo. The process was principally 
guided by Christopher Hill, US Ambassador to Macedonia, and designated US 
special envoy to Kosovo. Ambassador Hill worked with the Kosovar Albanian side to 
receive the views of those engaged in the fighting, and with Milosevic to press him 
to meet his obligations and revive the prospects for dialogue. Meanwhile, the Contact 
Group continued to impose economic sanctions on the FRY. In addition to consulting 
with allies about possible action at the UNSC to reinforce the Contact Group’s 
demands, the United States worked with NATO on possible action.695  
 
The Serb offensive made Albright believe, as she had from the outset, that it was 
necessary to “back diplomacy with force”. She even suggested that the 
administration should “initiate a concerted strategy aimed at ending Milosevic’s rule 
in Belgrade”. Beyond humanitarian concerns, Albright argued that “our interests in 
Kosovo, moreover, stemmed from our interests in a peaceful Europe, and Yugoslavia 
would never find its way into such a Europe with Milosevic at its helm”.696 
Accompanied by daily news of disasters from Kosovo, Clinton was thus convinced 
by Albright’s arguments and approved a strategy for “supporting alternatives to 
Milosevic through overt, public means”. Meanwhile, the administration also worked 
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on pushing for “a clear-cut Alliance decision on Kosovo”.697  
 
In August, the NATO alliance approved the ACTWARN plan for using force with air 
campaigns rather than ground troops for the Kosovo crisis. In the meantime, 
considering that the deteriorating situation in Kosovo constituted a threat to peace 
and security in the region, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1199, which 
called upon the FRY to withdraw security units, to enable an international monitoring 
mission conducted by the EC in Kosovo, and to allow the refugees and displaced 
persons to return to their homes safely with the aid of humanitarian organizations.698 
After the adoption of UNSCR 1199 in September, NATO reinforced the ACTWARN 
plan for its readiness to use force to enforce the UN resolution.699  
 
There was a growing consensus within the Clinton administration and NATO that the 
alliance’s credibility was at stake since Milosevic had by and large ignored NATO’s 
threats and his forces had stepped up their crackdown by shelling villages in Kosovo. 
NATO Secretary-General Solana pointed out one Serb diplomat’s joke, “A village a 
day keeps NATO away.” Secretary Cohen said, “The credibility of NATO is on the 
line.” He called on NATO to be prepared to act. Britain, Germany, the Netherlands, 
and other countries also supported the military action. However, some European 
allies such as France remained reluctant to order NATO into action without explicit 
UN authorization. The allies continued to press Milosevic to negotiate with Kosovar 
Albanian political leaders about restoring the province’s autonomy. Yet they did not 
support the province’s demands for independence.700  
 
Despite the adoption of UNSCR 1199 and NATO’s threat of military force, three 
villages in Kosovo were under siege by the Yugoslav Army and Serb police forces in 
late September. There was no sign that the army and the police were about to be 
withdrawn. Ambassador Hill told CNN, “This is a very brutal conflict; there have 
been a number of these reports of massacres.”701 A Principals Committee meeting 
was held on 30 September. The outcome of the meeting was a recommendation to 
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President Clinton that he should send Richard Holbrooke, then a private citizen, to 
Belgrade to deliver NATO’s terms.702  
 
On the other hand, Albright mentioned that the United States was prepared to act and 
was optimistic that the Russians would reluctantly change their position to go along 
with the United States like they had done in the cases of Bosnia and the Gulf. 
Nevertheless, Russia used its veto at the UNSC to block air strikes against the FRY, 
and warned that the Russian military was ready to carry out any order from the 
Kremlin over Kosovo.703  
 
On 8 October, Albright and Holbrooke met with the NATO alliance’s representatives 
in Brussels to discuss whether an agreement with Milosevic was possible only if 
NATO authorized the use of force. Then, they went to London to attend the Contact 
Group meeting. The purpose of the meeting was to make the same assertion, and in 
the meantime, to make sure that Russia would be on board. At the meeting, German 
Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel pressed Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov to 
support a UNSC resolution to authorize the use of force. However, Ivanov claimed 
that Milosevic had promised to withdraw troops and therefore, Russia would veto 
such a resolution. Failing to alter the Russian position, the Europeans acknowledged 
that the UN Security Council would not act decisively in this case.704    
 
Following the NATO meeting, Holbrooke went back to Belgrade again to deliver a 
final ultimatum. At the same time, North Atlantic Council was poised ready to strike 
on 13 October. NATO activation orders – ACTORDS – “for both limited air strikes 
and a phased airs campaign in the FRY, execution of which will begin in 
approximately 96 hours”, allowed four days for Milosevic to comply. With NATO’s 
backing, this time Holbrooke had more leverage to negotiate with Milosevic. In early 
October, Ambassador Hill had drafted a settlement for Kosovo, which assigned 
public authority to differing levels of governance and would have a comprehensive 
assessment after a period of three years. However, Kosovar Albanians did not accept 
the settlement and the Serbs were cautious about it. Instead, Serbia preferred the 
11-point principles of a political settlement proposed by Holbrooke.  
 
A few hours after NATO’s formal authorization of force, Holbrooke announced a 
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cease-fire agreement with Milosevic that Serbia would withdraw security forces from 
Kosovo and let 2,000 unarmed international monitors, led by William Walker, former 
US Ambassador to El Salvador, under the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) of the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) verify compliance by 
all parties in Kosovo with UNSCR 1199.705 
 
To sum up, at the early stage, “the second Clinton foreign policy team, perhaps 
mirroring Clinton himself, was as divided on Balkans policy as the first team”.706 
Meanwhile, Clinton was distracted by the Monica Lewinsky affair and the possible 
impeachment. Also, the Clinton team was preoccupied with the presidential trips to 
China and Africa in early 1998 and later on a confrontation with Osama bin Laden’s 
Al Qaeda.707 Thus, Kosovo remained “largely off the radar screen”.708  
 
6.1.2 Decision-making Stage 2: December 1998 ~ March 1999 
The fighting escalated again in Kosovo in late December when the KLA killed 6 
Serb youths at the Panda Café in Pec. Consequently, Yugoslav and irregular Serb 
forces began to violate the October agreement.709 At the time, as Albright wrote in 
her memoir: 
 
I felt we had to try something new. The situation was emerging as a key test of American leadership 
and of the relevance and effectiveness of NATO. The Alliance was due to celebrate its fiftieth 
anniversary in April. If my fears proved correct, that event would coincide with the spectacle of 
another humanitarian disaster in the Balkans. And we would look like fools proclaiming the Alliance’s 
readiness for the twenty-first century when we were unable to cope with a conflict that began in the 
fourteenth.710     
 
At an NSC principals meeting on 15 January 1999, top foreign policy aides, 
including Berger, Albright, General Shelton, and Director of the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) George Tenet, gathered together in the White House Situation Room 
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to discuss the deteriorating situation in Kosovo. The final outcome of the meeting 
approved a thirteen-page classified Kosovo strategy known as “Status Quo Plus”, the 
goal of which showed that: “Our fundamental strategic objectives remain unchanged: 
promote regional stability and protect our investment in Bosnia; prevent resumption 
of hostilities in Kosovo and renewed humanitarian crisis; preserve US and NATO 
credibility”. It proposed to beef up the KVM with additional personnel, helicopters, 
and bodyguards and to plan an election in Kosovo during the summer of 1999.711  
 
The strategy papers had two sections on “revitalizing negotiations” and “increasing 
leverage”, with a list of goals. However, in Albright’s view, “it was all rhetoric. The 
so-called ‘decisive steps’ were muddled. There was no clear path to a solution”. 
During the meeting, she stressed: “We must go back to our allies and renew the threat 
of air strikes. We must tell Milosevic bluntly that we will use force if he doesn’t meet 
his commitments. We must go to the public and highlight his failures. We must 
emphasize over and over again that Milosevic is the problem”. Again, her colleagues 
did not share her enthusiasm. As she described in her memoir, she could sense them 
thinking: “There goes Madeleine again”. To sum up, for Albright, the administration 
was moving in constant motion but getting nowhere. And her fear, again, was that 
“Bosnia’s past would become Kosovo’s future”.712  
 
The next morning, there was a report that Serb security forces had killed 45 Kosovar 
Albanians in the village of Racak, Kosovo. When Ambassador Walker, head of the 
KVM, visited the site, he described the killings as a massacre, “an unspeakable 
atrocity”, and “a crime very much against humanity”. About the same time, Western 
intelligence detected signs that Belgrade planned a major spring offensive 
code-named Operation Horseshoe, a military operation for pushing hundreds of 
thousands of Albanians out of Kosovo.713 Since Milosevic had launched a series of 
large-scale offensive attacks against the KLA the previous February and tried to 
reinforce Serbian governmental control over Kosovo, the nearly year-old conflict in 
the Albanian-majority province of Serbia, had led to 2,000 people dead.714  
 
The Clinton administration, though preoccupied with the impeachment hearings and 
with its concentration on Iraq, condemned the Racak massacre by Serb security 
forces in the “strongest possible terms” and called for the Serb authorities to 
cooperate with the KVM, to carry out all the commitments they had made to NATO, 
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and to cease their repression.715 As one NATO diplomat stated, “Once again, it takes 
a massacre to put this back to the top of the international agenda.”716 By the same 
token, Halberstam noted, “The last time, in Bosnia, it was Srebrenica that had moved 
the West to take action. This time, in Kosovo, it was a village called Racak.” “What 
happened at Racak changed everyone, and its political import was obvious: Kosovo, 
like Bosnia, could no longer be ignored”.717 For Albright, as she told Berger, “It 
looks like spring has come to Kosovo early this year.”718 
 
Albright mentioned that the fragile Kosovo agreement brokered by Holbrooke was 
about to fall apart and described how the administration faced a “decision point” in 
Kosovo now: either by stepping back or muddling through or taking decisive 
steps.719 At the State Department on 19 January, Albright convened a meeting with 
her team members, including Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, Assistant 
Secretary of State for Public Affairs and chief spokesman Jamie Rubin, and Policy 
Planning Director Morton Halperin. They developed an approach linking the threat 
of air strikes to press Milosevic for a political settlement that provided the Kosovar 
Albanians with self-government, and there was to be a NATO-led peacekeeping force 
to guarantee their security. If the Serbs refused to endorse the settlement, NATO 
would commence a phased air campaign. “Instead of linking the threat of force to a 
simple ceasefire, we would like it to a definitive diplomatic solution,” Jamie Rubin 
stated. “This would be a clear mission, with a real peace to keep, not a dressed-up 
ceasefire like the one in October”.720 
 
The evening of 19 January, Albright presented her proposal at an NSC meeting. 
However, Defense Secretary Cohen and General Shelton were against a NATO-led 
peacekeeping force, in particular contributing US troops to it. Once again, as 
Halberstam put it, “The tensions between the administration and the military, most 
particularly the US army, were not that different from the time almost six years 
earlier when Clinton had first arrived in office and Colin Powell dominated the play, 
slowing down the administration’s somewhat unfocused vision of a more flexible 
policy toward peacekeeping missions”.721 Still, the military did not want to get 
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involved in a second major long-term mission in the Balkans and feared that the 
mission might get caught in the middle of a civil war. They preferred keeping the 
KVM team rather than deploying new armed forces. Meanwhile, they doubted 
whether Congress would agree on the share of peacekeeping costs.  
 
The debate within the national security team continued for the next four days. 
Albright was determined to push her Washington colleagues to agree on a plan to 
“encourage negotiations by threatening air strikes and to support a NATO-led 
peacekeeping force, with US participation ‘possible’”. She believed that “the way to 
avoid disaster was to use diplomacy backed by the threat of NATO force to achieve 
and implement a political solution”. Despite the skepticism from the military, it 
seemed that there was no better alternative to the proposal. Clinton approved 
Albright’s strategy.722 
 
Having her own government more or less on board, Albright travelled to Moscow 
and other European allies to fashion an agreement on NATO air strikes. Despite the 
fear that Racak was just “the beginning of a campaign of mini-Srebrenica”,723 none 
of the allies, with the exception of Britain and, to some extent, France, was 
supportive of immediate military action.724 This was partly because they feared that 
it would repeat the disastrous experience in Bosnia - that NATO troops would be sent 
to Kosovo to stabilize the situation and enforce a peace without American 
participation. As one senior US national security official said, “Any serious 
discussion on how to resolve Kosovo over the long term must explore all options, 
including American participation on the ground. It’s just a fact of life that our allies 
are reluctant to support air power against the Serbs in the absence of a clear strategy 
for what happens next on the ground”.725 They were also concerned that the threat of 
force directed solely at Belgrade would benefit KLA’s military aims and radicalize 
the Albanians’ push for independence.726  
 
As NATO’s 50th anniversary was approaching, the Clinton administration was under 
pressure to “do something” to save NATO from appearing irresolute over Kosovo. As 
a result, the administration pushed hard to persuade NATO to agree on air strikes 
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against Serbia.727 Concerning European objections to air strikes because of the lack 
of US commitment on ground troops, Berger claimed that the Clinton administration 
remained opposed to deploying US ground troops but might be prepared to 
participate in a peacekeeping force if there was a political settlement first. However, 
he stressed that the White House had to consult with Congress under those 
circumstances. On the other hand, the Clinton administration suggested that the 
revision of the Ambassador Hill plan could provide a framework for an interim 
settlement, which would restore Kosovo’s political autonomy for a three-year period 
before a final decision on the province’s long-term status. At the same time, NATO 
forces would push military pressure on the KLA if its leaders continued to demand 
full independence rather than restored autonomy.728  
 
When visiting Moscow, Albright and Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov issued a 
joint statement, calling upon the Serbian authorities to carry out the October 
agreement and to comply “without delay” with UNSCR 1199.729 Having Russia on 
board, Albright then joined the Contact Group in London on 29 January, announcing 
that peace talks would commence in Rambouillet, Paris on 6 February for the Serb 
and Kosovar Albanian authorities to negotiate an effective self-government for 
Kosovo.730 In Washington, Clinton announced that the United States, along with 
NATO allies, was ready to back the strategy of using force, and with Contact Group 
allies, to achieve the terms of an interim agreement that would protect the rights of 
all the people of Kosovo and give them the self-government they deserved.731 In the 
meantime, the North Atlantic Council authorized Secretary-General Solana to launch 
NATO air strikes against military targets in Kosovo and elsewhere in Serbia if the 
Serb side resisted the negotiations.732  
 
Before the diplomatic conference opened in Rambouillet, Albright delivered a speech 
at United States Institute Peace (USIP) explaining why it was important to bring 
about peace in Kosovo. Firstly, she pointed out where American interests and values 
were at stake.  
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America has a fundamental interest in peace and stability in southern Europe, and in seeing that the 
institutions which keep the peace across that continent are strengthened. America has a fundamental 
interest in preserving Bosnia’s progress toward peace, for which our soldiers, diplomats and 
humanitarian workers have given so much – and which would be seriously jeopardized by renewed 
violence in nearby Kosovo. America has a fundamental interest in strengthening democratic principles 
and practices in the Balkans and throughout Europe. Developing a real democracy in the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia is crucial. And America has a fundamental interest in seeing the rule of law 
upheld, human rights protected and justice done. 
 
We must never forget that there is no natural boundary to violence in southern Europe. Spreading 
conflict could re-ignite fighting in neighboring Albania and destabilize fragile Macedonia. It could 
affect our NATO allies, Greece and Turkey. And it could flood the region with refugees and create a 
haven for international terrorists, drug traffickers and criminals.  
 
Secondly, she emphasized the importance of NATO’s credibility. 
 
Regional conflict would undermine NATO’s credibility as the guarantor of peace and stability in 
Europe. This would pose a threat that America could not ignore.733 
 
Lastly, Albright demonstrated that American leadership was crucial in bringing about 
peace in Kosovo.  
 
We know that the longer we delay in exercising our leadership, the dearer it will eventually be – in 
dollars lost, in lost credibility and in human lives. Simply put, we learned in Bosnia that we can pay 
early, or we can pay much more later.  
 
…. we learned in Bosnia, and we have seen in Kosovo, that President Milosevic understands only the 
language of force. Nothing less than strong engagement from NATO will focus the attention of both 
sides; and nothing less than firm American leadership will ensure decisive action.734 
 
The Rambouillet conference was conducted by three negotiators, appointed by the 
Contact Group: Christopher Hill from the United States, Wolfgang Petritsch from the 
EU, and Boris Mayorski from Russia. The three negotiators were supported by a 
group of legal experts, headed by Jim O’Brian of the US Department of State.735 The 
proposed Rambouillet agreement, which would replace the October agreement, 
provided for: 
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(1) The withdrawal of most Yugoslav military and paramilitary forces from Kosovo. 
(2) The restoration of Kosovo’s political autonomy.  
(3) A three-year transition period, at the end of which there would be a referendum on Kosovo’s 
future. 
(4) Disarmament of the KLA. 
(5) Deployment of an armed NATO peacekeeping force in Kosovo.736 
 
At the conference, the Serbian delegation, led by Serbian Deputy Prime Minister 
Ratko Markovic, insisted that Kosovo, the heart of Serbia’s medieval empire, must 
remain a part of Serbia; while the Kosovar Albanian delegation, including the 
moderate political leader Ibrahim Rugova and the KLA commander Hashim Thaci, 
demanded full independence for Kosovo. However, diplomats from the United States, 
the EU, and Russia sought an in-between autonomous status for Kosovo.737  
 
While the international sponsored peace talk was under way in Paris, the Clinton 
administration was under pressure from NATO allies to make a final decision over 
whether US troops would take part in a peacekeeping force. It was assumed that the 
details of the promised NATO force would affect Serbia’s and the Kosovar 
Albanians’ decision whether or not to sign a settlement.738 On 13 February, the day 
after his impeachment charges by the Senate, Clinton announced during a Radio 
Address that he would send “a little less than 4,000” US troops to Kosovo as part of 
a NATO peacekeeping force if there was an agreement reached by the warring 
parties.  
 
The President explained why peace in Kosovo was important to America: 
 
In this decade, violent ethnic conflicts in the former Yugoslavia have threatened Europe’s stability and 
future. For 4 years Bosnia was the site of Europe’s bloodiest war in half a century. With American 
leadership and that of our allies, we worked to end the war and move the Bosnian people toward 
reconciliation and democracy. Now, as the peace takes hold, we’ve been steadily bringing our troops 
home. But Bosnia taught us a lesson: In this volatile region, violence we fail to oppose leads to even 
greater violence we will have to oppose later at greater cost. We must heed that lesson in Kosovo.739 
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As a result, he stressed the importance of the Rambouillet peace talks: 
 
America has a national interest in achieving this peace. If the conflict persists, there likely will be a 
tremendous loss of life and a massive refugee crisis in the middle of Europe. There is a serious risk the 
hostilities would spread to the neighboring new democracies of Albania and Macedonia, and reignite 
the conflict in Bosnia we worked so hard to stop. It could even involve our NATO Allies Greece and 
Turkey. If we wait until casualties mount and war spreads, any effort to stop it will come at a higher 
price, under more dangerous conditions. The time to stop the war is right now.740 
 
Clinton made a last point: 
 
America cannot be everywhere nor do everything overseas. But we must act where important interests 
are at stake and we can make a difference. Peace in Kosovo clearly is important to the United 
States…741  
 
Nevertheless, even though Secretary Albright and other Western leaders repeated the 
threat of NATO air strikes against the FRY if there was no settlement reached, the 
first week of the conference ended nowhere. The Kosovar Albanians insisted on a 
substantial military presence guaranteeing their safety; however, the Serbs refused to 
allow any foreign military presence on their sovereign soil. Serbian President Milan 
Milutinovic stated, “We’re against any kind of foreign troops. If the agreement is 
good and fair and supported by a vast majority of residents of Kosovo, no foreign 
force is necessary to make them implement it”. Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov also 
objected any military action to force a settlement. As a consequence, the Contact 
Group decided to extend the deadline.742  
 
During the second week of the negotiations, Ambassador Hill went to Belgrade twice 
to present the entire peace plan to Milosevic. Unfortunately, he tried in vain to 
convince Milosevic to sign the agreement.743 On the other hand, Albright devoted 
her efforts to getting the Kosovar Albanians to endorse the agreement. Also, General 
Clark flew from NATO headquarters to meet with KLA members to explain what 
NATO ground troops would do in Kosovo. The guerrillas were unhappy about the 
demilitarization of the KLA and wanted immediate independence. Thaci was the 
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main opponent of signing the agreement, while Rugova had minimal influence at the 
talks.744 In order to complete the Rambouillet process, the Contact Group decided to 
extend the deadline for signing the agreement to 15 March.745  
 
When both parties returned to Paris in mid-March, the Kosovar Albanian delegation 
signed the accord; while Serbia accepted most of the political provisions but 
remained opposed to NATO peacekeepers to enforce the settlement, even in the face 
of the threat of possible NATO bombing. Russia, though, agreed with the allies to 
have a NATO peacekeeping force in Kosovo, but still opposed the use of NATO 
bombing to force the Serbs to agree to the settlement. Nevertheless, as Albright 
remarked, “There can be no agreement if the Serbs do not sign.” Moreover, she 
stated, “The situation is as clear as it could be: the Albanians have said yes to the 
accords and the Serbs are saying no.”746 As a result, the co-chairs of the Contact 
Group announced, “We consider there is no purpose in extending the talks any 
further. The negotiations are adjourned. The talks will not resume unless the Serbs 
express their acceptance of the Accords.”747 Consequently, the diplomatic efforts to 
reach a political solution to the Kosovo crisis ended.  
 
At the same time, it was reported that Milosevic had used the break in talks since 23 
February to amass 30,000 to 40,000 troops into or close to Kosovo.748 After peace 
talks collapsed, KVM international monitors and Western embassy staff were 
informed that they had to leave the FRY. Milosevic took the advantage of the vacuum 
and launched a heavy offensive against the KLA. In particular, Serbian forces 
deployed tanks and troops all around the Drenica region, the heart of the Kosovar 
Albanians’ revolt. General Clark described, “All sources indicate that the situation 
has dramatically deteriorated on the ground in Kosovo as the verifiers have 
departed.” The terrifying situation drove thousands of panicked refugees from their 
homes.749  
                                                 
744 Jane Perlez, ‘Talks on Kosovo Near Breakdown; Deadline Is Today’, New York Times, 23 February 
1999. 
745 ‘Statement Rambouillet Accords: Co-Chairmen’s Conclusions’, Contact Group Statement – 
Rambouillet, 23 February 1999 [http://www.ohr.int/other-doc/contact-g/default.asp?content_id=3560] 
20 August 2008. 
746 ‘Secretary of State Albright, Remarks on Developments in Kosovo’, 18 March 1999, reprinted in 
Marc Weller, The Crisis in Kosovo, 1989-1999 (Cambridge: International Documents and Analysis, 
1999), p. 493. 
747 ‘Statement by the Co-Chairs of the Contact Group’, 19 March 1999, reprinted in Weller, The 
Crisis in Kosovo, 1989-1999, p. 493. 
748 Carlotta Gall, ‘Kosovo Rebels Act to Accept Peace Accord’, New York Times, 13 March 1999; 
Craig R. Whitney, ‘Ethnic Albanians Move to Accept Kosovo Pact’, New York Times, 16 March, 1999; 
Craig R. Whitney, ‘Kosovo Talks Near End as Serbs Build Up’, New York Times, 18 March 1999; 
Weller, ‘The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo’, p. 436. 
749 Craig R. Whitney, ‘Monitors and Embassy Staff Told to Leave Yugoslavia’, New York Times, 20 
 163
 
At this stage, despite diplomatic setbacks at Rambouillet, the Clinton administration 
was determined to end the Kosovo crisis. As some senior administration officials 
argued, “Rambouillet at least allowed the administration to show to other NATO 
nations, still dubious about any military action, that the United States had walked the 
last mile to bring peace.”750  
 
6.1.3 Decision-making Stage 3: March ~ June 1999 
On 19 March, the foreign policy team met with the President to review possible 
options. During the meeting, Albright said, “Let’s remember the purpose of using 
force is to stop Milosevic-style thuggery once and for all. There’s no guarantee it will 
succeed, but the alternatives are worse. If we don’t respond now, we’ll have to 
respond later, perhaps in Macedonia, maybe in Bosnia. Milosevic had picked this 
fight. We can’t allow him to win.” Clinton advocated, “In dealing with aggressors in 
the Balkan, hesitation is a license to kill.” Facing NATO’s upcoming 50th anniversary, 
it seemed that for the second time in its history (the first time being in Bosnia), the 
alliance’s military commitment to maintain order in the Balkans was inevitable.751  
 
In a presidential press conference on the same day, Clinton first of all stressed, 
“Kosovo, a part of the former Yugoslavia, lies in the heart of the Balkans, a region of 
strategic importance of the United States and Europe.” In short, the speech could be 
summarised to say that the continued violence threatened US national interests in 
two ways:  
 
The Threat of Spreading Conflict. The United States has a strong interest in preventing Kosovo 
from spiraling out of control. Violence in Kosovo could spread, threatening the fragile stability of the 
entire region, including Bosnia, Macedonia and Albania. Greece and Turkey – both NATO allies – 
could also be drawn into a conflict.  
 
An Ongoing Humanitarian Crisis. Over 200,000 Kosovar Albanians have been driven from their 
homes in recent weeks, highlighting the potential for a humanitarian crisis that could spill over into 
neighboring countries. The United States has a strong interest in seeing that Milosevic is prevented 
from burning towns and terrorizing civilians with impunity. 
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Lastly, Clinton claimed that the United States and NATO allies were united and 
prepared to carry out military action against the Serbs if they continued to mount an 
offensive in Kosovo.752  
 
After the president’s press conference, a Gallup poll result showed that 46% of the 
American public were for air strikes and 43% against it. In the poll data, it also 
showed that a majority (58%) believed that the United States had a moral obligation 
to secure peace in Kosovo, in comparison with a minority (42%) who considered that 
the United States should get engaged to protect its national interests.  
 
In the meantime, Clinton began to lobby Congress to support his military 
intervention in Kosovo. Internationalist Senators such as Democrat Joseph Biden of 
Delaware and Republican Richard Lugar of Indiana strongly supported intervention. 
Some Republicans such as the new speaker Dennis Hastert and Henry Hyde were 
also for an intervention. Still others opposed such an intervention for fear of getting 
embroiled in a civil war like Vietnam. On the other hand, the motivation for 
Republican presidential aspirant, Senator John McCain of Arizona, to agree with the 
intervention was to produce unity in crisis rather than support the president’s policy. 
In early March, the House of Representatives had voted 219-191 to support the 
president’s plan to send troops if there was a peace agreement reached. On 23 March, 
the Senate voted 58-41 to support NATO bombing.753  
 
On the same day, Clinton sent Holbrooke to negotiate with Milosevic to persuade 
him to agree to the Rambouillet settlement. It was considered as a “last chance” for 
Milosevic to avoid NATO bombing. However, it seemed that Milosevic refused 
“every opportunity” to avoid NATO air strikes. Yugoslav Foreign Minister Zivadin 
Jovanovio defended, “Yugoslavia desires a peaceful resolution to Kosovo that 
provides extensive autonomy, self-government, democracy and human rights to the 
province’s population” but, as a sovereign state, “cannot accept foreign troops to 
occupy our land”.754 As a consequence, NATO Secretary-General Solana directed 
General Clark to initiate air strikes. Despite having a majority of Congress and all 
NATO allies’ support, Russia was not happy about this. When Russian Prime 
Minister Yevgeny Primakov was en route to the United States to meet with Vice 
President Al Gore, he flew back to Moscow as Gore informed him that the NATO 
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bombing was imminent.755  
 
On 24 March, NATO began air strikes against Serbian forces. “It was the first time in 
history that the United States or its European allies had intervened to head off a 
potential genocide”.756 The NATO mission, called Operation Allied Force, set up 
five objectives for Kosovo:  
 
(1) A verifiable stop to all Serb military action and the immediate ending of violence and repression. 
(2) The withdrawal from Kosovo of all Serb military, police, and paramilitary forces. 
(3) An agreement to the stationing in Kosovo of an international military presence. 
(4) The acceptance of the unconditional and safe return of all refugees and displaced persons and 
unhindered access to them by humanitarian aid organizations. 
(5) Credible assurances that Belgrade would work, on the basis of the Rambouillet accords, to 
establish a political framework agreement for Kosovo.757 
 
In Washington, Clinton explained to the American people why the United States had 
had to act. He pointed out that inaction to end the conflict in Kosovo would bring 
about greater catastrophe later. As he said,  
 
I have concluded that the dangers of acting now are clearly outweighed by the risks of failing to act, 
the risks that many more innocent people will die or be driven from their homes by the tens of 
thousands, the risks that the conflict will involve and destabilize neighboring nations. It will clearly be 
much more costly and dangerous to stop later than this effort to prevent it from going further now. 
 
Moreover, he demonstrated that “a stable, peaceful and democratic Europe” was very 
much in US national interests. He stated: 
 
At the end of the 20th century, after two world wars and a cold war, we and our allies have a chance to 
leave our children a Europe that is free, peaceful, and stable. But we must act now to do that, because 
of the Balkans once again become a place of brutal killing and massive refugee flights, it will be 
impossible to achieve.758  
 
In his second address on the same day, Clinton made clear that the decision to use 
military force against Serbia was in order to uphold American values. The 
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determination to avert a humanitarian disaster in Kosovo was a moral imperative. He 
stated: 
 
We act to protect thousands of innocent people in Kosovo from a mounting military offensive. We act 
to prevent a wider war; to diffuse a powder keg at the heart of Europe that has exploded twice before 
in this century with catastrophic results. And we act to stand united with our allies for peace. By 
acting now, we are upholding our values, protecting our interests and advancing the cause of peace…..  
Ending this tragedy is a moral imperative.  
 
Yet beyond moral concerns, the President also emphasized that it was an act on 
behalf of geopolitical interests after a calculated assessment of US interests in the 
Balkans.759  
 
It is also important to America’s national interest…. Kosovo is a small place, but it sits on a major 
fault line between Europe, Asia and the Middle East, at the meeting place of Islam and both the 
Western and Orthodox branches of Christianity. To the south are our allies, Greece and Turkey; to the 
north, our new democratic allies in Central Europe. And all around Kosovo there are other small 
countries, struggling with their own economic and political challenges – countries that could be 
overwhelmed by a large, new wave of refugees from Kosovo. All the ingredients for a major war are 
there: ancient grievances, struggling democracies, and in the center of it all a dictator in Serbia who 
has done nothing since the Cold War ended but start new wars and pour gasoline on the flames of 
ethnic and religious division.760 
 
Furthermore, Clinton learned from the lessons of Bosnia, when he had not acted 
earlier to stop ethnic cleansing:  
 
At the time, many people believed nothing could be done to end the bloodshed in Bosnia. They said, 
“Well, that’s just the way those people in the Balkans are.” But when we and our allies joined with 
courageous Bosnians to stand up to the aggressors, we helped to end the war. We learned that in the 
Balkans, inaction in the face of brutality simply invites more brutality, but firmness can stop armies 
and save lives. We must apply that lesson in Kosovo before what happened in Bosnia happens, too.761 
 
On the other hand, as NATO 50th anniversary was approaching, the United States and 
18 NATO alliance countries had to demonstrate the seriousness of NATO’s purpose 
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to restore the peace in Kosovo: 
 
Imagine what would happen if we and our allies instead decided just to look the other way, as these 
people were massacred on NATO’s doorstep. That would discredit NATO, the cornerstone on which 
our security has rested for 50 years now.762  
 
As a consequence, Clinton claimed that the United States had the responsibility to 
work in concert with allies to end the conflict.  
 
America has a responsibility to stand with our allies when they are trying to save innocent lives and 
preserve peace, freedom, and stability in Europe. That is what we are doing in Kosovo. 
 
If we’ve learned anything from the century drawing to a close, it is that if America is going to be 
prosperous and secure, we need a Europe that is prosperous, secure, undivided, and free. We need a 
Europe that is coming together, not falling apart, a Europe that shares our values and shares the 
burdens of leadership. That is the foundation on which the security of our children will depend.763 
 
In a session with the American Society of Newspaper Editors in San Francisco on 15 
April, Clinton addressed again that it was moral and strategic imperatives that were 
driving the United States and NATO allies to get involved in the Kosovo conflict.764 
He stated: 
 
We and our 18 NATO Allies are in Kosovo today because we want to stop the slaughter and the ethnic 
cleansing; because we want to build a stable, united, prosperous Europe that includes the Balkans and 
its neighbors ….. Were we to stand aside, the atrocities in Kosovo would go on and on. Neighboring 
democracies, as you see, would be overwhelmed by permanent refugees and demoralized by the 
failure of democracy’s alliance… NATO would be discredited because its values and vision of Europe 
would be profoundly damaged. Ultimately, the conflict in Kosovo would spread anyway, and we 
would have to act anyway.765  
 
To sum up, the Clinton administration asserted that the United States had moral as 
well as strategic interests at stake if the Kosovo crisis continued. Other factors such 
as the lessons of Bosnia, NATO’s credibility, and the necessity for American 
leadership were also considered as important factors that motivated the 
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administration to intervene in the Kosovo conflict. 
 
Although Clinton stated that the purpose of the action was to prevent a humanitarian 
catastrophe or a wider war, it was estimated that 4,600 Kosovar Albanians were 
killed by Serb forces during NATO’s bombing campaign, whereas more than 1,800 
had died as a result of the fighting between the Serb authorities and the KLA from 
the beginning of 1998 until the air campaign began on 24 March.766 Meanwhile, the 
State Department reported that 90 percent of Kosovar Albanians had been expelled 
from their homes by early May. The Belgrade government claimed that most of the 
refugees had fled Kosovo because of NATO’s bombing.767 Russian President Yeltsin 
had denounced the bombing in strong terms at the beginning, “This is in fact NATO’s 
attempt to enter the 21st century as global policeman. Russia will never agree to 
it.”768 In fact, the expansion of NATO membership to Poland, Hungary, and the 
Czech Republic two weeks before NATO’s bombing had provoked Russia.769  
 
Moreover, NATO’s accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy on 7 May had 
seriously damaged US-Chinese relations. Despite explanations from US officials 
with a report detailing the errors, China was not convinced that the attack was an 
accident.770 Michael Mandelbaum argued that the Clinton administration went to 
war in Kosovo where there was no US national interest at stake, but that the war had 
affected its most important strategic interest: relations with Russia and China, the 
only two countries in the world that had nuclear weapons pointing towards the 
United States.771  
 
Concerning the failure of NATO’s air war to deter a worse humanitarian crisis in 
Kosovo within the first week, military analysts started to argue that air strikes alone 
could not disrupt the Serb strategy Operation House - village-by-village burnings and 
assassinations. It seemed that the deployment of US ground troops was necessary if 
NATO wanted to achieve its goal. As one retired army official said, “The only way to 
stop that sort of ground movement is to put troops on the ground and stop that 
advance.”772 However, there was wide debate over an invasion of Kosovo by ground 
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forces. In a news interview, when being asked whether ground troops might be 
necessary, Senator McCain said: “We’re in it, and we have to win it…We have to 
exercise every option”.  
 
Democrat Senator Charles S. Robb of Virginia indicated that the United States should 
not rule out the possibility of using US and other NATO ground troops. He said: “It 
is very difficult to take a whole territory without the use of ground forces. I don’t 
want to see anything taken off the table”.773 Similarly, Republican Senator Chuck 
Hagel of Nebraska wrote: “The only acceptable exit strategy is victory…We have to 
have the will and the vision to work our way through this, and to do so we must not 
foreclose on any options. We must be prepared to do what is necessary to achieve our 
objectives and ensure victory, including the option of ground troops”.774  
 
Nevertheless, Republican Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison of Texas stated that while 
ground troops might be needed to stop the suffering in Kosovo, “Americans should 
absolutely not be part of such a deployment”. Republican Senator Pat Roberts of 
Kansas stated that the deployment of ground troops was “a political judgment the 
President is not willing to take, and I must say there’s not any support for that in 
Congress”.775 Overall, many Republican congressmen remained against any military 
involvement in the Balkans, just as they had done throughout much of the decade. 
 
Secretary Albright was in favour of a credible threat of ground invasion. But she did 
not gain any support within the administration. Both the Pentagon and the White 
House were less than convinced that ground forces would be necessary and did not 
concede that airpower would fail to do the job. NATO supreme commander General 
Clark was strongly supportive of using ground forces in Kosovo. He indicated that 
“an expanded air effort would be a necessary precursor to a ground campaign”.776 In 
the meantime, British Prime Minister Tony Blair was leaning hard to push ahead on 
planning the ground option. In order to use NATO’s upcoming 50th anniversary 
summit as an opportunity for Washington and London to convince the other allies to 
support an invasion of Kosovo, Blair visited Clinton to propose the plan on 21 April, 
two days before NATO’s summit. However, he did not succeed in his mission.  
 
The NATO summit did not consider the plan for ground troops, but became a turning 
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point in US-Russian relations. Instead of opposing the war, President Yeltsin tried to 
find a way to end the war while helping Milosevic get as good a deal as he possibly 
could: “continued Serb sovereignty over Kosovo, a UN role in Kosovo’s 
administration, a Serb sector of Kosovo if possible, and a balancing role by Russia 
and other non-NATO countries to any NATO troop presence that might ultimately 
deploy to the territory”. The Yeltsin government sought a key role for Russia in 
bringing that about.777  
 
In mid-May, when the war had been dragging for about two and a half months, 
Clinton claimed for the first time that he would consider sending ground troops to 
Kosovo. This marked a rhetorical shift from what he had announced on 24 March, 
the first day of NATO air strikes – “I do not intend to put our troops in Kosovo to 
fight a war”. But now, as a practical matter, Clinton stated that his mind was open to 
putting combat troops in Kosovo if an invasion might eventually push Milosevic to 
embrace a settlement offer that NATO and Russia were hoping to jointly craft.778  
 
Given the increasing tension within the United States and NATO alliance about the 
possibility of ground invasion, Clinton wrote in the New York Times on 23 May to 
clarify core objectives of the mission in Kosovo:  
 
First, and most important, it is working and will succeed in meeting NATO’s basic conditions of 
restoring the Kosovars to their homes, with Serb forces out of Kosovo and the deployment of an 
international security force… Second, this strategy has broad and deep support in the alliance, and 
allows us to meet our objectives… Third, this strategy gives us the best opportunity to meet goals in a 
way that strengthens, not weakens, our fundamental interest in a long-term, positive relationship with 
Russia… Finally, we must remember that the reversal of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo is not sufficient 
to end ethnic conflict in the Balkans and establish lasting stability. The European Union and the 
United States must do for southeastern Europe what we did for Western Europe after World War II and 
for Central Europe after the cold war. Freedom, respect for minority rights, and prosperity are 
powerful forces for progress. 
 
Clinton called the NATO war over Kosovo “just and necessary”.779  
 
At a meeting on 2 June, Berger met with several foreign policy experts who were 
activists on Bosnia and Kosovo, including former US Ambassador to the UN Jeane J. 
Kirkpatrick, former NATO commander George Joulwan, former US Ambassador to 
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NATO Robert Hunter, and former NSC staff member Ivo H. Daalder, to discuss how 
NATO could win the war. In the meeting, it was made clear that NATO’s victory 
outweighed other American goals – holding the alliance together and keeping Russia 
on board – for the war. Berger stated that “we will win” no matter what was required, 
getting “the Serbs out, NATO in and the Albanians back” to Kosovo. He made four 
points: “First, we will win. Period. Full stop. There is no alternative; second, winning 
means what we said it means; third, the air campaign is having a serious impact; 
fourth, the president said he has not ruled out any options. So go back to one. We will 
win”. “Go for a ground invasion. This was the only option left,” Berger stated, who 
having previously doubted any kind of air campaign, now sounded more hawkish. 
Clearly, failing to win the war over Kosovo would “do serious, if not irreparable 
harm, to the US, NATO, and European stability”.780 More important, as General 
Clark pointed out, “There could be no future for NATO without success in this 
mission”.781  
 
On the same day, President Clinton gave the commencement address to the US Air 
Force Academy, emphasizing: 
 
We are in Kosovo for the same reason you are here today. We believe that there are some things worth 
fighting for. If we have the power to act, and we do not reject and reverse ethnic cleansing, we will 
ratify it. We have acted to end this horror – and that is exactly what we will do.782 
 
In a previous speech, Clinton had showed the determination to win the war. He said: 
 
I believe that our air campaign in Kosovo is working and will ultimately succeed in its objective of 
returning the people of Kosovo to their homes with security and self-government. With that in mind, 
we are planning with our allies for success.783 
 
Later, in a television interview, Clinton stressed again that “NATO would have put 
ground forces in there and that we were determined not to lose this thing. We were 
determined to reverse the ethnic cleansing”.784 General Clark proposed an invasion 
by up to 175,000 allied troops. However, General Shelton, who did not favor an 
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invasion, warned that this would commit “too few American troops to too limited a 
goal”.785  
 
In the meantime, former Russian Prime Minister Viktor S. Chernomyrdin and 
Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari were in Belgrade, presenting NATO’s terms to 
Milosevic. As a result of NATO’s intense bombing of electricity plants and targets of 
immediate interest to Milosevic’s chief associates and cronies, combined with a 
militarily stronger growing KLA on the ground and Russia’s pressure, Milosevic was 
in a true crisis. Moreover, the plan of a ground invasion of Kosovo had a 
psychological impact on Milosevic. Ultimately, Milosevic accepted the terms.786  
 
On 10 June, Clinton announced that NATO had suspended its air campaign as a 
result of an agreement reached between NATO and the FRY. Moreover, the Serb 
troops started to withdraw from Kosovo. In the peace agreement, it indicated: 
 
The complete withdrawal of all military, paramilitary, and police from Kosovo; 
the establishment of an international security force with NATO at its core; and 
the return of Kosovar refugees to their homes in security and self-government. 
 
The NATO-led peacekeeping force, called KFOR, would include 7,000 US troops. 
KFOR’s mission was to create a secure environment for all citizens of Kosovo.787 In 
the meantime, the UN Security Council approved Resolution 1244, based on the 
peace agreement signed by Milosevic, which would place the UN in administrative 
charge of the province.788  
 
There was an agreement between Russia and the United States that about 3,600 
Russian troops would participate as a part of KFOR and be placed under the 
command of NATO.789 Since the NATO alliance had failed to force Milosevic’s 
troops out of Kosovo after four days of bombing, the Clinton administration had 
approached Moscow to serve as a go-between with Serbia in order to find a 
diplomatic solution to end the war.790 As John Sitilides stated, “The Russians made 
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very clear that they would support the United States, in exchange for being part of 
the peacekeeping team, and joining the West in asserting its presence in this part of 
Europe that the war finally came to an end.” In comparison with the minimal role 
they played in shaping Western policy-making in the Bosnia conflict, Russia played a 
very important role in helping to bring about the end of the war in Kosovo.791 
However, some argued that Clinton’s second administration tended to marginalize 
rather than integrate Russia into the international effort to resolve global issues as a 
result of its newfound confidence on the world stage.792  
 
The Kosovo War was extremely controversial. For example, Mandelbaum argued 
that the war, especially with regard to the humanitarian goal of NATO seeking to 
prevent more human suffering of Kosovar Albanians, was “a deliberate act of policy, 
a perfect failure”. Also, critics argued that NATO bombing could have been avoided 
if NATO’s position at the Rambouillet negotiations could have been more 
“flexible”.793 Mandelbaum illustrated that “whereas Rambouillet gave NATO forces 
unimpeded access to all of Yugoslavia, including Serbia, the June settlement allowed 
the alliance free rein only in Kosovo”.794 Milosevic, quoting Henry Kissinger’s 
words, described the Rambouillet peace conference as “a mechanism for the 
permanent creation of problems and confrontation”.795  
 
Moreover, because US involvement took place soon after Clinton’s impeachment 
scandal, many argued that “this was the president’s way of ‘wagging the dog’, or in 
Henry IV’s words, busying ‘giddy minds with foreign quarrels’”. Some even argued 
that “NATO was trying to secure yet more markets for American companies or to 
stuff capitalism down the throats of socialist stalwarts”.796  Despite the fact that 
Russia and China used their veto powers, NATO, who, as a regional alliance, went to 
war without a UNSC resolution, had disregarded international law. It was an 
illustration of the tendency towards a unilateralist thrust in Clinton’s second 
administration. For example, as one analysis described:  
 
Intra-NATO squabbling and operational calamities, such as the Chinese embassy bombing, actually 
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reinforced the case for American unilateralism. The war also stimulated lines of criticism of the 
United States – as a power prepared to act outside international law – which were to reverberate and 
intensify in the years following Clinton’s departure from the White House.797 
 
On the other hand, “the conflict enhanced the international standing of NATO, which 
was now carving out an expansive post-Cold War role”.798 
 
At the final stage, in The Economist’s words,  
 
The polling data, together with the shift in favour of the administration in Congress, pose an obvious 
question. If Mr. Clinton is able to increase support for his policy by explaining it energetically, why 
did he not to do so earlier? The simplest answer is temperament: the president lacks the discipline to 
work steadily on big issues, and so is reduced to last-minute scrambling. But there is also a more 
complicated answer. On some issues, the president’s party and advisers are so divided that firm 
leadership is not easy.799  
 
Ultimately, as the war had dragged on longer than expected, winning the war became 
the primary goal. It was Washington’s and the NATO alliance’s plan for a ground 
invasion that eventually forced Milosevic to agree to a settlement and brought the 
Kosovo War to an end. 
 
6.2 Explaining the Clinton Administration’s Intervention in Kosovo  
When the Kosovo crisis broke onto the international scene in early 1998, the Clinton 
administration was preoccupied with the Monica Lewinsky affair. As Senator Dole 
returned from Kosovo in September 1998, he described his meeting with Clinton and 
Berger: “The President listened carefully; I don’t recall him saying a great deal. He 
agreed it was terrible. Sandy Berger didn’t say much, either. When Berger left, we 
discussed impeachment. This was a critical time in the Monica events”.800 Similarly, 
a Cabinet member commented, “The whole rhythm of the Government was thrown 
off, because the big guy had something more important on his mind than any 
foreign-policy crisis – a 900-pound gorilla that was always in the room with him, 
named impeachment.”801  
 
However, after the President’s impeachment trial, the Clinton administration was 
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quick to respond to the Kosovo conflict and to take the lead.802 It was believed that 
the administration acted more quickly and was better prepared because of the 
experience of Bosnia.803 For example, Charles A. Kupchan stated, “Yeah, and in 
Kosovo I think they were better prepared because of the experience of Bosnia, and 
that’s why they acted more quickly and made clear ultimatums to Milosevic. So I 
think there was a positive…positive learning curve.” 804  Besides, as Sitilides 
described, “There was the belief that in the end the only way to deal with Slobodan 
Milosevic after a decade of aggression in the Balkans was to bring about a military 
defeat that would help bring about the end of his regime in Belgrade.” After all, 
Milosevic was seen as a perpetual aggressor, continuously upsetting the stable 
balance in this part of Europe.805  
 
On the other hand, the handling of Kosovo also reflected Clinton’s newfound 
international confidence. As Derek Chollet and James Goldgeier described it,  
 
In past situations when the use of military force did not go as expected – in Somalia, in the first Haiti 
intervention, in Bosnia, and even at times in Iraq – the president responded with outrage, anxiety, and 
blame. But this time, rather than worrying about the costs to his political prospects and complaining 
about being ill-served – which his aides were bracing for – Clinton greeted his team with a pep talk, 
displaying a kind of steely confidence his top advisers weren’t expecting. “Guys, let’s not lose sight of 
why we did this,” he said. “Let’s not forget what prompted us to do this and who is responsible.806  
 
Nevertheless, the Monica Lewinsky scandal had eroded Clinton’s moral authority 
and powers of persuasion. Clinton found it difficult to get public or congressional 
support to send in ground troops or take unilateral military action.807 As Clinton 
recalled in his memoir, “The Republicans seemed to have reverted to the theme they 
had trumpeted since 1992: I was a person without character who could not be trusted. 
During the Kosovo conflict some Republicans almost seemed to be rooting for us to 
fail. One Republican senator justified his colleagues’ tepid support for what our 
troops were doing by saying I had lost their trust.”808  
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In the meantime, it is important to note that Clinton was aloof to the policy-making 
process during most of the Kosovo conflict. It was Secretary of State Albright who 
mainly drove US policy and motivated the administration to support the threat and 
eventual use of force.809 Albright, together with her British counterpart Robin Cook, 
managed to mobilize a strong international response.810 In the case of Bosnia, 
Albright’s voice was largely on the periphery of the decision-making. As Daalder 
recalled, “Everybody listened to her interventions, some more politely than others, 
but no one really was swayed one way or the other by her arguments.”811 However, 
for Lake, her arguments were “excessively ideological”.812  
 
Similarly, Chollet and Goldgeier describe Albright as an idealist, believing in 
promoting liberal values, more comfortable in expressing them and “more willing to 
advocate for the use of military force than many of her colleagues”.813 As Michael 
Dobbs put it, “She was a politician with a penchant for staking out firm moral 
questions and seeing the world in black and white.” Moreover, “she had been 
brought up to view America as the world’s “indispensable nation” that had ridden to 
the rescue in two world wars”.814  
 
Yet now, in the case of Kosovo, Albright was instrumental, pushing for more 
intensive US engagement, both political and military.815 In David Halberstam’s 
words, Albright “was absolutely certain of her beliefs about what needed to be done 
in Kosovo”; and “was absolutely sure that Kosovo was a repeat of Bosnia and the 
United States would, sooner or later, have to take military action against 
Belgrade”.816 As a consequence, the Kosovo conflict was described as “Madeleine’s 
war”.817  
 
It was believed that Albright’s initial impulse to take some kind of preventative 
action was linked to her family background. Albright was born in Czechoslovakia, 
and her family had twice driven from home because of the control of Hitler’s Nazism 
                                                 
809 See note in DiPrizio, Armed Humanitarians, p. 221. 
810 Clinton, My Life, p. 850. 
811 Quoted in Michael Dobbs, Madeleine Albright: A Twentieth-Century Odyssey (New York: Owl 
Books, 2000), p. 363. 
812 Ibid., p. 363. 
813 Chollet and Goldgeier, America Between The Wars, p. 146. 
814 Dobbs, Madeleine Albright, p. 377. 
815 Interview with Janusz Bugajski on 30 June 2008. Bugajski is Director of the New European 
Democracies Project and senior fellow in the Europe Program at the Center for Strategic & 
International Studies. 
816 Halberstam, War in a Time of Peace, p. 376. 
817 See Walter Isaacson, ‘Madeleine’s War’, Time (Canadian Edition), Vol. 153, No. 19, 17 May 
1999. 
 177
and Stalin’s communism over the country. In particular, many of her relatives died in 
Nazi concentration camps.818 Similarly, Janusz Bugajski stated, “Madeleine Albright 
who’s from the region, she’s from Eastern Europe originally, understands the 
problems much more, and didn’t want America to stand on the sidelines as this 
terrible war unfolded, so she was I think instrumental both in the case of Bosnia but 
also in the case of Kosovo.”819 For this reason, “she was one of the first members of 
the Clinton administration to understand the threat posed to the new world order by 
the rise of nationalism in the geopolitical vacuum created by the collapse of 
communism”.820 Thus, “there was every reason to believe that Kosovo represented 
the final battleground for Serbian nationalism”.821 On the other hand, as Chollet and 
Goldgeier wrote, “For many observers, Madeleine Albright personified the newfound 
confidence and ambition that came to characterize the second Clinton 
administration’s approach to the world.”822 
 
As shown in major speeches of the Clinton administration, it was clear that the 
Kosovo War involved a degree of humanitarian concern. In particular, the massacre 
at Racak, like the Srebrenica massacre in the case of Bosnia, became “the critical 
lever for those in the American government and in allied Western governments to 
move for military action against the Serbs”. It was viewed as “a sure sign that the 
worst of Bosnia would be repeated”.823 The United States and its allies were thus 
determined to fight for ending human suffering. For instance, Albright later recalled: 
 
My reasons were partly strategic: Europe was never going to be fully at peace as long as the Balkans 
were unstable, and the Balkans were never going to be stable as long as Milosevic was in power. My 
primary motive, however, was moral: I did not want to see innocent people murdered. NATO’s 
presence in Europe gave us the means to stop ethnic cleansing on that continent, and I hoped that by 
doing so we could help prevent similar atrocities elsewhere.824 
 
However, humanitarian concerns were not the only primary goal for the Clinton 
administration in Kosovo. As Republican Senator Slade Gorton of Washington 
argued, “If simply stopping a slaughter is a primary goal – and I believe that it is – 
there are far greater slaughters taking place in Sudan, in several countries in Africa, 
and in a number of other places around the world in which there has been no request 
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on the part of the administration to intervene”. Yet perhaps Senator Biden, the 
ranking Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, was right to counter 
that “the loss of a life in Kosovo and the loss of a life in Somalia have totally 
different consequences, in a Machiavellian sense, for the United States’ interests. If 
there is chaos in Europe, we have a problem; we are a European power.”825  
 
Again, in a similar way to the Bosnia situation, the reason for the administration’s 
intervention in Kosovo was not because there was any direct threat to US national 
security, but because there was a series of secondary interests which seemed to drive 
the administration into action.826 It was believed that stability in Europe was 
important for American interests. If the conflict in the Balkans continued, there 
would be other similar types of situations emerging in other parts of Europe. If there 
was an unstable part of Europe, the United States had to do something about it.827 
For instance, if the situation in Kosovo continued and large numbers of refugees 
emerged, it could explode into a wider war and destabilize the region. It could thus 
pose a threat to international peace and security. As Daniel Serwer said: 
 
The American became convinced that if Milosevic was successful in expelling the Albanians from 
Kosovo that would destabilize Macedonia and potentially lead to a chaotic war that would involve 
Greece, Bulgaria, Turkey. This is what I call the Holbrooke nightmare scenario. I think it was a very 
low probability, but it was possible and it would have been unhappy, and I think that was a major 
reason for the intervention. Of course the humanitarian factor existed, there were 800,000 people out 
of their homes, and you needed to get them back to their homes. But I think that the wider war aspect 
of the thing was really what drove American intervention.828 
 
Similarly, as Taylor Branch wrote in The Clinton Tapes: 
 
The outline of Clinton’s argument that Kosovo heightened all three danger points to the post-Cold War 
quest for a stable, democratic Europe. One was the potential collapse of democracy in Russia. Two 
was the stubborn conflict between Greece and Turkey. Three was the proven danger of secession and 
ethnic hatred in the Balkans. Only on the second was Clinton at all sanguine, citing history’s first 
cooperation between NATO members Greece and Turkey in relief efforts for Kosovo. In Russia, said 
the president, hard-line nationalists supported the Serb Milosevic, their fellow Slav, against all the 
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Kosovar minorities. Demonizing Yeltsin as a stooge of NATO, they mobilized Slavic fear and 
resentment behind authoritarian visions of a restored Russian empire.829 
 
Moreover, there were fears that continued wars and political instability in the 
Balkans would invite Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups to infiltrate the region.830 
As Albright described in her memoir, “If NATO had not acted, the Serb offensive 
would have permanently displaced more than half a million Kosovars, radicalizing 
many and creating a new source of long-term tension within Europe.” 831  In 
particular, during Clinton’s second term, terrorism was placed under a higher threat 
status. This kind of transnational threat was able to cross beyond old notions of 
political boundaries or national allegiances and allowed the few and the weak to 
challenge the mightiest of nations by taking advantage of new and constantly shifting 
global networks and virtual organizations.832  
 
To sum up, as Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O’Hanlon concluded: 
 
The United States is engaged there… because the stability and security of the region are of real US 
interest. These interests are partly humanitarian, but they are at least as much strategic. For decades, 
the United States deployed hundreds of thousands of troops to safeguard the security of Western 
Europe. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, it became possible to extend the stability and security 
that NATO countries long enjoyed to the rest of Europe – to build a Europe that was “whole and free 
(in President George Bush’s words) and “undivided, peaceful, and democratic” (as President Bill 
Clinton has urged). That is not just a noble sentiment but a vision with deep strategic meaning. Such a 
Europe is more likely to be a partner of the United States in meeting the many challenges of the global 
age and much less likely to pose a threat to US interests.833  
 
Therefore, it was an “undivided, peaceful, and democratic” Europe that was central 
to America’s interests. “Stability and decency in Kosovo were important to Europe, 
they were also important to Washington”.834 “Washington has been heavily invested 
in this effort ever since the United States entered World War II. That investment has 
paid off – in a stable, prosperous, and democratic partner in Western Europe”. And 
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hence, when a peaceful and democratic Europe was threatened by the prospect of 
organized violence in the Balkans, the United States, as the world’s only military 
superpower, still had to play its proper role as the alliance’s leader.835  
 
Ultimately, Clinton described Kosovo as an example of a policy in which America’s 
values and interests were intertwined, “It’s to our advantage to have a Europe that is 
peaceful and prosperous. And there is the compelling humanitarian case: if the US 
walks away from an atrocity like this where we can have an impact, then these types 
of situations will spread. The world is full of ethnic struggles, from Ireland to the 
Middle East to the Balkans. If we can convince people to bridge these tensions, 
we’ve served our interests as well as our values”.836  
 
Another key element in the US decision to intervene was NATO’s credibility. As 
James Goldgeier said, “The United States wanted to ensure that NATO continued to 
function effectively after the end of the Cold War, and even though this was not a 
mission that was a traditional mission, it did come to be seen as influencing the 
credibility of NATO.”837 In particular, NATO had just formed new partnerships -- 
with Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic --, and was due to celebrate its 50th 
anniversary. Consequently, if NATO had not acted to punish atrocities committed on 
its doorstep, the alliance’s credibility would certainly have been in doubt.  
 
Regardless of the diversity of their political cultures and historical relationships with 
the Balkans, NATO allies did find that they had a common interest in ending the 
Kosovo conflict. As James Steinberg stated:   
 
A prolonged conflict there would have had no natural boundaries. The allies had an interest in not 
seeing Kosovars driven from their land, across national borders into fragile new democracies that 
would be overwhelmed and destabilized by their presence. If NATO had not acted, Kosovo’s 
neighbors might have felt compelled to respond to this threat themselves, and a wider war might have 
begun. The allies clearly had an interest in preserving the stability of southeastern Europe – and 
protecting the strides it has made away from a violent past toward a more democratic future. And the 
allies had an interest in maintaining the unity and credibility of NATO, which would have been 
impossible, had the alliance done nothing in the face of unspeakable atrocities committed at its 
doorstep – a lesson learned in Bosnia. One can dispute whether these interests justified NATO’s 
decision to use force. But one cannot dispute that these interest exist.838  
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For the United States, a NATO that was united and held together was crucial.839 It 
was important that NATO not only “still existed as a functioning, relevant alliance” 
in the aftermath of the Cold War, but also adapted to meet 21st century challenges. 
For example, Albright argued that if NATO had not acted, it “would have been left 
divided and questioning its own relevance as the twenty-first century dawned”. This 
could show not only the distinctive characteristic of the United States as a leader of 
NATO but also the reassurance of US dominance, providing for the new democracies 
in central and southeastern Europe.840 If the United States did not take any action 
over the Kosovo conflict, “the new democracies of central and southeastern Europe 
would feel abandoned by the West, left to fend for themselves in their search for 
security”.841  
 
Therefore, both in Bosnia and Kosovo, the United States was within a NATO 
mandate, as Bugajski said, 
 
… it [wouldn’t] just be an American mission, it would be a joint European-American mission. So you 
know it was…of all the wars I would say, of all the conflicts for America to be involved in, that made 
most sense, for restoring the transatlantic relationship, restoring stability in Europe, even 
demonstrating I would say to the moderate Islamic world that here we are defending an Islamic 
population in the middle of Europe, the same with the Kosovar Albanians, who were mostly Muslim. 
So, yes, I mean there’s always a choice but I think this made most sense I think in the nineties.842 
 
Finally, as Goldgeier argued, neither the “Bosnia [nor the] Kosovo [intervention] was 
done for American national security interests because [those conflicts] could have 
gone on and wouldn’t have had any impact on American national security”. However, 
in comparison to Bosnia, the “Kosovo [intervention] really was done for 
humanitarian reasons”.843  
 
Conclusion 
During the early stages of the decision-making on Kosovo, Secretary of State 
Albright was enthusiastic in mobilizing a strong domestic and international response 
in case Kosovo would lead to a repetition of Bosnia. Albright’s approach to the 
Kosovo crisis was to “back diplomacy with force”; a view strongly shared by NATO 
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supreme commander General Clark. However, similarly to his first term, the second 
Clinton foreign policy team was divided. Whereas Albright was in favour of using 
NATO airpower against Milosevic, Secretary of Defense Cohen shared General 
Shelton’s lack of enthusiasm for any US military involvement. Despite sharing 
Albright’s view, President Clinton was distracted by the Monica Lewinsky affair and 
impeachment proceedings, and therefore, was aloof from the policy-making process. 
On the whole, it seemed that “mid-1998 was not a good time to push ahead too 
aggressively in the Balkans. As the Lewinsky scandal unfolded and impeachment 
became a real possibility, both Berger and the president were tiptoeing through a 
potential minefield. The last thing they wanted was military intervention in 
Kosovo”.844  
 
Meanwhile, Kosovo was overshadowed by other events, such as the president’s trips 
to China and Africa and later a confrontation with bin Laden’s Al Qaeda. Moreover, 
having largely used ground troops to implement the Dayton Peace Agreement in 
Bosnia, Congress and European allies were reluctant to deploy additional forces to 
the Balkans. Besides, a majority of NATO countries did not want to take any action 
without a UNSC resolution. On the other hand, the emergence of the KLA also had 
an influence on the willingness of the US military and NATO alliance to take any 
military action against the Serbs. Thus, it was clear that the administration would not 
take the Christmas warning into action in response to the Kosovo crisis. Finally, the 
diplomatic efforts succeeded in NATO’s authorization of force and thus resulted in 
the October Agreement. 
 
When the fighting escalated again in late December of 1998 and the Racak massacre 
occurred in January 1999, the decision-making process entered a new stage. This 
time Albright was determined to forge a consensus within the administration. She 
and her team members developed an approach which linked in the threat of air 
strikes to encourage negotiations and sought for a political settlement that provided 
the Kosovar Albanians with self-government. Also, they supported a NATO-led 
peacekeeping force, with the possibility of US participation, to guarantee security for 
Kosovar Albanians. Again, the military was dubious about Albright’s proposal, 
particularly with regard to US troops’ participation. But it seemed that no one could 
come up with an alternative, and therefore, Clinton approved the strategy.  
 
However, the European allies still worried about NATO sending troops to Kosovo 
without American participation. In order to strengthen NATO unity, in particular in 
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the face of its upcoming NATO’s 50th anniversary, the Clinton administration 
announced that US ground troops would participate in a peacekeeping force if there 
was a political settlement. Having Washington’s commitment and Russia, Serbia’s 
traditional ally, on board, NATO was ready to back the strategy of using force. The 
diplomatic effort brought the warring parties, the Serbs and the Albanians, to the 
bargaining table at Rambouillet. Despite facing the threat of NATO air strikes, the 
Serbs refused to sign a settlement because they could not allow NATO forces to enter 
their sovereign soil. As a consequence, the diplomatic efforts for the Kosovo crisis 
came to an end. Some argued that the Rambouillet negotiations were bounded to fail 
because NATO’s position was too inflexible. Yet others argued that the Rambouillet 
conference at least showed the Clinton administration’s determination to end the 
Kosovo crisis.  
 
At the final stage of decision-making, it was obvious that Clinton was fully engaged 
in bringing peace to Kosovo. He demonstrated that a massive humanitarian crisis in 
Kosovo threatened US interests and challenged US values. In other words, for the 
Clinton administration, Kosovo was a region of strategic importance to the United 
States and Europe. The United States had a strong interest in standing up against 
Milosevic’s ethnic cleansing campaign as well as preventing a wider war in Europe. 
The voting outcome of both Houses and the polling data revealed that the country 
was supportive of military intervention, with the belief that the United States had a 
moral obligation to end human suffering in Kosovo.  
 
When NATO began the bombing campaign on 24 March, Clinton, in two speeches to 
the nation, stressed again that the determination to end the humanitarian crisis in 
Kosovo was a moral imperative. It was in order to uphold American values. 
Moreover, it was also an act on behalf of geopolitical interests, since Kosovo’s 
strategic importance in the Balkans and “a stable, peaceful and democratic Europe” 
were very much in the US national interest. In addition, the experience of Bosnia, 
NATO’s credibility, and American leadership were also reasons that motivated the 
administration to get involved in the Kosovo conflict.  
 
Again, in the case of Kosovo, it was clear that humanitarian interests alone were not 
sufficient to justify sending military forces to save lives in distant lands. It was 
combined with a series of secondary interests such as the stability and security of 
Europe, NATO’s credibility, and the necessity for American leadership, which 
eventually drove the Clinton administration to intervene in Kosovo. 
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Chapter 7. 
Conclusion 
 
The analysis presented in this thesis has identified a number of key motivations for 
US foreign policy interventions in the 1990s. As shown by the US intervention in 
Somalia in 1992, the desire to pursue a moral and humanitarian agenda formed one 
of these motivations. However, the subsequent history of the intervention – 
especially following the ‘Black Hawk Down’ incident – indicated the limits of 
morality-based humanitarian intervention. The Rwandan non-intervention appeared 
to confirm that American lives would not be risked without any compelling national 
interest being at stake. The Haitian intervention, as we have seen, was clearly linked 
to such a compelling interest. In the case of an island so close to the United States, 
non-intervention in Haiti really would have called America’s regional credibility into 
question.  
 
Bosnia and Kosovo, of course, were lands far more distant than Haiti. Direct, 
compelling US national security interest in the Balkans was difficult to find. We have 
seen, however, that secondary interests (such as affirming the post-Cold War 
credibility of NATO) were present in the Balkans. Experiences in Bosnia and Kosovo 
appeared to demonstrate the possibility of intervention in conditions in which 
humanitarian motives were strengthened by secondary geopolitical concerns. The 
concluding chapter of this thesis applies an ethical realist theoretical framework to 
the evaluation of Clinton’s foreign policy on humanitarian intervention. The 
implications of this analysis will be examined in terms of future US foreign policy.  
 
7.1 Moral Leadership  
In the case of humanitarian interventions, the Clinton administration made it clear 
that American leadership was part of the reason for action. Recognizing the 
American military’s unparalleled fighting ability in his speech at the National 
Defense University, Anthony Lake acknowledged that the United States could not 
escape from its responsibility as a superpower. Even though the United States should 
not be the world’s policeman and could not answer every emergency call [911] 
around the globe, Lake emphasized that the United States, as the world’s most 
powerful nation, would not simply sit on the sidelines when millions of human lives 
were threatened if it could make a difference. That is to say, the United States had a 
responsibility to act.845  
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This seemed to support the ethical realists’ assertion that human beings are willing to 
do good in relation to others, rather than simply considering their own concerns and 
interests. Moreover, perhaps a state might not have the right to intervene in the 
affairs of others but have a responsibility to save strangers in suffering – for common 
humanity. For example, in the cases of Somalia and the Balkans, the United States 
“had the capacity to intervene and stop those atrocities and because the cost wouldn’t 
be extremely high there [was] a moral impetus to help, which [was] completely 
unconnected to national interest”.846 
 
In particular, in the case of the Balkans, NATO’s credibility was a major concern for 
the Clinton White House. As a leader of the transatlantic organization, the United 
States had a responsibility to take the initiative. In his speech to the nation on the 
implementation of the peace agreement in Bosnia, President Clinton argued against 
isolationist assertions that the United States should step back from the 
responsibilities of leadership with the end of the Cold War. He stressed that there was 
still the need for American leadership in many global issues: 
 
As the cold war gives way to the global village, our leadership is needed more than ever because 
problems that start beyond our borders can quickly become problems within them. We’re all 
vulnerable to the organized forces of intolerance and destruction; terrorism; ethnic, religious, and 
regional rivalries; the spread of organized crime and weapons of mass destruction and drug trafficking. 
Just as surely as fascism and communism, these forces also threaten freedom and democracy, peace 
and prosperity. And they, too, demand American leadership.847    
 
Hence, he demonstrated that the case in Bosnia was an example in which American 
leadership was required. Clinton stated: 
    
When America’s partnerships are weak and our leadership is in doubt, it undermines our ability to 
secure our interests and to convince others to work with us. If we do maintain our partnerships and our 
leadership, we need not act alone. As we saw in the Gulf war and in Haiti, many other nations who 
share our goals will also share our burdens. But when America does not lead, the consequences can be 
very grave, not only for others but eventually for us as well.848 
 
Similarly, Deputy National Security Adviser Sandy Berger remarked that “American 
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leadership was essential to put out the fire and stop the slaughter”.849 
 
To sum up, as mentioned before, the primary reason why the United States 
eventually decided to intervene in the Balkans was transatlantic leadership and then 
indirectly global leadership. It was clear that the crisis in the Balkans was not a 
matter of core national security interest to the United States. Yet as it did matter to 
America’s European allies, the United States had to pay attention to what they 
thought was of interest, particularly if the United States wanted to exercise leadership 
within the alliance. Therefore, “it was [this] kind of secondary national interest that 
eventually led the US to take the role”.850 So the United States did have ‘the dog’ in 
this fight, and it was America’s alliance partners, which goes against the phrase “we 
don’t have a dog in this fight” by former Secretary of State James Baker.  
 
Again, as Gary J. Schmitt (Executive Director of the neo-conservative Project for the 
New American Century in 1997-2005) maintained, “One could argue [that the 
intervention was] not strictly speaking in the US national interest narrowly defined, 
but in terms of the US position as leader it was in our interest.”851 This seems to 
support the ethical realist assertion that the conduct of international affairs by the 
United States should consider and respect the views and interests of other nations, 
and that powerful states should have responsibilities and exercise leadership with 
ethical obligations. In addition, it seems that this ethical realist spirit is particularly 
essential when applied to their relations with alliances.  
 
Moreover, it is worth noting that US-led humanitarian interventions in the Balkans 
led not only to the alleviation of human suffering but also to the United States 
improving its relations with the other intervening countries. Tomicah Tillemann, a 
professional staffer who specialised in the Balkans on the Committee on Foreign 
Relations of United States Senate stated: 
 
By virtue of the intervention  ... we were able to save many lives. And if you go to Bosnia these days, 
despite the fact that it is a predominantly Muslim country, the United States is very popular in most 
corners of the country, and the people of Bosnia, particularly the Bosniac population, I think feel a 
great debt of gratitude to the United States for what we undertook there.852 
 
The same story happened in Kosovo. He concluded:   
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I don’t think there is a Muslim country in the world at this point where the United States is more 
popular than in Kosovo. … the big street going down into the city is named after Bill Clinton; there 
are American flags and Statues of Liberty all over the place.853 
 
Furthermore, when being asked whether the United States found it was worth putting 
a lot of effort into Bosnia and Kosovo, Tillemann responded: 
 
We would say absolutely it was worth it and we’ve come a long way… we feel that things are moving 
in a very good direction, and we have very good relations with every country in the region including, 
and this one is particularly important, with Serbia, and the United States went to war with Serbia not 
that long ago, and today… we have friends throughout the Serbian government and people who we 
work closely with.854 
 
These illustrations show that a foreign policy with an ethical dimension can help a 
state to enhance good relations with other states. In this case, it is in return for the 
support of American capitalism in the former communist countries, which are 
described as “secondary benefits”.855 As Lake remarked on US military achievement 
in his speech at the National Defense University, “We should always keep in mind 
that the force of our example bolsters our leadership in the world and enhances our 
ability to achieve our interests.”856  
 
On the other hand, as far as overall international relations are concerned, if powerful 
states have good relations with other states, it would of course contribute to 
promoting international order. Again, such international order would in return be of 
benefit to the powerful states. For example, John Mearsheimer argues that “great 
powers can transcend realist logic by working together to build an international order 
that fosters peace and justice. World peace, it would appear, can only enhance a 
state’s prosperity and security”.857 For Jean Bethke Elshtain, American stability and 
international stability are closely linked. To put it more precisely, “as the world’s 
superpower, America bears the responsibility to help guarantee that international 
stability”. Elshtain has asserted, “We, the powerful, must respond to attacks against 
persons who cannot defend themselves because they, like us, are members of states, 
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or would-be states, whose primary obligation is to protect the lives of those citizens 
who inhabit their polities.” In Elshtain’s view, it is in America’s long-term national 
interest to foster and sustain an international society of equal regard; and thus, 
“strategic necessity and moral requirements here meet”.858 
 
Also, Mearsheimer demonstrated that there are various strategies for a state’s 
survival, such as shifting the balance of power in its favour or preventing other states 
from shifting against it. Nevertheless, he did not indicate how states should act to 
gain and maintain such power and what kind of strategies they could employ to 
maximize their share of world power.859 My research would suggest a strategy of 
keeping the ethical realist spirit, that is to say, of acting responsibly. This study thus 
supports the Clinton administration’s strategy of enlargement, as mentioned in 
Chapter 4, that “America wouldn’t be using its power to keep a rival in check; it 
would use its power to expand its circle of friends and spread its values”. Although 
this thesis agrees with Joshua Muravchik’s assertion that it is important to think 
ahead about possible future enemies, it argues that it is far more important to 
preserve friendships at a time of peace.  
 
This has an important implication for US foreign policy, as the second term of 
Clinton’s presidency gradually acknowledged borderless threats as new challenges to 
the United States. In dealing with these issues that transcend national borders, the 
United States needs to work with other states. As President Clinton put it: “Because 
the post-Cold War world was increasingly interdependent, our country could not 
afford to withdraw from the world’s problems; neither could we solve them on our 
own. Instead we had to strengthen the institutions -- and habits -- of international 
cooperation.”860 Ironically, despite the fact that the notion of an indispensable nation 
and the tendency towards unilateralism in his second term reflected Clinton’s 
newfound international confidence, it nevertheless became a dangerous signal that an 
overly-confident power without humility would turn out to be an arrogant power. For 
example, John Ikenberry observed, “Some intellectuals in the West even suggest that 
an arrogant America brought the terrorism of 11 September on itself.”861  
 
In a hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, 
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Senator Robert Byrd of West Virginia has stated, by referring to Byron’s view of the 
ruins of Rome in his Childe Harold’s Pilgrimage, 
 
“There is the moral of human history. It is but the same rehearsal of the past. First, freedom, then, the 
glory, wealth, corruption, vice, and barbarism at last. History, with all her volumes vast, hath but one 
page” – meaning that history repeats itself… Why does history repeat itself? Because human nature 
has never changed since Adam and Eve were created and placed in the Garden of Eden. Adam, made 
in the image of his Creator. Human nature has never changed. Consequently, we can expect that 
history will have a way of repeating itself.862 
 
Senator Byrd further pointed out: “We are right in the center of that page of history. 
That is where we are. And we should heed the lesson.”863 This reminds us that as 
modern ethical realist George Kennan warned during the Cold War, “We are going to 
have to recognize that a large proportion of the sources of our troubles and dangers 
lies outside the Soviet challenge, such as it is, and some of it even within 
ourselves.”864 Therefore, it could be argued that the decline of a powerful state 
sometimes results not from external threat or defeat but from self-defeating 
behaviours, usually beginning with moral destruction within a state itself. 
 
Meanwhile, NATO’s intervention in Kosovo “without any of the checks and balances 
provided by US law, international agreements, or even the realpolitik of the Security 
Council” has led many analysts to draw “a direct line between Clinton’s handling of 
Kosovo and the way the George W. Bush administration approached the world after 
the 9/11 attacks”. 865  As mentioned before, in dealing with global issues that 
transcend national barriers, the United States needs to work with allies and friends, 
particularly in the war against terror. For instance, John Ikenberry has asserted, “To 
fight terrorism effectively, the United States needs partners: the military and 
logistical support of allies, intelligence sharing and the practical cooperation of 
frontline states.”866 However, the unilateral military intervention in Iraq has severely 
damaged not only America’s moral authority and international image but also its 
alliance relationships. To borrow Joseph Nye’s words, “Failure to pay proper respect 
to the opinion of others and to incorporate a broad conception of justice into our 
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national interest will eventually come to hurt us.”867  
 
As former US Ambassador to the UN Donald F McHenry commented: 
 
9/11 proved that you can be as strong economically and politically and militarily, and yet you are 
vulnerable and you are dependent upon the co-operation of others. You cannot simply go around 
throwing your weight. Now unfortunately we didn’t learn that lesson, otherwise we wouldn’t be in 
Iraq. The United States can seek to lead but it can’t dominate if it wants a world in which it is 
respected and where it respects itself, and it has to depend upon the co-operation of others, even to 
protect itself…that instead of welcoming the co-operation of the international community after 9/11 
we embarked on Iraq, and basically told the rest of the international community you do it my way or 
we’ll do it alone.868 
 
Moreover, as Tim Dunne and Brian Schmidt argue, “A costly military intervention 
followed by a lengthy occupation in the Middle East has weakened the USA’s ability 
to contain the rising threat from China. In short, the Bush Presidency has not 
exercised power in a responsible and sensible manner.”869 
 
This was why Barack Obama suggested renewing American leadership, as the war in 
Iraq had led the world to lose trust in American purposes and American principles. 
Obama called for a retrieval of leadership rooted in the fundamental insight of 
Roosevelt, Truman, and Kennedy. He argued: 
 
One [thing] is truer now than ever before: the security and well-being of each and every American 
depend on the security and well-being of those who live beyond our borders. The mission of the 
United States is to provide global leadership grounded in the understanding that the world shares a 
common security and a common humanity.870 
 
In Obama’s view, when it came to the use of military force “in circumstances beyond 
self-defense in order to provide for the common security that underpins global 
stability – to support friends, participate in stability and reconstruction operations, or 
confront mass atrocities”, the United States should “make every effort to garner the 
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clear support and participation of others”. The best example of this was President 
George H. W. Bush who led the international effort to oust Saddam Hussein from 
Kuwait in 1991. However, it seems that the United States has in recent times 
forgotten the lesson of the Gulf War, so that it suffers grave consequences in the 
context of the conflict in Iraq. Thus, for Obama, in order to “rebuild the alliances, 
partnerships, and institutions necessary to confront common threats and enhance 
common security”, it is now definitely necessary to renew American leadership in the 
world.871 
 
Overall, this study suggests that the role for the United States in the aftermath of the 
Cold War should be as a responsible power. Plus, if the United States acts responsibly, 
it helps to consolidate its standing as a moral leader. This thesis thus argues against 
Michael Mandelbaum’s description of the Clinton administration’s humanitarian 
intervention as “social work”. But why is moral leadership important? In Nye’s 
words, “If a state can make its power seem legitimate in the eyes of others, it will 
encounter less resistance to its wishes.”872 This research suggests that it is only when 
a state acts ethically and responsibly that its power is made to appear legitimate in 
the eyes of others.  
 
7.2 Pragmatic Foreign Policy 
On the other hand, it is important to note that in his speech at the National Defense 
University, Lake also emphasized that when it came to operations other than war, the 
goals must be “practical and limited”. As mentioned in Chapter 2, because a state 
owes “a fiduciary duty” to its citizens, a state leader has no responsibility more 
solemn than to decide when to put its armed forces in harm’s way. Thus, Lake made 
it clear that the use of American force would be for one purpose: “To protect and 
promote American interests.”873 However, the emergent issue of ethnic conflict in 
the post-Cold War era posed new challenges to the only superpower in the world. 
The United States was in between “the heartless-ness of doing nothing in the face of 
human suffering and the callousness of making promises it cannot keep”.874  
 
Thus, Lake divided American interests into three categories. The first involved a 
direct attack on America’s soil, people, and allies, which was to override the 
importance of American national security and survival. Under these circumstances, 
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Lake claimed, “We will do whatever it takes to defend these vital interests, including 
the use of decisive military force – with others where we can, and alone when we 
must…” The second comprised of situations that did not threaten America’s vital 
interests, but still affected American interests. For instance, the conflict in Bosnia 
jeopardized stability in a region that was of vital importance to the United States. 
Because the threats might be less clear and American interests are less immediate in 
this kind of case, the United States should make a careful assessment before using 
force. As Lake stated: “Before we send our troops into situations where our interests 
are less than vital, they need a clear and achievable mission, the means to prevail, 
and a strategy for withdrawal that is based on the military mission’s goals.”  
 
The third category involved primarily humanitarian interests; the military might not 
be the best to address such concerns. Relief organizations may be overwhelmed in 
the case of humanitarian disasters such as those in Somalia or Rwanda.875 These 
arguments go a long way to explaining why the Clinton administration intervened in 
Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo, but did not send US troops to end the Rwandan genocide. 
As a result, this study concludes that the administration’s foreign policy on 
humanitarian intervention did follow a guiding principle. Overall, the 
administration’s approach to the humanitarian intervention issue was, in Lake’s term, 
“pragmatic neo-Wilsonian”. This thus implies a pragmatic conception of morality 
articulated in ethical realism.  
 
Perhaps one might expect the world’s only superpower to intervene in every case of 
humanitarian crisis in the name of common humanity or universal moral principles; 
or one might accuse of the United States of being hypocritical. However, ethical 
realists view the world as it is. Because the world is still divided into different 
sovereign states, statespeople are primarily responsible and accountable for their own 
citizens and for national survival. As Hans Morgenthau argued, “As long as the 
world is politically organized into nations, the national interest is indeed the last 
word in world politics. When the national state will have been replaced by another 
mode of organization, foreign policy must then protect the interest in survival of that 
new organization.”876  
 
This was why Morgenthau attempted to distinguish the relation between universal 
moral principles and political action. He maintained that “universal moral principles 
cannot be applied to the actions of states in their abstract universal formulation”. 
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Instead, the state itself should be “inspired by the moral principle of national 
survival”.877 Also, George Kennan attempted to draw a clear distinction between 
state morality and the morality of ordinary men and women. He argued, 
“Government is an agent, not a principal. Its primary obligation is to the interests of 
the national society it represents, not to the moral impulses that individual elements 
of that society may experience”. As a result, “the interests of the national society for 
which government has to concern itself are basically those of its military security, the 
integrity of its political life and the well-being of its people”.878  
 
Thus, in such a divided world, “a wise leadership will preach the joys of 
selectivity”879 and one can hardly expect that a state would send its troops to distant 
lands for only humanitarian concerns without there being any further interest 
involved. Even when the state decides to intervene to save human lives beyond its 
borders, its policy decisions must be made after careful calculations and the 
consequences of the actions ought to be fully weighed. Take the case of Bosnia - it 
was not until the success of the Croatian offensive to retake the Krajina region that 
the United States became engaged and willing to take the lead. The Bosnian War 
involved three warring parties, something which made outside intervention 
especially difficult. The abandonment of the Croatian Serbs by Milosevic and the 
Croatian success on the battlefield changed not only the balance of power in the 
region but also the psychology of all the parties.  
 
Besides, prior to the successful Croatian offensive on the ground, Washington’s 
diplomatic efforts had successfully brought the Muslims and Croats together to 
establish a joint Muslim-Croat federation. As the changing military situation 
engineered by the successful Croatian ground offensive took a dramatic turn in the 
Balkan game, the Clinton administration identified an opportunity to initiate the 
endgame strategy. Moreover, it is important to note that in the cases of intervention 
of Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo, the Clinton administration was engaged in diplomatic 
efforts and sought a political solution first, with the use of military force always the 
last resort. It could be argued that Clinton’s foreign policy on humanitarian 
interventions was rooted in a realist calculation of consequences. This exemplifies 
the ethical realist assertions that prudence leads to a guideline for shaping goals and 
deciding on actions (especially with regard to the launching of military operations) 
and that an international strategy must be worked on achievable results rather than 
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good intentions.  
 
Overall, this research concludes that the Clinton administration’s foreign policy on 
humanitarian intervention was essentially selective and thus, was coherent in its 
policy-making. From the administration’s experiences of dealing with humanitarian 
intervention issues, it could also be concluded that an ethical foreign policy is not an 
abstract moral conception; it needs to be conducted on the basis of a prudent 
calculation of the consequences and of a case-by-case approach. That is why 
Edmund Burke emphasized that “pure metaphysical abstraction” did not belong to 
any moral or political subject. The lines of morality on political subjects admit of 
exceptions and demand modifications. “These exceptions and modifications are not 
made by the process of logic, but by the rules of prudence. Prudence is not only the 
first rank of the virtues political and moral, but she is the director, the regulator, the 
standard of them all”.880 Morgenthau further reinforced the importance of prudence 
by saying, “There can be no political morality without prudence, that is, without 
consideration of the political consequences of seemingly moral action.”881  
 
Also, Alastair J. H. Murray argued that “moral principles must be realised as far as 
possible in action, but always in line with the canons of prudence”. Therefore, 
“realism’s principal concern is not with the exposition of a highly complex 
explanatory theory, but with the interface with ethics and politics”.882 In other words, 
the conduct of foreign policy with an ethical agenda needs to be followed from a 
“prudent consideration of interest, not from the direct application of morality or 
idealism”.883 Ultimately, as Anatol Lieven and John Hulsman suggest, “US officials 
must both pursue American interests and seek to set those interests within a 
framework that will be beneficial for humanity in general… Ethical realism in 
general would help US policymakers to create a hierarchy of US interests after 
deciding which ones are vital and which ones can be adapted in order to 
accommodate the vital interests of other states.”884 
 
In conclusion, this research recommends an ethical realist approach to foreign policy 
decision-making on those agendas associated with an ethical dimension. The virtues 
of responsibility and prudence, which constitute the philosophical root of ethical 
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realism, provide a compromise between abstract moralism and pure realpolitik, and a 
solution of the tension between ethics and politics.  
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Appendix – 1: 
Interviewing Questions 
 
1. How did the United States perceive its national interest in the Balkans and define 
its relationship with US national security, especially in post-Cold War period?  
 
2. How much did the United States understand the cause of the Bosnian and Kosovar 
conflict and its implications for international relations and international order? 
 
3. Why did the administration intervene in the Balkans? Was it because national 
security issue? Or was it because foreign policy agenda, in particular with regard to 
Clinton’s ‘assertive humanitarianism’ foreign policy agenda ? 
 
4. How do you think the influence of the actors of foreign policy team on foreign 
policy decision-making? 
 
5. From your perspective, what kind of domestic factors did influence and motivate 
the Clinton administration decision-making on humanitarian interventions in Bosnia 
and Kosovo? For example, Vietnam Syndrome, Congress, media and public 
opinion..etc 
 
6. What did the role of morality in the process of decision-making? Did the pcitures 
of massacre reported by media (esp. CNN effect) stimulate moral conscience and 
moral sense of public opinion and policy-makers? 
 
7. How do you think American power changed following the collapse of the world in 
1990s? Did the issue of humanitarian intervention challenge the US foreign 
policy-making? Did the structural transformation in the international system and new 
international environment, for instance, globalization and information age, after the 
Cold War influence the role of US in international politics?  
 
8. How do you think the role of US leadership and its relationship with European 
allies played on these conflicts?  
 
9. Do you think, the US, as the only superpower in the post-Cold War era, should 
take moral responsibility to protect the interests of others? Esp. genocide and ethnic 
cleansing… 
 
 197
10. Should the interests of humanity be considered as a part of national interest and 
placed in the centre of policy-making?  
 
11. Why was the Clinton administration slow to respond to the Bosnian crisis but 
quick to respond to the Kosovo conflict? 
 
12. Of course, the US could not intervene in every case of humanitarian crisis. Does 
the US during the 1990s have any criteria or strategy for military interventions? For 
example, towards pragmatic foreign policy based on ‘cost/benefit analysis’? 
 
13. Can the United States keep its position of leadership in the international order if 
it does not act in ways which are consisent with its shared values? 
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Appendix – 2: 
Transcript of the interview with Daniel P. Serwer 
 
1. How did the United States perceive its national interest in the Balkans and define 
its relationship with US national security, especially in post-Cold War period? 
 
James Baker in the beginning of the 90s said we had no dog in that fight. He was 
right, there are no vital American interests at stake in the Balkans. The trouble was, 
that there was an accumulation of secondary interests, not primary interests but 
secondary, having to do with the NATO alliance, holding it together, having to do 
with the CNN effect, the impact on the Muslim population in the Balkans. It was a 
series of secondary interests that accumulated to the point that we might not have a 
dog in that fight but the Europeans did and we were gonna have to help out. 
  
2. How much did the United States understand the cause of the Bosnian and 
Kosovar conflict and its implications for international relations and international 
order? 
 
Well I mean different people understood things in different ways but I would say this, 
that we certainly understood, correctly I think, that this was not about ancient hatreds, 
it wasn’t about…it was about people wanting to stay in power and using ethnic strife 
to do it, and we certainly understood that. I think we also understood, and this is very 
important, that if it continued, especially in Bosnia, that what you were gonna get 
was the ethnic cleansing of the Muslims from the Serbian territory and from the 
Croat territory, and you would end up with what we referred to as a rump Muslim 
state, non viable rump Muslim state, which would be a platform for Iranian terrorism 
in Europe, those were the words we used many times to describe this problem. A 
non-viable rump Muslim state, Islamic state, that would be a platform for Iranian 
terrorism in Europe. Terrorism in the United States hadn’t been conceived of yet …, 
but terrorism in Europe had been, and there were good reasons to fear that the 
Iranians were gaining a foothold in Bosnia because they were supplying the Bosnians 
with weapons and we in fact were allowing them to do that. 
 
3. Why did the administration intervene in the Balkans? Was it because national 
security issue? Or was it because foreign policy agenda, in particular with regard 
to Clinton’s ‘assertive humanitarianism’ foreign policy agenda ? 
 
And the reason we intervened, more than anything else, more I think even than the 
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humanitarian considerations, was to prevent the creation of this Islamic state…. it 
wasn’t a primary vital American interest, it wasn’t the United States that was really at 
risk from the creation of this Islamic state in Bosnia, it was Europe that was at risk. 
But, you know, it was right after the Cold War, we still believed that our security and 
European security were very closely tied. I don’t think it had anything to do with 
assertive humanitarianism, I don’t believe that. I don’t even believe that the Kosovo 
intervention had anything to do with that. The Kosovo intervention, Bosnia, I mean 
there were humanitarian considerations, no question about that, but it wasn’t an 
agenda…President Clinton …. waited three and a half years before doing what he 
had promised to do during his first campaign which was to bomb the Serbs when 
they attacked and then Sarajevo. But he did that mainly because Senator Dole was 
criticizing him in the Presidential campaign for failing to do it, three and a half years 
after he’d promised it. So it wasn’t Clinton’s ‘assertive humanitarianism’ foreign 
policy, that’s conservative claptrap. Just not true. 
 
4. How do you think the influence of the actors of foreign policy team on foreign 
policy decision-making? 
 
……. the trouble was that the circumstances on the ground changed very 
dramatically during the summer, so that by August, early September, the federation, 
well at the time of the ceasefire and I can’t give you a precise date for that, you’ll 
have to look that up, the federation controlled 66% of the territory. Now frankly I 
believe that during that summer somebody should have gone back to the President 
and said Mr President you had a nice peace plan but circumstances on the ground 
have changed, the guys we’ve been supporting for three and a half years are winning, 
let’s see if they can win. Nobody did that. And I think that was Holbrook’s 
responsibility to do that and he didn’t do it. 
 
5. From your perspective, what kind of domestic factors did influence and motivate 
the Clinton administration decision-making on humanitarian interventions in 
Bosnia and Kosovo? For example, Vietnam Syndrome, Congress, media and 
public opinion..etc 
 
Well, you know, I think public opinion has its impact, I mean you know in a 
democratic society, you know, Senator Dole starts getting headlines, Dole criticizes 
Clinton for not carrying out what he promised in the Balkans and there’s an impact. 
And I don’t think there is any question that it was Dole’s headlines that summer that 
really pushed things ahead. Holbrook never mentions that in his book. I think 
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Americans were kinda fed up with the war, I think they found what happened in 
Srebrenica disgusting, and I think Holbrook was determined to try to demonstrate 
that American power could be used effectively to intervene abroad, he was very 
concerned about, you know, he was, in Dick’s mind Vietnam was ever-present, you 
know, and it was a failure of the use of American power and he wanted to 
demonstrate, he says this in the introduction to his book, that this obsessed him, the 
need to demonstrate the effective use of American power in a good cause and so 
Vietnam was very much on his mind. You know, I think there was a feeling that, you 
know, it’s amazing when you think about it today, that what was going on in Bosnia 
was regarded as the most important problem in the world at that time, those were 
happy days compared to today. Today we’ve got much bigger problems, but we had 
relatively few problems then. 
 
6. What did the role of morality in the process of decision-making? Did the pictures 
of massacre reported by media (esp. CNN effect) stimulate moral conscience and 
moral sense of public opinion and policy-makers? 
 
Yes I mean the moral dimension was always there but frankly it was there every day 
for people who worked in the State Department, I mean it wasn’t, you know, just 
because, the fall of Srebrenica had a real impact in the State Department, that was a 
very depressing moment and people really felt that we had to do something. So moral 
conscience I think did have an impact but, you know, when it came to listing the 
reasons for intervention, preventing the formation of a rump Islamic state that would 
be a platform for Iranian terrorism in Europe was very high on the list, and you’ll 
find if you get the declassified memos of that period you’ll find that phrase dozens 
and dozens of times. 
 
7. How do you think American power changed following the collapse of the world 
in 1990s? Did the issue of humanitarian intervention challenge the US foreign 
policy-making? Did the structural transformation in the international system and 
new international environment, for instance, globalization and information age, 
after the Cold War influence the role of US in international politics? 
 
Well. There was certainly a feeling that America, if it wanted to do something about 
Bosnia, about Kosovo, it could do it. It just had to mobilize the power that it 
inherently had, and this was where Holbrook was amazingly effective because it’s 
not, you know, everybody comes to Washington and thinks that there’s a lot of power 
in Washington and then when you get here you can’t find it, where is it? Who has it? 
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And the answer is it’s very divided, it’s divided between the President and Congress, 
it’s divided between two houses of Congress, it’s divided between the State 
Department and the Defence Department, it’s divided…economic power can’t be 
influenced so readily by the government, the whole economic world is insulated from 
government influence, so when you get here you realize my God there’s a lot of 
power but it’s all divided up into little packages and nobody has it all, so to use it 
effectively you have to get it all in one place, and that’s what Holbrook did, and 
that’s the brilliance of what he did, was that he managed to accumulate…Holbrook 
managed to accumulate the diplomatic, economic, political, military power and 
exercise it all in one place, he had it all in his hands, and that’s how he got the 
Dayton agreements because the Dayton agreements were agreements that Milosevic 
wanted …and we would never have gotten them except for this really quite 
remarkable accumulation of power in Dick’s hands. Now globalisation, information 
age, Cold War influence, certainly the information age had a certain impact, I mean 
you had instant responses, I mean something happened on the ground in Srebrenica 
and you knew about it an hour later in Washington, I mean it’s absolutely incredibly 
velocity of information. And…but in many respects the Bosnian war was an old style 
war, I mean it was a war of attrition, it was a war against civilians, it was a war that 
was just as crude and as nasty as war can be, there was nothing modern about it at all 
really, I mean the Bosnian army had one tank, you know. Kosovo, there the situation 
was a little bit different, I think what happened with Kosovo was that, and again 
Holbrook was quite instrumental, but what happened with Kosovo was that the 
Americans became convinced that if Milosevic was successful in expelling the 
Albanians from Kosovo that that would destabilize Macedonia and potentially lead to 
a chaotic war that would involve Greece, Bulgaria, Turkey, this is what I call the 
Holbrook nightmare scenario. I think it was a very low probability, but it was 
possible and it would have been very unhappy, and I think that was a major reason 
for the intervention. Of course the humanitarian factor existed, there were, whatever, 
800,000 people out of their homes, you needed to get them back to their homes, but 
you know all of that accumulates, but I think that the wider war aspect of the thing 
was really what drove American intervention, and remember we didn’t intervene on 
the ground. We were planning to if we had to, but we were trying to avoid that kind 
of commitment. The Balkans when all is said and done, just didn’t cost the United 
States very much, I mean compare it with the Iraq War or the Afghanistan War and 
it’s nothing, it’s 25 billion dollars, no-one killed in Bosnia, no-one killed in Kosovo, 
an air war, it really was not a gigantic burden, it’s, again the right wing in criticizing 
Clinton says it was but it wasn’t … it was 25 billion over ten years, we’re now 
spending ten billion, twelve billion a month, there’s a big difference. 
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8. How do you think the role of US leadership and its relationship with European 
allies played on these conflicts?  
 
I mean the point is the Europeans were hopeless, they really were. I mean, today 
they’re in better shape but they’re still pretty hopeless….  NATO didn’t exist to go 
to war, it existed to prevent war, and it didn’t dawn on us for a long time that not 
everybody felt that way, that Milosevic had gone to war before we had and before we 
were ready to even contemplate it. The Europeans…sometimes Europeans say to me 
that we imposed at Dayton a European agreement, the Americans imposed a 
European style agreement because it provides for group rights and all sorts of…and 
they’re right. But the Europeans would never have gotten that, they weren’t capable 
of it. Too divided, too fragmented. Watch them on Kosovo now, I mean they’re very 
ineffective on Kosovo right now because they’re divided, they can’t get anybody to 
agree on anything. US leadership was vital. The end of the Bosnia war…the Bosnian 
war would not have ended the way it did if not for the United States, the Kosovo war 
would not have ended the way it did except for the United States. We were vital and 
no single European power was as important. The Germans and British were 
important but they were significantly less important than the United States. 
 
9. Do you think, the US, as the only superpower in the post-Cold War era, should 
take moral responsibility to protect the interests of others? Esp. genocide and 
ethnic cleansing.. 
 
Ah well. Yes and no, I mean it’s a very difficult thing to do. I mean you intervene, the 
world is still a world in which you intervene to protect your own interests not the 
interests of others, and Darfur is the classic case now. Should we be intervening, and 
if we did would it really help the situation or would it make it worse? A lot of tough 
issues surrounding that and we’ll see the recommendations…we have a task force on 
prevention of genocide that is working now, it’s chaired by Madeleine Albright and 
William Cohen and we’ll see what they recommend on this subject…. should we 
take moral responsibility to protect the interests of others? Well, I don’t think we 
should ignore the interests of others. The question is, how much responsibility do we 
take? 
 
10. Should the interests of humanity be considered as a part of national interest and 
placed in the centre of policy-making? 
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I wouldn’t place it at the centre of policy-making, but I think you have to consider 
always what the broader impacts are of…on interests that may not be in the first 
instance your own, I mean, you know in, you know, we’re not the only country that 
faces that problem. China faces that problem too, people are saying the Chinese 
shouldn’t be developing oil in Sudan when they’re doing these things in Darfur. Well, 
you know, they have to weigh those things, and it’s a question of how much should 
they weigh Darfur? And ultimately, you know, the problem with genocide is it 
probably will effect your interests at some point, so better to stop it earlier rather than 
later, and so, you know, you have to take it into consideration, I’m not sure that it 
should be the centrepiece of policy-making. 
  
11. Why was the Clinton administration slow to respond to the Bosnian crisis but 
quick to respond to the Kosovo conflict? 
 
That’s not true, it was even slower to respond to the Kosovo conflict than to the 
Bosnia conflict. The crisis in the Balkans started in Kosovo in 1989. We put the 
Kosovo conflict on ice, refused to deal with it while we dealt with Bosnia. But we 
came back to it, forced by what Milosevic was doing, we came back to it in 98/99. 
But it had been a problem since 89 and we knew that, so it’s not true that we were 
slow…that we were quick to respond to the Kosovo crisis. I think we were slow to 
respond to the Bosnian crisis and that’s because our primary vital interests were not 
involved. We were even slower to respond in Kosovo because there were even fewer 
interests involved. 
 
12. Of course, the US could not intervene in every case of humanitarian crisis. Does 
the US during the 1990s have any criteria or strategy for military interventions? 
For example, towards pragmatic foreign policy based on ‘cost/benefit analysis’? 
 
You’ll have to ask the administration. I think the answer is yes, I mean these guys 
will intervene wherever they think that they have to to counter possible terrorist 
attacks, that’s the current main criterion. Cost/benefit analysis, well, you know, when 
it comes to vital interests you don’t talk cost/benefits. 
 
13. Can the United States keep its position of leadership in the international order if 
it does not act in ways which are consisent with its shared values? 
 
I mean American leadership is…is, is on the one hand a fact of our lives, I mean it’s 
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just a big powerful country with a big military and big economy and…at the same 
time, looked at from, in the long-term perspective, World War II forwards, we are a 
declining power. And the question is how to manage our decline as safely as possible. 
Declining in the relative sense because we are a smaller percentage of the world’s 
economy, a smaller percentage of the world’s population, than, than we were at the 
end of World War II, obviously, everybody else was destroyed, we were intact. So it’s 
a question of managing declining relative power in a way that is safe for the United 
States, and the best way to do that in my view is to construct institutions that make 
the world safe for us. UN in many ways has been a disappointment but it has its 
functions. NATO doesn’t do what it used to do but it has its functions. There are, you 
know, in every region of the world whether it’s the, you know, the OAS and Latin 
America, or…almost every place actually, there was that cover story in The 
Economist the other day about this, the elaborate nature of our international 
institutions and they were criticizing it, but I think, you know, it may need 
rationalization but we can’t intervene in every place, we have to divide the labours 
with others. In order to do that you need some common understandings of when it’s 
appropriate, when it isn’t appropriate to intervene, you know, see you have to build 
institutions for that purpose. You can’t, you can’t just ignore everything that’s there 
and try to, you know, savagely defend your own interests by yourself, and that’s 
close to what this administration tried to do at the beginning, and got into a lot of 
trouble trying to do it. We are a declining power. The world, you know, frankly I 
think the world will regret that. It’s not avoidable, it’s the natural evolution of things. 
Powers are growing faster than we are and we will be less dominant than…we’ll be, 
we’ll be more dominant than we were during the Cold War because we had a single 
adversary, but we will be less dominant than we were at the end of, right at the end of 
World War II before the Cold War started, because we…there’s just no way we can 
maintain dominance and there’s no need to maintain dominance. I mean there’s no 
need to maintain dominance, I mean there’s no…you have to maintain a system that 
protects your interests, not just a capacity to unilaterally protect your interests, and, 
you know, we haven’t done very well in recent years at building that system, but 
there are elements like, you know, responsibility to protect and things of that sort that 
help to build a system of rules that, even the…even the indictment of Bashir in 
Sudan is part of the emerging rules. And it may not help in Sudan, it may cause us 
problems in Sudan, but it’s a warning to other guys like him, you will not get away 
with this. You need to think twice before you, you know, you chase two million 
people off their land and mistreat them the way you have. So I think there are new 
emerging rules. We haven’t played the leadership role we should in recent years in 
building that set of rules, but it’s still in our interests to do that, both candidates have 
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made it clear that they will return to an effort to do that. So I think we’re headed back 
to more multilateralism.  
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Appendix – 3:  
Transcript of the interview with James Goldgeier 
 
14. How did the United States perceive its national interest in the Balkans and define 
its relationship with US national security, especially in post-Cold War period?  
 
I don’t think there was a huge national interest in the Balkans, but to the extent that 
the United States felt that there was any kind of national interest I think you sort of 
had two things. One, a general notion that stability in Europe was important for 
American interests and if there was an unstable part of Europe then the United States 
needed to do something about that. And just fears that there would be other types of 
situations like that, that would emerge in other parts of Europe. And then the second 
was NATO, that the United States wanted to ensure that NATO continued to function 
effectively after the end of the Cold War, and even though this wasn’t a mission that 
was a traditional NATO mission, it did come to be seen as influencing the credibility 
of NATO, that there was this sense that if NATO couldn’t deal with something right 
there in Europe that it wasn’t going to be able to deal with things outside, that it 
wasn’t going to be relevant to the post-Cold War world. So I think both stability in 
Europe and NATO’s credibility were things that were important to people in 
Washington. 
 
15. How much did the United States understand the cause of the Bosnian and 
Kosovar conflict and its implications for international relations and international 
order? 
 
Well I think the United States saw both as caused by the same thing, which was a 
leader in … a leader in Yugoslavia who was threatening these populations, and that 
this was something the United States didn’t want to allow after the Cold War was 
over, that it thought it should do something about people like Milosevic. I don’t think 
from the US standpoint there was a lot of other thought given to who was doing what, 
I think it was pretty much there’s a bad guy in charge in Belgrade and the United 
States should do something about him. 
 
16. Why did the Clinton administration intervene in the Balkans? Was it because 
national security issue? Or was it because foreign policy agenda, in particular 
with regard to Clinton’s ‘assertive humanitarianism’ foreign policy agenda ? 
 
Well Bosnia and Kosovo are different, I mean in Bosnia the United States did not do 
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anything really for four years, the last couple of years of George HW Bush and then 
the first two years of Clinton, and the problem was that by 1995 the Clinton 
administration couldn’t accomplish anything else on foreign policy because it, 
because if you looked at the newspapers everything was about Bosnia and all the 
front page stories were about Bosnia, and I think they really felt like they had to deal 
with it in 1995 before the election year of 1996. So I think that in some cases for 
political reasons they finally decided that they had to act. In Kosovo I think the issue 
there was having been successful in Bosnia, and having the same guy in charge in 
Serbia doing something again, I think they felt like they couldn’t allow it to happen, 
that they had to, they had to do something. I do think the responsibility to protect was 
much more important even in Kosovo than it had been before. I think they really had 
by then really felt like this was an important thing for the United States. 
 
[Author: I think also in your book, I think you mentioned that Kosovo war as a 
humanitarian effort?] 
 
Right, these are not national interests to us, the United States could have just totally 
ignored this and it would have had no impact on the American national interest. So I 
don’t think you can really argue that either Bosnia or Kosovo was done for American 
national security interests because they could have gone on and it wouldn’t have had 
any impact on American national security. 
 
[Author: But how about comparing Bosnia and Kosovo?] 
 
Well I think people had more national security concerns in Bosnia just because it was 
seen as an issue of credibility for NATO. I mean I think Kosovo really was done for 
humanitarian reasons, and I think they also thought it would be easy, so I think that’s 
also partly why they got started on it. And, the other question though for both of 
them is would the United States have been involved in either of them had they not 
been in Europe? I mean that’s a big question because there are conflicts in other parts 
of the world that the United States does not get involved in, and I think Europe being 
an area of special interest to the United States, I think that also did play a role. 
 
[Author: So do you think because Kosovo is in Europe, because compared to 
Rwanda…] 
 
Right. 
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17. How do you think the influence of the actors of foreign policy team on foreign 
policy decision-making? 
 
Well, there were definitely people who wanted to do something, and there were other 
people who didn’t. So in Bosnia for example, Anthony Lake the National Security 
Advisor, really wanted to do something about Bosnia, and I think it took time for him 
to be able to have an impact because I think there were others who weren’t so sure. 
Kosovo, I think Madeleine Albright the Secretary of State was a big person 
promoting the idea of doing something about Kosovo, so I do think that there were 
specific individuals who were very important for pushing this idea that the United 
States should do something. 
 
18. From your perspective, what kind of domestic factors did influence and motivate 
the Clinton administration decision-making on humanitarian interventions in 
Bosnia and Kosovo? For example, Vietnam Syndrome, Congress, media and 
public opinion..etc 
 
Well, so I think that part of the reason why Bosnia took so long was the domestic, the 
fear that there was not going to be domestic support and not wanting another 
Vietnam, and again because it wasn’t so clear that there was a national interest issue 
it took a while. Now as I said, because it starts to get a lot of press attention and it’s 
on the front page and the United States isn’t doing something about it, I think that for 
domestic reasons in fact the United States did have to act in the end in Bosnia. 
Kosovo, you see the, you see the impact of the public most in the decision about how 
to fight the war. The Clinton administration decision to say that in the beginning, 
they were not going to use ground troops in Kosovo and it was just going to be an air 
campaign. That was for domestic political reasons. There was a fear that if they 
started talking about a ground war that people would start thinking about Vietnam. 
 
[Author: But how about Bosnia? Because at the very beginning the Clinton 
administration, I think President Clinton he also didn’t want to…] 
 
Right, that’s correct. Right, because he asked Colin Powell the chairman of the joint 
chiefs of staff, how many troops would be required to do Bosnia. Colin Powell tells 
him, you would need 200,000 American troops and it’s jungle fighting and mountain 
fighting and, yeah, they weren’t going to do it. 
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[Author: So do you think the reason President Clinton didn’t want to put ground 
troops in Bosnia was the same reason why he didn’t want to in Kosovo?] 
 
I don’t think the issue really came up in Bosnia, I don’t really remember it coming up 
in Bosnia. But they were very clear in Kosovo, at the beginning of Kosovo, that they 
were not going to put ground troops in. 
 
19. What did the role of morality in the process of decision-making? Did the pcitures 
of massacre reported by media (esp. CNN effect) stimulate moral conscience and 
moral sense of public opinion and policy-makers? 
 
Well, I don’t think it had that much of an impact because, again, it went for four 
years. So, those pictures were out there for four years and the United States hadn’t 
done anything. I really do think that the United States finally acted because it needed 
to, it needed to get it fixed so that it could move on to other things. And Kosovo of 
course… the big ethnic population movements didn’t take place until after the war 
started, so I don’t think it had, I don’t think the CNN effect was important in Kosovo 
at all. 
 
20. How do you think American power changed following the collapse of the world 
in 1990s? Did the issue of humanitarian intervention challenge the US foreign 
policy-making? Did the structural transformation in the international system and 
new international environment, for instance, globalization and information age, 
after the Cold War influence the role of US in international politics?  
 
Well I think what these cases showed in the 1990s was the United States starting to 
act for humanitarian reasons as long as no Americans were killed. And that’s what 
you start to see during the 1990s, that the military is so powerful that it can do these 
campaigns without losing American soldiers and it can do humanitarian intervention. 
I think had there been significant American casualties then the public wouldn’t have 
supported it because it wasn’t a national interest issue. That’s why for example in 
Somalia in 1993 as soon as a few Americans were killed the US leaves because it 
wasn’t in the national interest, and we don’t really have, you don’t see a national 
interest war until Afghanistan after September 11th, and then the population is 
supportive because the United States had been attacked, but in the 1990s these were 
all, these weren’t national security interest interventions so it was important that the 
United States not have Americans killed in the process. 
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21. How do you think the role of US leadership and its relationship with European 
allies and Russia played on these conflicts?  
 
Well, so in the Bosnia case, in the George HW Bush administration and even I guess 
in the early Clinton years there was a sense that Europe should do something about 
Bosnia, and over time there was a realization that Europe would not do something 
about Bosnia without the United States leading the effort. So that was important in 
Bosnia. In Kosovo it was important to have NATO because the United States was not 
going to be able to get UN Security Council authorization but it wanted to go through 
a multilateral institution for legitimacy reasons. And so NATO was important for 
that. 
 
[Author: But do you think the Kosovo war is also because of the pressure, because 
NATO is going to celebrate I think its 50th…] 
 
Right, its anniversary? Right. No I don’t think there was, I mean the only person who 
was really out there saying the United States needed to do something was Tony Blair, 
from Great Britain. But if the United States hadn’t wanted to do Kosovo I don’t think 
there would have been a huge European outcry. In fact the anniversary made it harder 
because there was a concern at the meetings in April in Washington that the allies 
would be divided as opposed to be united, so it was a huge effort to make sure that 
NATO was united in trying to prevent the, I mean in trying to do the war correctly. 
 
22. Do you think, the US, as the only superpower in the post-Cold War era, should 
take moral responsibility to protect the interests of others? Esp. genocide and 
ethnic cleansing.. 
 
Yeah I think the United States, I think that this notion of the responsibility to…well, 
the responsibility to protect is an important international obligation. So I think the 
international community needs to take seriously this responsibility to protect. Now, 
the problem is if the United States isn’t able and willing to lead the international 
community to support the responsibility to protect, it’s going to be hard to do 
anything because there’s no other country powerful enough to do this. But it’s an 
international community obligation, not a, it’s not something unique to the United 
States. 
 
[Author: But because the United States is a powerful country it’s like a leadership…] 
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Yes, it has to. Absolutely.  
 
23. Should the interests of humanity be considered as a part of national interest and 
placed in the centre of policy-making?  
 
Well I don’t know that it’s, I don’t know that I would say it’s a national interest, I 
would say that it is one of the reasons why the international community should act, 
and I think that the important thing in the 1990s is that previously the notion in the 
international community was that you should not intervene in the affairs of a 
sovereign state, and the notion in the 1990s was if that state was so violating part of 
its internal population that the international community should as a community do 
something about it and not let sovereignty stand in the way, and I think that was an 
important development in the 1990s. But it’s not going to happen all the time and, 
you know, in cases when it’s not in a country’s core national interest it’s going to be 
hard to get action. I mean Darfur for example, the international community should 
act, but if it’s not in the core national security interest of particular countries it’s 
going to be hard to get that action.  
 
24. Of course, the US could not intervene in every case of humanitarian crisis. Did 
the US during the 1990s have any criteria or strategy for military interventions? 
For example, towards pragmatic foreign policy based on ‘cost/benefit analysis’? 
 
Not that I know of. I mean there was an effort, there was an effort in 1993 or so to 
have a sort of set of criteria laid out for, for intervention. And in fact the people who 
wrote that argue that that’s one of the reasons why the United States did not intervene 
in Rwanda but I don’t think there had been really a widely discussed plan about 
when the United States would or would not intervene or what kind of checklist there 
would be. I mean again there was something that was done in 93 and there are those 
who argue that that was looked at and, or at least that that was the basis for not 
intervening in Rwanda but I don’t know how widely discussed that was. 
 
25. Can the United States keep its position of leadership in the international order if 
it does not act in ways which are consisent with its shared values? 
 
You mean in terms of either at home or, you know, torture? Those kinds of things? 
 
[Author: I think, yeah, in international system, yeah.] 
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Well hopefully the United States will act in a way that’s consistent with its values but 
sometimes it does not. And, that is a problem. I mean, it’s a problem for them trying 
to act on the basis of values because then countries accuse it of being hypocritical 
and not, why does it act this way in one case but then it doesn’t act in accordance 
with its own values in other cases. I think that those are imperfections that are 
unfortunate but it’s hard to…but it is important for the United States, I mean that’s 
why these issues like the torture issues are so important in the American political 
debate, because if the United States is engaging in torture then that makes it harder 
for the United States to prevent other countries from engaging in torture. 
 
26. Why was the Clinton administration slow to respond to the Bosnian crisis but 
quick to respond to the Kosovo conflict? 
 
Well I think, so it was slow in Bosnia because it was worried about getting involved 
in another Vietnam, and because it wasn’t clearly in America’s national interest there 
was no sort of compelling, we have to go do this, and concern about public…lack of 
public support. And the reason the United States acted more quickly in Kosovo was 
because after the Bosnia experience went so well in finally acting there was a sense 
that Kosovo would be over quickly. I think if they had known that Kosovo was going 
to be, you know, as long as it was going to be, I don’t know that they would have 
done it so quickly. 
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